Matt Andrews

Revisiting economies of size in American education: are we any closer to a consensus?

Abstract Consolidation remains a common policy recommendation of state governments looking to improve efficiency, especially in rural school districts. However, state policies encouraging consolidation have increasingly been challenged as fostering learning environments that hurt student performance. Does the empirical research on economies of size support for this policy? The objective of this paper is to define the factors affecting economies of size and update the literature since 1980. The best of the cost function studies suggest that sizeable potential cost savings in instructional and administrative costs may exist by moving from a very small district (500 or fewer pupils) to a district with ca 2000–4000 pupils. The findings from production function studies of schools are less consistent, but there is some evidence that moderately sized elementary schools (300–500 students) and high schools (600–900 students) may optimally balance economies of size with the potential negative effects of large schools. Since program evaluation research on school consolidation is limited, it is time for researchers on both sides of this debate to make good evaluation research on consolidation a high priority. In addition, the potential diseconomies of size in large central city school districts needs increased attention in academic research.

The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development

Developing countries commonly adopt reforms to improve their governments yet they usually fail to produce more functional and effective governments. Andrews argues that reforms often fail to make governments better because they are introduced as signals to gain short-term support. These signals introduce unrealistic best practices that do not fit developing country contexts and are not considered relevant by implementing agents. The result is a set of new forms that do not function. However, there are realistic solutions emerging from institutional reforms in some developing countries. Lessons from these experiences suggest that reform limits, although challenging to adopt, can be overcome by focusing change on problem solving through an incremental process that involves multiple agents.

Escaping Capability Traps Through Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA)

Many development initiatives fail to improve performance because they promote isomorphic mimicry—governments change what they look like, not what they do. This article proposes a new approach to doing development, Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA), which contrasts with standard approaches. PDIA focuses on solving locally nominated and prioritized performance problems (instead of transplanting “best practice” solutions). PDIA encourages positive deviance and experimentation (instead of requiring that agents implement policies as designed). PDIA creates feedback loops that facilitate rapid learning (instead of lagged learning from ex post evaluation). PDIA engages many agents to create viable, relevant interventions (instead of depending on external experts).

The Good Governance Agenda: Beyond Indicators without Theory

Effective government matters, but what is it? Good governance indicators go some way to provide a definition, but how much do they say about what effectiveness is, why this is so, and how it matters to development? This article argues that much work on the good governance agenda suggests a one-best-way model, ostensibly of an idyllic, developed country government: Sweden or Denmark on a good day, perhaps. The implied model lacks consistency, however, seems inappropriate for use in the development dialogue and is not easily replicated. In short, it resembles a set of well meaning but problematic proverbs. The good governance picture of effective government is not only of limited use in development policy but also threatens to promote dangerous isomorphism, institutional dualism and “flailing states”. It imposes an inappropriate model of government that “kicks away the ladder” that todays effective governments climbed to reach their current states. The models major weakness lies in the lack of an effective underlying theoretical framework to assist in understanding government roles and structures in development. A framework is needed before we measure government effectiveness or propose specific models of what government should look like. Given the evidence of multiple states of development, the idea of a one-best-way model actually seems very problematic.

Looking like a state: Techniques of persistent failure in state capability for implementation

Abstract In many nations today the state has little capability to carry out even basic functions like security, policing, regulation or core service delivery. Enhancing this capability, especially in fragile states, is a long-term task: countries like Haiti or Liberia will take many decades to reach even a moderate capability country like India, and millennia to reach the capability of Singapore. Short-term programmatic efforts to build administrative capability in these countries are thus unlikely to be able to demonstrate actual success, yet billions of dollars continue to be spent on such activities. What techniques enable states to ‘buy time’ to enable reforms to work, to mask non-accomplishment, or actively to resist or deflect the internal and external pressures for improvement? How do donor and recipient countries manage to engage in the logics of ‘development’ for so long and yet consistently acquire so little administrative capability? We document two such techniques: (a) systemic isomorphic mimicry, wherein the outward forms (appearances, structures) of functional states and organisations elsewhere are adopted to camouflage a persistent lack of function; and (b) premature load bearing, in which indigenous learning, the legitimacy of change and the support of key political constituencies are undercut by the routine placement of highly unrealistic expectations on fledging systems. We conclude with some suggestions for sabotaging these techniques.

Authority, acceptance, ability and performance‐based budgeting reforms

Performance‐based budgeting (PBB) is a prominent reform around the world, and has been in prominence in the USA for over a decade now. Evidence presented in this article suggests, however, that the reform is commonly implemented in a limited fashion. This raises the questions, “Why do few states adopt PBB meaningfully?” and “What needs to be done to ensure meaningful adoption?”. In addressing these questions with reference to case studies of state performance‐based budgeting, this article suggests that a three‐factor model is useful in thinking about PBB implementation. In this model authority, acceptance and ability intersect to determine the “reform space” a government has for PBB. In most governments this reform space seems rather constrained.

The Impact of Traditional Budgeting Systems on the Effectiveness of Performance‐Based Budgeting: A Different Viewpoint on Recent Findings

Abstract This article expands on recent research into performance‐based budgeting (PBB) initiatives in the states. It seeks to explain survey findings showing that, while most states are implementing PBB reforms, few show any evidence of direct behavioral changes resulting from such reforms—either in terms of the development of, or response to, new performance‐based incentives, or allocations that are linked to performance. The explanation offered is that PBB approaches are implemented in addition to traditional approaches, resulting in the traditional approaches dominating PBB. In order to influence behavior, PBB reforms should be implemented as replacements of, not additions to, pre‐existing budgetary regimes.

Which Organizational Attributes Are Amenable to External Reform? An Empirical Study of African Public Financial Management

ABSTRACT Many externally motivated public sector reforms produce less change than expected. This article argues that we should expect limited reform results in respect of certain organizational attributes. Applying institutional theory on isomorphism, the argument is simply that reforms are harder where they influence organizational characteristics that (i) are difficult to observe externally, (ii) are core to the organization, and (iii) involve actors with whom the externally defined change agenda is unlikely to resonate normatively. These arguments are tested in an analysis of Public Financial Management (PFM) reform in Africa, where evidence is supportive. The article contributes to public management literature, and comparative studies in particular, by applying a well-suited theory to the study of public sector change. The approach and findings should be of particular interest to the development community, shedding light on why reforms routinely underperform—in PFM and beyond, extending to topics like externally driven nation building.

Isomorphism and the Limits to African Public Financial Management Reform

Many reform results fall below expectations in the development arena, especially in the public sector. Do the reforms just need more time to work better, or should we adjust our expectations? In addressing this question, the current article draws from isomorphism to think about potential limits to reform in developing countries. The theory is considered appropriate for thinking about change processes in the developing world. It presents change as motivated more by the need for legitimacy than efficiency and, in identifying the mechanics of change, points to potential limits of such change: to organizational dimensions that are visible, peripheral and involves concentrated sets of professional agents. These limiting factors are applied to a study of public financial management reform in 31 African countries which shows that some dimensions do appear more limited to isomorphic influence than others. Isomorphic change may indeed face natural limits, something the development community should consider in thinking about how it goes about facilitating and motivating reform in its client countries.

“Getting it Together”… or Not. An Analysis of the Early Period of Tanzania's Move Towards Adopting Performance Management Systems

Abstract Budget reform fits into a broad context of public sector improvement in Tanzania. This article discusses the progress in reforms up to the end of 2002 and attempts to explain such progress. The discussion indicates that while there have been many steps forward, overall reform progress has been slow. Two approaches to explaining this are presented. The first suggests that the Tanzanian case is a prime example of a reform “work in progress,” with reformers choosing a measured, gradual approach that accommodates necessary improvements in capacity and the development of reform structures and coalitions along the way. The second approach suggests that reform implementation has not been quite so purposeful, and that its slow pace is more a function of problems experienced and not sufficiently dealt with, including capacity limitations, varying reform support and will, and problematic reform coordination. The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the positions of the World Bank.