Matthias Neuenkirch

Managing financial market expectations: The role of central bank transparency and central bank communication

In this paper, we study the influence of central bank transparency and informal central bank communication on the formation of money market expectations. The sample covers nine major central banks from January 1999 to July 2007. We find, first, that transparency reduces the bias in money market expectations and dampens their variation. Second, informal communications help manage financial market expectations by reducing the variation of expectations. Third, various subcategories of the Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) transparency index lead to a smaller bias in expectations (in particular, evaluation of policy outcome and explanation of interest rate decisions) and to a reduction in the variation of expectations (in particular, explicit prioritization of objectives and provision of information on unanticipated macroeconomic disturbances).

Monetary Policy Transmission in Vector Autoregressions: A New Approach Using Central Bank Communication

In this paper, we study the role played by central bank communication in monetary policy transmission. We employ the Swiss Economic Institute’s Monetary Policy Communicator to measure the future stance of the European Central Bank’s monetary policy. Our results indicate, first, that communication has an influence on inflation (expectations) similar to that of actual target rate changes. Communication also plays a noticeable role in the transmission of monetary policy to output. Consequently, future work on monetary policy transmission should incorporate both a short-term interest rate and a communication indicator. A second finding is that the monetary policy transmission mechanism changed during the financial crisis as the overall effect of monetary policy on (expected) inflation and output is weaker and of shorter duration during this period compared to the overall sample period.

Do Federal Reserve Presidents Communicate with a Regional Bias

In this paper, we analyze the determinants of US monetary policy stance as expressed in speeches by Federal Reserve (Fed) officials over the period January 1998–September 2009. Econometrically, we use a probit model with regional and national macroeconomic variables to explain the content of these speeches. Our results are, first, that a rise in the inflation rate or the Leading Index makes a hawkish speech more likely. Second, when Fed presidents make a speech in their home district, its content is influenced by both regional and national macroeconomic variables, whereas speeches given outside the home district are influenced solely by national information. Third, the influence of regional variables increases during (i) Ben Bernanke’s tenure as Fed Chairman, (ii) recessions, and (iii) the financial crisis. Finally, speeches by nonvoting presidents reflect regional economic development to a greater extent than those by voting presidents.In this paper, we analyse the determinants of speeches by Federal Reserve (Fed) officials over the period January 1998 to September 2009. Econometrically, we use a probit model with regional and national macroeconomic variables to explain the content of these speeches. Our results are, first, that Fed Governors and presidents follow a Taylor rule when expressing their opinions: a rise in expected inflation (unemployment) makes a hawkish speech more (less) likely. Second, the content of speeches by Fed presidents in their home district is affected by both regional and national macroeconomic variables, whereas speeches outside their home district are influenced solely by national information. Third, the influence of regional variables increases during the financial crisis. Fourth, speeches by nonvoting presidents are more focused on regional economic development than are those by voting presidents. Finally, voting presidents and Governors are less backward-looking in their wording than are nonvoting presidents. JEL: D72, E52, E58

The Impact of Foreign Macroeconomic News on Financial Markets in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland

In this paper, we investigate the effects of euro area and US macroeconomic news on financial markets in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland (CEEC-3) from 1999 to 2006. Using a GARCH model, we examine the impact of news on daily returns of three-month interest rates, stock market indices, exchange rates versus the euro, and the US dollar. First, both US and European macroeconomic news has a significant impact on CEEC-3 financial markets. Second, the process of European integration is accompanied by an increasing importance of euro area news relative to US news. Third, there are country-specific differences: for example, the Czech stock market is relatively more affected by foreign news since the Copenhagen Summit in December 2002. In general, our results support the hypothesis of a deepening euro area influence on the CEEC-3 over time and a corresponding reduction in the relative importance of US shocks.

Communication Matters: U.S. Monetary Policy and Commodity Price Volatility

We analyze the influence of US monetary policy on commodity price volatility. Expected target rate changes and communications decrease volatility, whereas target rate surprises and unorthodox measures increase it. The “calming” effect of communication is reduced during the financial crisis.

Federal Reserve Communications and Emerging Equity Markets

Work on the impact of U.S. monetary policy on emerging financial markets mostly focuses on official target rate announcements; empirical evidence using data on informal communication channels, such as speeches, is scant. Employing a unique data set covering formal and informal communication channels in a generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity model framework, we provide comprehensive evidence on the effects of U.S. monetary policy on 17 emerging equity market returns over the period 1998–2009. We find, first, that both monetary policy actions and communications have a significant impact on market returns. Second, target rate change surprises are an important driver of emerging market returns. However, informal communications—particularly when taking into account their higher frequency—have a larger (cumulative) influence on returns than do target rate surprises. Third, during the recent financial crisis, central bank communication played an even more pronounced role. Finally, American emerging markets react more to communications than do non-American markets.

Financial Market Reaction to Federal Reserve Communications: Does the Crisis Make a Difference?

This paper studies the effects of Federal Reserve communications on US financial market returns from 1998 to 2009 and asks whether a significant change occurred during the financial crisis of August 2007–December 2009. We find, first, that central bank communication moves financial markets in the intended direction. In particular, shorter maturities are affected in an economically meaningful way. Second, speeches by the Chairman generate relatively more public attention than communication by other governors or presidents. Finally, central bank communication is even more market relevant during the financial crisis subsample.

Party Affiliation Rather than Former Occupation: The Background of Central Bank Governors and its Effect on Monetary Policy

In this paper, we analyze the relationship between certain characteristics of incumbent central bank governors and their interest-rate-setting behavior. We focus on (i) occupational backgrounds, (ii) party affiliation, and (iii) experience in office and estimate augmented Taylor rules for 20 OECD countries and the period 1974-2008. Our findings are as follows. First, the tenures of central bank governors who are affiliated with a political party are characterized by a relatively dovish monetary policy stance, irrespective of their partisan ideology. Second, party affiliation appears to be more important than occupational background, i.e., all bankers with(out) a party affiliation behave very similarly to each regardless of their specific occupational background. Third, party members react significantly less to inflation and more to output the longer they stay in office.

What's in a Second Opinion? Shadowing the ECB and the Bank of England

One way of evaluating how well monetary authorities perform is to provide the public with a regular and independent second opinion. The European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of England (BoE) are shadowed by professional and academic economists who provide a separate policy rate recommendation in advance of the central bank announcement. In this paper, we systematically evaluate this second opinion and find that, first, the shadow committee of the ECB tends to be relatively less inflation averse than the ECB. In contrast, the shadow committee of the BoE proposes a more hawkish monetary policy stance than the BoE. Second, consensus within a shadow committee is far easier to reach when there is no pressure to change the policy rate. Third, the ECB’s shadow committee is more activist than the ECB’s Governing Council and a larger degree of consensus within the former brings about a greater likelihood that the two committees will agree.

Federal Reserve communications and newswire coverage

In this article, we explore the determinants of newswire coverage of Federal Reserve (Fed) communications. Our sample covers all 344 forward-looking communications made in the period May 1999 to May 2004. We find, first, that there is a higher likelihood of newswire coverage for monetary policy reports and speeches by Chairman Greenspan than for testimony and speeches by other Fed members. Furthermore, communications with an explicit monetary policy inclination or tone different from the current interest rate path are particularly likely to be covered. However, the release of important macroeconomic news reduces the likelihood of newswire coverage. Second, speeches by regional Fed presidents are relatively less likely to be reported than speeches by Board members. Nevertheless, newswire coverage of Fed president speeches is more likely if central bank communication is stale. Finally, our results indicate that Ben Bernanke played a distinguished role even before his Chairmanship.