Matteo Bianchin

Design in mind

Research on the relationship between design and the creation of knowledge is a relatively recent phenomenon. In architecture, for instance, it was not so long ago that designers tended to view knowledge with disdain, as a hindrance to unfettered creativity or an encapsulation of “freeze-dried prejudices.”1 Recently, however, the American Institute of Architects (AIA) devoted the December 2004 issue of its AIA Journal entirely to the theme of knowledge, which strongly suggests that times are changing. Increasingly, the act of designing is considered to be or involve some kind of knowledge production.2 This directly follows from the type of knowledge designing relies on, which is practicebased and tacit,3 (i.e., embedded within the very act of designing).4 On the other hand, it is possible—at least in a rough and ready way—to appreciate the distinction between the aim, or intention, of producing knowledge and other aims,5 such as designing an object or a building. To state it a bit more bluntly, a client typically hires an architect to design a building, not to produce knowledge. Why then is it so difficult to set clear boundaries between design and scholarly research? Questions about the relationship between both are far from new. According to Nigel Cross, they reappear about every forty years,6 and have been written about by many authors before. Already in 1973, Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber pointed out the difference between the kind of problems designers and planners deal with and those that scientists handle.7 More recently, Johannes Eekels and Norbert Roozenburg made a methodological comparison of the structures of design and research in engineering, and concluded that both are strongly interwoven and mutually dependent, yet fundamentally different.8 Although it seems time to move on from making all sorts of comparisons between design and research, this paper tries to shed more light on the issue from a conceptual and psychological point of view. To this end, it calls in the philosophy of mind—rather than the philosophy of science, as is usually the case9 —and more precisely the notion of intentionality. Instead of considering design as a mix of knowledge creation and application, the process is decomposed into distinct yet interacting mental acts, in which designers establish relationships with (objects in) the world. A detailed analysis of this relationship forms the basis for a nuanced, yet fundamental, comparison with

Reciprocity, Individuals and Community Remarks on Phenomenology, Social Theory and Politics

The contribution of Husserl’s phenomenology to the foundations of social and political theory can be appraised at both the methodological and the normative level. First, it makes intersubjective interaction central to the constitution of social reality. Second, it stresses reciprocity as a constitutive feature of intersubjectivity. In this context, individuals can be seen to be both ‘constituting’ and ‘constituted by’ their participation in communities, under a constraint of mutual recognition as intentional agents. This view is in no way atomistic, as it allows individual identities to be constituted intersubjectively; still, it remains individualistic, since it does not permit the ontological independence of collective entities. At the epistemological level, this provides a foundation of methodological individualism; at the normative level, it suggests that social order is a deliberative task and political legitimacy ultimately rests on moral principles of reciprocity and equal respect.

Simulation and the We-Mode. A Cognitive Account of Plural First Persons

In this article, I argue that a capacity for mindreading conceived along the line of simulation theory provides the cognitive basis for forming we-centric representations of actions and goals. This explains the plural first personal stance displayed by we-intentions in terms of the underlying cognitive processes performed by individual minds, while preserving the idea that they cannot be analyzed in terms of individual intentional states. The implication for social ontology is that this makes sense of the plural subjectivity of joint actions without making group agents require either a corporate body or the unity of consciousness.

From joint attention to communicative action Some remarks on critical theory, social ontology and cognitive science

In this article I consider the relevance of Tomasello’s work on social cognition to the theory of communicative action. I argue that some revisions are needed to cope with Tomasello’s results, but they do not affect the core of the theory. Moreover, they arguably reinforce both its explanatory power and the plausibility of its normative claims. I proceed in three steps. First, I compare and contrast Tomasello’s views on the ontogeny of human social cognition with the main tenets of Habermas’ theory of communicative action. Second, I suggest how to reframe the role of language in the theory of communicative rationality in order to integrate the two theories. Third, I show how this affects social ontology, supporting the view that the construction of social reality is normatively constrained by the bounds of reason.

Siding with modernity

I started participating in the Prague conference in 1999 following an invitation by Alessandro Ferrara. To me, it felt like a wonderful possibility to access what in my view were the most prominent international debates and ongoing research in critical theory and the philosophy of social science. In this respect, a few words must be spent about the role Sandro played in connecting the relatively small Italian community of critical theorists with a broader international context. Critical theory was never mainstream in Italy, in spite of the fact that the Frankfurt School had been slowly assimilated both by the academic culture and the political culture of the left, though with some significant caution. Only in the 1990s, however, a group of scholars started meeting in a workshop on a regular basis in Gallarate, near Milan. The group was academically scattered, yet deeply committed to critical theory and kept together by a shared feeling of genuine enthusiasm and intellectual integrity. All this would have been confined to the local level, however, unless some work had been done to connect it with a broader context. The Prague conference, the journal Philosophy & Social Criticism and of course the personal connections and intellectual exchanges involved made it possible for a generation to grow out of the most obvious limitations and parochial routines affecting national academic cultures. At the time when I joined the Prague conference I had just finished my PhD at the University of Venice and was about to start a Marie Curie fellowship in Leuven. I cannot help remember that I used to share an apartment in Prague with Massimo Rosati, at that time a very young yet astonishingly mature scholar. We were both excited and intimidated by the impressive record of the participants in the conference and by the idea that its history went back to the years when critical theory took the shape we had become familiar with during our graduate and postgraduate studies. This feeling in a sense appeared to be in contrast with the friendly atmosphere and relaxed, unhierarchical mood dominating in the conference. I have the impression that this atmosphere has been preserved despite the conference’s growing bigger and its format having deeply changed over time.

Fair by design. Addressing the paradox of inclusive design approaches

Abstract Inclusive design approaches like universal design prescribe addressing the needs of the widest possible audience in order to consider human differences. Taking differences seriously, however, may imply that “the widest possible audience” is severely restricted. In confronting this paradox, we recruit Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness. Applying Rawls’ principles to universal design implies that users derive which design allows for equitable use by deliberating under a veil of ignorance concerning their own capacities or limitations. Rather than addressing everyone’s needs, being designed universally then means matching what everyone would choose under the condition sketched. Since this can hardly apply to single artefacts, we suggest considering the social distribution of usability as the proper domain of fairness in design instead. Under this reading, just design concerns how usability is distributed across relevant users. Differences in usability are acceptable if overall usability for the worst offs is maximized.