Matthew Finifter
University of California, Berkeley
Network
Latest external collaboration on country level. Dive into details by clicking on the dots.
Publication
Featured researches published by Matthew Finifter.
security and privacy in smartphones and mobile devices | 2011
Adrienne Porter Felt; Matthew Finifter; Erika Chin; Steve Hanna; David A. Wagner
Mobile malware is rapidly becoming a serious threat. In this paper, we survey the current state of mobile malware in the wild. We analyze the incentives behind 46 pieces of iOS, Android, and Symbian malware that spread in the wild from 2009 to 2011. We also use this data set to evaluate the effectiveness of techniques for preventing and identifying mobile malware. After observing that 4 pieces of malware use root exploits to mount sophisticated attacks on Android phones, we also examine the incentives that cause non-malicious smartphone tinkerers to publish root exploits and survey the availability of root exploits.
european symposium on research in computer security | 2011
Joel Weinberger; Prateek Saxena; Devdatta Akhawe; Matthew Finifter; Richard Shin; Dawn Song
While most research on XSS defense has focused on techniques for securing existing applications and re-architecting browser mechanisms, sanitization remains the industry-standard defense mechanism. By streamlining and automating XSS sanitization, web application frameworks stand in a good position to stop XSS but have received little research attention. In order to drive research on web frameworks, we systematically study the security of the XSS sanitization abstractions frameworks provide. We develop a novel model of the web browser and characterize the challenges of XSS sanitization. Based on the model, we systematically evaluate the XSS abstractions in 14 major commercially-used web frameworks. We find that frameworks often do not address critical parts of the XSS conundrum. We perform an empirical analysis of 8 large web applications to extract the requirements of sanitization primitives from the perspective of realworld applications. Our study shows that there is a wide gap between the abstractions provided by frameworks and the requirements of applications.
computer and communications security | 2008
Matthew Finifter; Adrian Mettler; Naveen Sastry; David A. Wagner
Proving that particular methods within a code base are functionally pure--deterministic and side-effect free--would aid verification of security properties including function invertibility, reproducibility of computation, and safety of untrusted code execution. Until now it has not been possible to automatically prove a method is functionally pure within a high-level imperative language in wide use, such as Java. We discuss a technique to prove that methods are functionally pure by writing programs in a subset of Java called Joe-E; a static verifier ensures that programs fall within the subset. In Joe-E, pure methods can be trivially recognized from their method signature. To demonstrate the practicality of our approach, we refactor an AES library, an experimental voting machine implementation, and an HTML parser to use our techniques. We prove that their top-level methods are verifiably pure and show how this provides high-level security guarantees about these routines. Our approach to verifiable purity is an attractive way to permit functional-style reasoning about security properties while leveraging the familiarity, convenience, and legacy code of imperative languages.
international conference on engineering secure software and systems | 2013
Anne Edmundson; Brian Holtkamp; Emanuel Rivera; Matthew Finifter; Adrian Mettler; David A. Wagner
With the rise of the web as a dominant application platform, web security vulnerabilities are of increasing concern. Ideally, the web application development process would detect and correct these vulnerabilities before they are released to the public. This research aims to quantify the effectiveness of software developers at security code review as well as determine the variation in effectiveness among web developers. We hired 30 developers to conduct a manual code review of a small web application. The web application supplied to developers had seven known vulnerabilities, including three different types: Cross-Site Scripting, Cross-Site Request Forgery, and SQL Injection. Our findings include: (1) none of the subjects found all confirmed vulnerabilities, (2) more experience does not necessarily mean that the reviewer will be more accurate or effective, and (3) reports of false vulnerabilities were significantly correlated with reports of valid vulnerabilities.
usenix conference on hot topics in security | 2012
Adrienne Porter Felt; Serge Egelman; Matthew Finifter; Devdatta Akhawe; David A. Wagner
network and distributed system security symposium | 2010
Matthew Finifter; Joel Weinberger; Adam Barth
usenix security symposium | 2013
Matthew Finifter; Devdatta Akhawe; David A. Wagner
usenix conference on web application development | 2011
Matthew Finifter; David A. Wagner
Archive | 2011
Joel Weinberger; Prateek Saxena; Devdatta Akhawe; Matthew Finifter; Richard Shin
computer and communications security | 2011
Adrienne Porter Felt; Matthew Finifter; Joel Weinberger; David A. Wagner