Mathieu Parenti

Monopolistic competition: Beyond the constant elasticity of substitution

We propose a model of monopolistic competition with additive preferences and variable marginal costs. Using the concept of “relative love for variety,” we provide a full characterization of the free-entry equilibrium.When the relative love for variety increases with individual consumption, the market generates pro-competitive effects. When it decreases, the market mimics anti-competitive behavior. The constant elasticity of substitution is the only case in which all competitive effects are washed out. We also show that our results hold true when the economy involves several sectors, firms are heterogeneous, and preferences are given by the quadratic utility and the translog.

Toward a Theory of Monopolistic Competition

We propose a general model of monopolistic competition, which encompasses existing models while being flexible enough to take into account new demand and competition features. The basic tool we use to study the market outcome is the elasticity of substitution at a symmetric consumption pattern, which depends on both the per capita consumption and the total mass of varieties. We impose intuitive conditions on this function to guarantee the existence and uniqueness of a free-entry equilibrium. Comparative statics with respect to population size, GDP per capita and productivity shock are characterized through necessary and sufficient conditions. Finally, we show how our approach can be generalized to the case of a multisector economy and extended to cope with heterogeneous firms and consumers.

Knocking on Tax Haven's Door: Multinational Firms and Transfer Pricing

This paper analyzes the transfer pricing of multinational firms. Intrafirm prices may systematically deviate from arm’s-length prices for two motives: pricing to market and tax avoidance. Using French firm-level data on arm’s-length and intrafirm export prices, we find that the sensitivity of intrafirm prices to foreign taxes is reinforced once we control for pricing-to-market determinants. Most important, we find no evidence of tax avoidance if we disregard tax haven destinations. Tax avoidance through transfer pricing is economically sizable. The bulk of this loss is driven by the exports of 450 firms to ten tax havens.

On the Dilution of Market Power

We show that a market involving a handful of large-scale firms and a myriad of small-scale firms may give rise to different types of market structure, ranging from monopoly or oligopoly to monopolistic competition through new types of market structure. In particular, we find conditions under which the free entry and exit of small firms incentivizes big firms to sell their varieties at the monopolistically competitive prices, behaving as if in monopolistic competition. We call this result the dilution of market power. The structure of preferences is the main driver for a specific market structure to emerge as an equilibrium outcome.