Matthew Flinders

The Politics of Public–Private Partnerships

Since 1 May 1997 the Labour government in the United Kingdom has implemented a number of public–private partnerships (PPPs) as a central tool of governance within their wider modernisation agenda. To date, the introduction of PPPs has largely been evaluated through conceptual lenses that emphasise either the administrative, managerial, financial or technical dimensions of this reform strategy. This article seeks to complement this wider literature by arguing that PPPs raise a host of political issues and tensions that have largely been overlooked. Five specific themes are set out in order to provide a framework or organising perspective. These are: efficiency; risk; complexity; accountability; and governance and the future of state projects. The main conclusion of the article is that PPPs represent a Faustian bargain in that forms of PPP may deliver efficiency gains and service improvements in some policy areas but these benefits may involve substantial political and democratic costs.

Governance in Whitehall

Governance theory raises conceptual and theoretical questions about the coordination of complex social systems and the evolving role of the state within that process. A central aspect of the governance debate focuses on the ability of national governments to address salient social issues. This article examines the British Labour governments’ attempts to facilitate cross-departmental inter-organizational collaboration within Whitehall in an attempt to develop innovative responses to seemingly intractable social problems. The government’s desire and strategy to increase its capacity to orchestrate ‘joined-up’ government can be interpreted as both an acceptance and a response to the challenges of modern governance. The article locates the structural, procedural and cultural responses to this challenge within the theoretical and analytical framework of governance theory. It concludes by suggesting that meaningful change in the way public policy is designed and implemented may well demand a more deep seated reappraisal of the structure of Whitehall and the dominant values of the British political elite than is currently anticipated.

The politics of accountability in the modern state

Part 1 History and theory: reinventing accountability. Part 2 Accountability models and case study analysis: parliamentary accountability parliamentary accountability and the Home Office judicial accountability judicial accountability in the Home Office managerial accountability and the contract state managerial accountability and the Home Office. Part 3 Freedom of information and conclusion: the executive morality and inverted conventions - ministerial responsibiity and freedom of information understanding the politics of accountability.

Distributed public governance in the European Union

This article examines the role, powers and future of independent European agencies as an aspect of the current debate surrounding European governance. It argues that the design and implementation of independent agencies in the EU should not be seen as a construct of apolitical administrative engineering or integration but should be interpreted as a central component of political debates regarding the future constitutional structure of the EU vis-à-vis member states. In order to demonstrate the validity of this argument, the article reflects upon five themes (growth, co-ordination, accountability, depoliticization and power) which have arisen as central issues in relation to delegated governance at the national level. These themes are analysed in order to assess the main lessons that could usefully be considered during this critical period of constitutional reflection and design for the EU.

Multi-Level Governance and the Study of the British State

The British State is currently being restructured through a process of constitutional and institutional reform. This process contributes to other changes that are creating an increasingly complex range of inter-governmental relationships of shifting and opaque jurisdictional boundaries together with a redefinition of state-society relations. In light of this, observers are increasingly making reference to an emergent system of ‘multi-level governance’ within Britain. The focus of this article is conceptual. The aim is to assess the value of multi-level governance as an analytical framework that can contribute to understanding the changing nature of the British State. In doing so, we identify and apply the two models or types of multi-level governance developed by Hooghe and Marks (2004). We conclude that while multi-level governance has its limitations, it has great potential as a contrastive concept when juxtaposed with the Westminster Model.

Mind the Gap: Political Analysis, Public Expectations and the Parliamentary Decline Thesis

The parliamentary decline thesis formed the dominant theory and narrative of legislative behaviour and capacity during the 20th century. And yet in analytical terms the thesis provides a relatively blunt instrument for dissecting complex socio-political relationships. The bluntness of this tool has not been remedied by the lazy thinking and unconscious theorising that has too often dominated research in this field. The central argument of this article is that the dominant public, media and academic perception of an eviscerated and sidelined parliament provides a misleading caricature of a more complex institution. Moreover the constant promotion and reinforcement of this caricature by scholars arguably perpetuates and fuels public disengagement and disillusionment with politics.

Majoritarian Democracy in Britain: New Labour and the Constitution

In May 1997 the British electorate voted a Labour government into office after 18 years of Conservative administration. This government has subsequently enacted a large number of constitutional reforms. However, a debate exists in relation to the degree to which, taken together, these reforms amount to a fundamental shift in the nature of British democracy. This article utilises Arend Lijpharts work on patterns of democracy in order to provide a conceptual lens through which New Labours constitutional reforms can be analysed in terms of representing either a minor or major shift from a traditionally majoritarian to more consensus-orientated system. The article concludes that, although significant, the actual degree of reform in Britain is less radical than is commonly assumed: although New Labour is committed to far-reaching constitutional reform in principle it has been far less committed in practice.

Shifting the Balance? Parliament, the Executive and the British Constitution

This article examines the paradoxes of parliamentary reform. Focusing mainly on the House of Commons, the first section highlights the contradictory roles of parliament and utilizes a distinction between the ‘Whig’ and ‘Peelite’ conceptions of the Whitehall-Westminster model to demonstrate the ambiguities and tensions that exist. This framework is then applied to a case study of parliamentary reform under Labour governments since 1997 in the second section. The third section emphasizes that parliament cannot be studied in isolation. It suggests that the British constitution is at a critical historical, political and institutional juncture in which a number of inter-linked emerging agendas are altering the relationship between parliament and the executive. The significance of these emerging agendas is that, unlike internal reform of parliament, they are largely beyond the executives control. The combined influence of these factors is likely to impel the executive, at some point, to support a coherent and far-reaching reappraisal of the structure, role and powers of parliament. Consequently the degree to which Britain (de facto) remains a parliamentary state will be subject to intense and increasing debate.

Daring to be a Daniel The Pathology of Politicized Accountability in a Monitory Democracy

This article attempts to make a bold and provocative argument not just about the state of accountability research as a field of inquiry but also about the gap that has apparently emerged between the governors and the governed (and the professional responsibilities of scholars beyond academe in terms of public engagement). It emphasizes that “too much accountability can be as problematic as too little” and asks whether it is possible that the transition from “representative” to “monitory” democracy, which is reflected in an increasingly dense and aggressive “accountability industry” (constitutional watchdogs, audit processes, ethical guardians, investigatory agencies, regulatory boards, freedom of information legislation, quasi-judicial commissions, etc.), has actually contributed to the erosion of public support for politicians, political processes, and political institutions? It therefore seeks to challenge a number of “self-evident truths” and dares to be a little brave, to fly some kites, and risk the inevitable misunderstanding and deliberate criticism that attempting to say something different entails.

Blame Games and Climate Change: Accountability, Multi-Level Governance and Carbon Management

Research Highlights and Abstract This article provides the first detailed and evidence-based account of the coalition governments approach to transport-related carbon management. It exposes the existence of a ‘governance vacuum’ between the statutory target and a very weak devolved implementation system (i.e. ‘fuzzy governance’ and ‘fuzzy accountability’). Research in four major city regions reveals a systemic switch from an emphasis on carbon management and reduction towards economic growth and job creation. Officials within the policy design and delivery chain emphasise the manner in which the demands of democratic politics tend to frustrate meaningful policy change. A general demand by actors at the local level not for the discretions delivered by localism but for a more robust and centrally managed—even statutory—governance framework. The Climate Change Act 2008 received global acclaim for embedding an ambitious set of targets for the reduction of carbon emissions in legislation. This article explores the policies and institutional frameworks in place to deliver transport-related carbon reductions as part of the subsequent Carbon Plan. A detailed methodology involving institutional mapping, interviews and focus groups combined with a theoretical approach that combines the theory of multi-level governance with the literature on ‘blame avoidance’ serves to reveal a complex system of ‘fuzzy governance’ and ‘fuzzy accountability’. Put simply, it reveals there are no practical sub-national implementation levers for achieving the statutory targets. Apart from symbolic or rhetorical commitments, the emphasis of policy-makers at all levels in the delivery chain has switched from carbon management and reduction to economic growth and job creation. This raises fresh research questions about the pathologies of democratic competition and future responses to the climate change challenge.