Matt E. Ryan

ALLOCATING INFECTION: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE SWINE FLU (H1N1) VACCINE

Previous research has isolated the effect of “congressional dominance” in explaining bureaucracy‐related outcomes. This analysis extends the concept of congressional dominance to the allocation of H1N1, or swine flu, vaccine doses. States with Democratic United States Representatives on the relevant House oversight committee received roughly 60,000 additional doses per legislator during the initial allocation period, though this political advantage dissipated after the first 3 weeks of vaccine distribution. As a result political factors played a role in determining vaccine allocation only when the vaccine was in particularly short supply. At‐risk groups identified by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), such as younger age groups and first responders, do not receive more vaccine doses, and in fact receive slightly fewer units of vaccine.

Information effects in major league baseball betting markets

Previous studies point to a generally efficient baseball betting market with no profitable betting strategies. However, failure to consider the time of year in which the bets are placed neglects differences in available information throughout the season. This analysis largely confirms the general efficiency of the major league baseball betting market by existing measures; however, incorporating the time of the year in which the bet is made generates persistent profitable betting strategies. The process by which information impacts returns is considered; increasing difficulties in determining the true favourite likely play the largest role, while assessing the exact favourite underdog relationship also has an impact.

Electoral Pressures and the Legal System: Friends or Foes?

Decisions made within the legal system are typically viewed as being impartial informed only by the testimony and evidence presented and legal precedent. For this reason, many scholars treat legal decisions as exogenous events, that is, that they are independent of preexisting conditions (see, for example, Baicker and Gordon 2006). However, political scientists and legal analysts have long understood that in many cases factors outside what is presented in the courtroom affect the outcomes of legal cases.1 The race, gender, and political affiliation of individuals involved in the legal process have all been found to play a role in determining legal outcomes.2

Do Relief Pitching and Remaining Games Create Moral Hazard Problems in Major League Baseball

Previous research neglects to consider additional sources of moral hazard in baseball beyond the designated hitter (DH) rule. Using a game-level analysis similar to Bradbury and Drinen (2006), the authors find that an additional National League (NL) relief pitcher leads to more hit batsmen than an additional American League (AL) relief pitcher and that the number of games remaining in the NL has a smaller positive effect on the number of hit batsmen than the number of games remaining in the AL, though the latter relationship is economically small. Both results, however, imply additional avenues by which moral hazard emerges.