Matthew J. Brown

Values in science beyond underdetermination and inductive risk

Proponents of the value ladenness of science rely primarily on arguments from underdetermination or inductive risk, which share the premise that we should only consider values where the evidence runs out or leaves uncertainty; they adopt a criterion of lexical priority of evidence over values. The motivation behind lexical priority is to avoid reaching conclusions on the basis of wishful thinking rather than good evidence. This is a real concern, however, that giving lexical priority to evidential considerations over values is a mistake and unnecessary for avoiding the wishful thinking. Values have a deeper role to play in science.

John Dewey’s Logic of Science

In recent years, pragmatism in general and John Dewey in particular have been of increasing interest to philosophers of science. Dewey’s work provides an interesting alternative package of views to those which derive from the logical empiricists and their critics, on problems of both traditional and more recent vintage. Dewey’s work ought to be of special interest to recent philosophers of science committed to the program of analyzing “science in practice.” The core of Dewey’s philosophy of science is his theory of inquiry—what he called “logic.” There is a major lacuna in the literature on this point, however: no contemporary philosophers of science have engaged with Dewey’s logical theory, and scholars of Dewey’s logic have rarely made connections with philosophy of science. This article aims to fill this gap, to correct some significant errors in the interpretation of key ideas in Dewey’s logical theory, and to show how Dewey’s logic provides resources for a philosophy of science.

Genuine Problems and the Significance of Science

This paper addresses the political constraints on science through a pragmatist critique of Philip Kitcher’s account of “well-ordered science.” A central part of Kitcher’s account is his analysis of the significance of items of scientific research: contextual and purpose-relative scientific significance replaces mere truth as the aim of inquiry. I raise problems for Kitcher’s account and argue for an alternative, drawing on Peirce’s and Dewey’s theories of problem-solving inquiry. I conclude by suggesting some consequences for understanding the proper conduct of science in a democracy.

Introduction: Reappraising Paul Feyerabend

This volume is devoted to a reappraisal of the philosophy of Paul Feyerabend. It has four aims. The first is to reassess his already well-known work from the 1960s and 1970s in light of contemporary developments in the history and philosophy of science. The second is to explore themes in his neglected later work, including recently published and previously unavailable writings. The third is to assess the contributions that Feyerabend can make to contemporary debate, on topics such as perspectivism, realism, and political philosophy of science. The fourth and final aim is to reconsider Feyerabends place within the history of philosophy of science in the light of new scholarship.

John Dewey's pragmatist alternative to the belief-acceptance dichotomy.

Defenders of value-free science appeal to cognitive attitudes as part of a wedge strategy, to mark a distinction between science proper and the uses of science for decision-making, policy, etc. Distinctions between attitudes like belief and acceptance have played an important role in defending the value-free ideal. In this paper, I will explore John Deweys pragmatist philosophy of science as an alternative to the philosophical framework the wedge strategy rests on. Dewey does draw significant and useful distinctions between different sorts of cognitive attitudes taken by inquirers, but none can be used to support the wedge strategy.

The Disconnect Problem, Scientific Authority, and Climate Policy

The disconnect problem arises wherever there is ongoing and severe discordance between the scientific assessment of a politically relevant issue, and the politics and legislation of said issue. Here, we focus on the disconnect problem as it arises in the case of climate change, diagnosing a failure to respect the necessary tradeoff between authority and autonomy within a public institution like science. After assessing the problematic deployment of scientific authority in this arena, we offer suggestions for how to mitigate climate change’s particular disconnect problem, as well as more general proposals for reforming science advising.

The Democratic Control of the Scientific Control of Politics

I discuss two popular but apparently contradictory theses: T1. The democratic control of science – the aims and activities of science should be subject to public scrutiny via democratic processes of representation and participation. T2. The scientific control of policy, i.e. technocracy – political processes should be problem-solving pursuits determined by the methods and results of science and technology.

The Roles of Implicit Understanding of Engineering Ethics in Student Teams’ Discussion

Following previous work that shows engineering students possess different levels of understanding of ethics—implicit and explicit—this study focuses on how students’ implicit understanding of engineering ethics influences their team discussion process, in cases where there is significant divergence between their explicit and implicit understanding. We observed student teams during group discussions of the ethical issues involved in their engineering design projects. Through the micro-scale discourse analysis based on cognitive ethnography, we found two possible ways in which implicit understanding influenced the discussion. In one case, implicit understanding played the role of intuitive ethics—an intuitive judgment followed by reasoning. In the other case, implicit understanding played the role of ethical insight, emotionally guiding the direction of the discussion. In either case, however, implicit understanding did not have a strong influence, and the conclusion of the discussion reflected students’ explicit understanding. Because students’ implicit understanding represented broader social implication of engineering design in both cases, we suggest to take account of students’ relevant implicit understanding in engineering education, to help students become more socially responsible engineers.

A Review of The Cambridge Companion to Dewey

It is no exaggeration to say that John Dewey is the most historically important American philosopher and educational theorist, as well as an important figure in the history of psychology. His central concept of human nature as actively engaged, biological and ecological, teleologically structured, socioculturally constituted, and deeply technological is of broad and lasting importance. The goal of the Cambridge Companions to Philosophy series is to “serve as a reference work for students and non-specialists,” as well as “to dispel the intimidation such readers often feel when faced with the work of a difficult and challenging thinker” (p. i). The Cambridge Companion to Dewey is uneven in executing this mission. Some of the core topics for understanding Dewey’s philosophy—epistemology, logic, inquiry, and education—are unsatisfactory as overviews. (James E. Tiles’s essay on “experimental empiricism” is an exception.) Some readers will also be disappointed to discover no significant discussion of Dewey’s empirical work in psychology or education (except as mentioned briefly in Robert Westbrook’s biographical chapter). Nevertheless, the volume includes some very good essays, especially the essays on mind, action, and values.

On What Quine Is - A BOOK REVIEW OF The Cambridge Companion to Quine edited by Roger F. Gibson Jr.

The Cambridge Companion to Quine is an excellent collection, bound to become an important resource for those interested in Quine’s work, novices and experts alike. For the uninitiated, volumes in the Cambridge Companions to Philosophy series are collections of commissioned essays on a particular philosophical thinker, period, or movement. These books serve not merely as references and introductions for students but also as the starting point for serious inquiry into the topic at hand. This volume is no exception to the rule. Not only does it competently introduce and evaluate Quine’s major positions, but it also situates Quine in the context of what he was responding to and what he, in turn, influenced, clearing up many myths about Quine and his place in philosophy and making this volume a major step forward for the serious study of the history of analytic philosophy. That said, it may be unclear to the readers of this journal why reading about Quine might be relevant to their own interests. There are two major reasons why Quine should be of interest. First, Quine is often counted among the pragmatists, and there are important relationships between pragmatism and cultural-historical psychology. Second, Quine’s own thesis of naturalized epistemology should be of general interest to the various readers of this journal. There are many significant relationships between cultural-historical psychology and pragmatism, some of which have been discussed in the pages of this journal.1 A satisfactory discussion would be impossible in the course of this review, but it is helpful to list a few historical points and pragmatist theses that should look familiar. Pragmatism, especially Dewey’s, has Hegelian roots, though it is not mediated through Marx. Pragmatism is opposed to Cartesian dualisms of various sorts, and it also tries to avoid the problems of idealism, materialism, and realism.2 The pragmatists share a theory of thinking and knowledge that sees them as activities that take place in certain contexts, directed at certain objects and purposes, essentially relying on the resources of tradition, culture, and society. MIND, CULTURE, AND ACTIVITY, 13(4), 339–343 Copyright