Matthew J. Dickinson

Explaining Increasing Turnover Rates among Presidential Advisers, 1929-1997

The transformation of the presidential electoral process from a party-controlled to a media-driven candidate-centered system has made it increasingly difficult for presidents to meld governing and campaigning expertise within a single White House-centered advisory organization. This is because the skills needed to win office are increasingly divorced from those needed to govern effectively. As presidential priorities shift from campaigning to governing (or vice versa), then, presidents must reorganize their advisory system to maximize the usefulness of those aides possessing the requisite talents and experiences. The findings from a logistic regression analyzing the causes of staff turnover during the period 1929-1997 are consistent with the claim that higher rates of presidential staff turnover are linked to changes in the presidential selection process.

“Worked Out in Fractions”: Neutral Competence, FDR, and the Bureau of the Budget

Presidents seem to scorn the “neutral competence” political scientists insist they need. Franklin Roosevelt (1933-45), however, evidently embraced this administrative approach–even at a time when the demands for presidential leadership were arguably greater than those experienced by any of his successors. Roosevelt thus offers an important historical test case for both critics and advocates of neutral competence. Focusing specifically on the Bureau of the Budget (BoB), we ask what historical circumstances dictated FDRs use of this agency; how, if at all, that use comported with the more abstract notions of a neutrally competent presidential staff; and what lessons, if any, result for modern presidents. We argue that the BoB under FDR epitomized neutral competence, but that this orientation responded to his political needs. More generally, we conclude that what constitutes responsiveness varies greatly depending on a presidents political context. [T]he gulf between the textbook approach to staffing the presidency and the approach adopted by most postwar presidents is so great that one may be tempted to ask whether the institutional presidency, originally advocated by Brownlow fifty years ago, has not just been a figment of the imagination of political scientists and public administrators. John Hart, “The Presidential Branch” (1995, 216)

The domestic presidency : policy making in the White House

1. The Institutionalization of White House Control of Domestic Policy. Overview: Nixon to Clinton. Institutionalization of the Domestic Policy Process. Emergence of an Institutional Process for Domestic Policy. Domestic Policy: An Institutional Part of the Presidency. Conclusion. 2. The Nixon Presidency: Charting a New Course. The 1968 Election. Victory: Nixons the One. The Transition: A Four-Pronged Process. Structuring Domestic Policy in the White House. Reorganization: A New Domestic Advisory Structure Emerges. The Domestic Council Emerges. Policy Making in the Domestic Council. The Second Term. The Legacy in Domestic Affairs. 3. The Ford Presidency: Managing Brushfires. Nixons Resignation Eminent. Nixon Resigns: The Transition Begins. The Rumsfeld White House. Overhauling the Domestic Council. The Domestic Council Without Rockefeller. Focusing on Brushfires. 4. The Carter Presidency: Focus on Government Efficiency. Campaign 1976: Setting the Domestic Agenda. Addressing Limited Domestic Issues. The Transition. Reorganization Examined. Cabinet Government. The Domestic Council Reviewed. Restructuring the Domestic Council. The Domestic Policy Office. The Triumvirate: Reviewing Reorganization. Carter as Public Administrator. Watsons Control of Policy Development. The Free For All: Departmental Independence in Policy Making. A New Approach to Policy Making. Conclusion. 5. The Reagan Revolution: The Conservative Agenda. A Foray into National Politics. Campaign 1980: The Revolution. The Transition. Designing the Domestic Agenda: The First Four Years. Cabinet Councils. The Legislative Strategy Group. Changes in the Office of Policy Development. Reagans Second Term. Iran-Contra Redefines the Domestic Agenda. Conclusion. 6. George Bush and Company: The Caretaker Presidency. Campaign 1988: Set a Clear Direction. The Transition. Key Appointments: Cabinet and White House Staff. Creating a Domestic Policy Process. Marching Orders. Moving the Process at a Faster Clip. Foreign Policy Dominates the Bush Agenda. A Return to the Domestic Agenda. The Interregnum Ends: Baker Moves In. 7. The Clinton Presidency: The Democrats Return. The 1992 Election. The Transition. Setting a Domestic Agenda. The Domestic Policy Council. Domestic Policy Making: Creating an Organization. The Domestic Agenda of 1993. Bringing Order from Chaos. Institutionalization and the Clinton White House. 8. Conclusion. Defining the Institutional Character of Domestic Policy. Comparing Management Styles for Domestic Policy. Politicization of the Domestic Policy Staff. Domestic Policy within the White House Organization. Summary.

Trump, Congress, and Health Care: All Politics Is National

Abstract John McCain’s dramatic early-morning “no” vote may have been the immediate cause of the Republican failure to repeal and replace Obamacare. However, Republicans undertook this endeavor from a weak political vantage point. The 2016 elections gave Republicans very little margin for error in Congress – a margin threatened by Trump’s inexperience and lack of political capital. Longer-term trends, including the polarization of the two congressional parties against the backdrop of increasingly nationalized elections, exacerbated this situation by leaving Trump and Republicans little choice but to legislate through their own party caucus – or to not legislate at all.

A Review of“Learning While Governing: Expertise and Accountability in the Executive Branch”

challenges. Over a series of election cycles, even percentages this low will affect many incumbents. Because getting primaried is a new topic and because the book provides new data, the study suffers from some limitations. One is that nearly one third of the primary challenges in the dataset could not be coded for a reason. There are clearly “reasons” for every candidacy, but we are unable to divine them. Relatedly, in several places Boatright punts on empirical questions by saying that the data are too messy or too difficult to collect. He also dismisses too quickly those cases where primary challenges failed to materialize. It is possible that incumbents preempted some of these by adjusting their behavior to pacify party insiders and ideological groups. If so, this would lead to a rather different conclusion about the importance of primary threats. Despite these modest concerns, which I hope will be taken up in subsequent research, Boatright’s analysis is a fair-minded correction to political chatter that has exaggerated the importance of getting primaried. The book’s conclusion suggests that this may be a case of self-fulfilling prophesies; widespread belief in the potency of primary challenges is in fact making them both more common and more consequential. A congressional incumbent facing a serious primary threat today certainly gets national attention in a way that her predecessors did not.

Review of The Obamas

Abstract Political Scientists can learn quite a bit about the Obama presidency by reading Jodi Kantors The Obamas, but they will need to wade through some journalistic fluff to do so.

Agendas, Agencies and Unilateral Action: New Insights on Presidential Power?

Howell, William G. Power Without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003. Pp. xx, 239.

Bitter harvest : FDR, presidential power and the growth of the presidential branch

45.00 hardbound,

Reexamining the Growth of the Institutional Presidency, 1940–2000

19.95 softbound. Lewis, David E. Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003. Pp. xiii, 224.

Presidents, Responsiveness, and Competence: Revisiting the “Golden Age” at the Bureau of the Budget

45.00 hardbound. Rudalevige, Andrew. Managing the Presidents Program: Presidential Leadership and Legislative Policy Formulation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002. Pp. xiii, 274.