Matthew R Denman
Sandia National Laboratories
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Featured researches published by Matthew R Denman.
Archive | 2011
Matthew R Denman; Douglas L. Porter; Art Wright; J.D.B. Lambert; Steven L. Hayes; Ken Natesan; Larry J. Ott; F.A. Garner; Leon Walters; Abdellatif M. Yacout
An expert panel was assembled to identify gaps in fuels and materials research prior to licensing sodium cooled fast reactor (SFR) design. The expert panel considered both metal and oxide fuels, various cladding and duct materials, structural materials, fuel performance codes, fabrication capability and records, and transient behavior of fuel types. A methodology was developed to rate the relative importance of phenomena and properties both as to importance to a regulatory body and the maturity of the technology base. The technology base for fuels and cladding was divided into three regimes: information of high maturity under conservative operating conditions, information of low maturity under more aggressive operating conditions, and future design expectations where meager data exist.
Archive | 2012
Hans Ludewig; Dana Auburn Powers; John C. Hewson; Jeffrey L. LaChance; Art Wright; Jesse Phillips; R. Zeyen; B. Clement; Frank Garner; Leon Walters; Steve Wright; Larry J. Ott; Ahti Jorma Suo-Anttila; Richard Denning; Hiroyuki Ohshima; Shuji Ohno; S. Miyhara; Abdellatif M. Yacout; M. T. Farmer; D. Wade; C. Grandy; R. Schmidt; J. Cahalen; Tara Jean Olivier; Robert J. Budnitz; Yoshiharu Tobita; Frederic Serre; Ken Natesan; Juan J. Carbajo; Hae-Yong Jeong
Expert panels comprised of subject matter experts identified at the U.S. National Laboratories (SNL, ANL, INL, ORNL, LBL, and BNL), universities (University of Wisconsin and Ohio State University), international agencies (IRSN, CEA, JAEA, KAERI, and JRC-IE) and private consultation companies (Radiation Effects Consulting) were assembled to perform a gap analysis for sodium fast reactor licensing. Expert-opinion elicitation was performed to qualitatively assess the current state of sodium fast reactor technologies. Five independent gap analyses were performed resulting in the following topical reports: (1) Accident Initiators and Sequences (i.e., Initiators/Sequences Technology Gap Analysis), (2) Sodium Technology Phenomena (i.e., Advanced Burner Reactor Sodium Technology Gap Analysis), (3) Fuels and Materials (i.e., Sodium Fast Reactor Fuels and Materials: Research Needs), (4) Source Term Characterization (i.e., Advanced Sodium Fast Reactor Accident Source Terms: Research Needs), and (5) Computer Codes and Models (i.e., Sodium Fast Reactor Gaps Analysis of Computer Codes and Models for Accident Analysis and Reactor Safety). Volume II of the Sodium Research Plan consolidates the five gap analysis reports produced by each expert panel, wherein the importance of the identified phenomena and necessities of further experimental research and code development were addressed. The findings from these five reports comprised the basis for the analysis in Sodium Fast Reactor Research Plan Volume I.
International Journal on Artificial Intelligence Tools | 2017
Michael C. Darling; George F. Luger; Thomas B. Jones; Matthew R Denman; Katrina M. Groth
This paper explores the viability of using counterfactual reasoning for impact analyses when understanding and responding to “beyond-design-basis” nuclear power plant accidents. Currently, when a s...
Archive | 2015
Matthew R Denman; Katrina M. Groth; Jeffrey N. Cardoni; Timothy A. Wheeler
Accident management is an important component to maintaining risk at acceptable levels for all complex systems, such as nuclear power plants. With the introduction of self-correcting, or inherently safe, reactor designs the focus has shifted from management by operators to allowing the systems design to manage the accident. Inherently and passively safe designs are laudable, but nonetheless extreme boundary conditions can interfere with the design attributes which facilitate inherent safety, thus resulting in unanticipated and undesirable end states. This report examines an inherently safe and small sodium fast reactor experiencing a beyond design basis seismic event with the intend of exploring two issues : (1) can human intervention either improve or worsen the potential end states and (2) can a Bayesian Network be constructed to infer the state of the reactor to inform (1). ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The authors would like to acknowledge the U.S. Department of Energys Office of Nuclear Energy for funding this research through Work Package SR-14SN100303 under the Advanced Reactor Concepts program. The authors also acknowledge the PRA teams at Argonne National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and Idaho National Laboratory for their continue d contributions to the advanced reactor PRA mission area.
Archive | 2015
Zachary Kyle Jankovsky; Matthew R Denman; Katrina M. Groth; Timothy A. Wheeler
Accident management is an important component to maintaining risk at acceptable levels for all complex systems, such as nuclear power plants. With the introduction of passive, or inherently safe, reactor designs the focus has shifted from management by operators to allowing the systems design to take advantage of natural phenomena to manage the accident. Inherently and passively safe designs are laudable, but nonetheless extreme boundary conditions can interfere with the design attributes which facilitate inherent safety, thus resulting in unanticipated and undesirable end states. This report examines an inherently safe and small sodium fast reactor experiencing a variety of beyond design basis events with the intent of exploring the utility of a Dynamic Bayesian Network to infer the state of the reactor to inform the operators corrective actions. These inferences also serve to identify the instruments most critical to informing an operators actions as candidates for hardening against radiation and other extreme environmental conditions that may exist in an accident. This reduction in uncertainty serves to inform ongoing discussions of how small sodium reactors would be licensed and may serve to reduce regulatory risk and cost for such reactors.
Archive | 2017
Matthew R Denman; Zachary Kyle Jankovsky; William Stuart
This report was written as part of a United States Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Nuclear Energy, Advanced Reactor Technologies program funded project to re-create the capabilities of the legacy Centralized Reliability Database Organization (CREDO) database. The CREDO database provided a record of component design and performance documentation across various systems that used sodium as a working fluid. Regaining this capability will allow the DOE complex and the domestic sodium reactor industry to better understand how previous systems were designed and built for use in improving the design and operations of future loops. The contents of this report include: overview of the current state of domestic sodium reliability databases; summary of the ongoing effort to improve, understand, and process the CREDO information; summary of the initial efforts to develop a unified sodium reliability database called the Sodium System Component Reliability Database (NaSCoRD); and explain both how potential users can access the domestic sodium reliability databases and the type of information that can be accessed from these databases.
Archive | 2017
Timothy A. Wheeler; Matthew R Denman; R. A. Williams; Nevin Martin; Zachary Kyle Jankovsky
Instrumentation and control of nuclear power is transforming from analog to modern digital assets. These control systems perform key safety and security functions. This transformation is occurring in new plant designs as well as in the existing fleet of plants as the operation of those plants is extended to 60 years. This transformation introduces new and unknown issues involving both digital asset induced safety issues and security issues. Traditional nuclear power risk assessment tools and cyber security assessment methods have not been modified or developed to address the unique nature of cyber failure modes and of cyber security threat vulnerabilities.
Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part O: Journal of Risk and Reliability | 2018
Katrina M. Groth; Matthew R Denman; Michael C. Darling; Thomas B. Jones; George F. Luger
Archive | 2018
Zachary Kyle Jankovsky; Troy Christopher Haskin; Matthew R Denman
Annals of Nuclear Energy | 2018
Zachary Kyle Jankovsky; Matthew R Denman; Tunc Aldemir