Maurício Soares Bugarin

Vote splitting, reelection and electoral control: Towards a unified model

Abstract. This article presents a dynamic game theoretic model of voting in the presence of asymmetric information about a relevant parameter of the economy, the state of the world. Voters may use both vote splitting and reelection as mechanisms of electoral control. In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, voters will reelect an Executive incumbent if a minimum level of social outcome, n*, is attained. The main findings are that voters tend to be more demanding, requiring a higher value for n*, if they expect the true state of the world to be favorable, and less demanding if they believe the state of the world is unfavorable. Moreover, vote splitting will be chosen if a favorable state is expected, whereas if an unfavorable state is more likely, voters reduce pressure over the incumbent by choosing a unified government.

À espera da reforma orçamentária: um mecanismo temporário para redução de gastos públicos

Este trabalho evidencia distorcoes associadas a pratica comum de contingenciamento do orcamento publico federal e sugere um mecanismo alternativo de aplicacao temporaria que reduz essas distorcoes. Apos verificar a evidencia empirica de que ha grande variacao na execucao orcamentaria, com elevada concentracao de gastos no ultimo mes do exercicio fiscal, constroi-se um modelo do tipo Principal-Agente que evidencia a ineficiencia existente no processo orcamentario atual. Em seguida e apresentado um modelo alternativo Pareto superior que reduz a variacao dos recursos disponiveis aos orgaos da administracao publica ao longo do ano e ao mesmo tempo induz uma reducao espontânea de seus gastos. Para ilustrar os ganhos potenciais da aplicacao de tal mecanismo, apresenta-se uma simulacao baseada da execucao orcamentaria de 2001.

Deficit Targeting: An Incentive Mechanism for Subnational Fiscal Deficit Reduction in Brazil

The traditional debate on fiscal federalism focuses on the trade-off between allocative efficiency and distributive concerns. From the point of view of the allocation of public resources, it is well known that local governments are better suited to accommodate in an efficient way differing preferences among agents. This view suggests that the best fiscal policies are decided at a decentralized local government level. However, from the point of view of the distribution of wealth, the central government has a clear role in designing revenue-sharing rules to achieve a more equitable redistribution of income among different regions of a country with heterogeneous levels of development. This second view suggests a higher level of centralization in a government’s fiscal policy decisions.1 Therefore, the optimal level of decentralization in a federation must reflect the right balance between those two opposing views.2

Ética & incentivos: devemos recompensar quem denuncia corrupção?

This article presents an applied mechanism design and a legal analysis of a Bill proposed into law by the Brazilian Federal District House of Representatives in 2013. The Bill offers monetary rewards for citizens that denounce corruption. In our decision-theoretic model, corruption control may give the citizens utility due to their civic responsibility feeling. The main trade-off brought about by the reward mechanism is that, by receiving compensation, citizens’ civic impulse to dedicate effort to curb corruption may be reduced. However, our model shows that if society is heterogeneous enough, the monetary reward motive prevails and the Bill fosters social involvement. Furthermore, we propose a mechanism that transforms the moral dissatisfaction of receiving money into a moral incentive to dedicate to corruption control. Finally, a careful analysis of the Law and of a series of case studies in Brazil suggest that such a mechanism does not violate the Constitution and, furthermore, has actually been used under different forms in the Brazilian legal system.

Strategic partisan transfers in a fiscal federation: evidence from a new Brazilian database

This article makes use of a unique database that allows, for the first time, calculating in a precise way the amounts of discretionary transfers from the Brazilian Federal government to municipalities in the period from 1997 to 2012. The new database is used to test the “strategic partisan transfers hypothesis”, which states that mayors from the same party as the president receive higher federal transfers than those from different parties, if the corresponding municipality is situated in a state where the governor is not aligned with the president. In general, the econometric analysis strongly supports the strategic partisan transfers hypothesis. Furthermore, it supports the hypothesis that there is a biannual political transfers cycle in Brazil due to the countrys staggered electoral system with elections every other year.

Regulação Ótima e a Atuação do Judiciário: uma Aplicação de Teoria dos Jogos

O objetivo desta pesquisa e analisar conjuntamente os efeitos da regulacao tradicional e do ativismo judicial sobre a atividade economica e o bem-estar social. A metodologia consiste em estudar a materia com a Analise Economica do Direito, ilustrando-a com casos julgados pelo Poder Judiciario e utilizando a Teoria dos Jogos para captar o comportamento estrategico dos agentes. Num primeiro jogo, interagem apenas firmas e agencia reguladora. O regulador tem informacao imperfeita sobre a estrutura de mercado vigente, mas deve decidir se intervem na economia aplicando preco-teto ou se deixa o mercado livre. O equilibrio mostra que, havendo capacidade tecnica suficientemente elevada pelo regulador, a intervencao regulatoria aumenta o bem-estar social. Num segundo jogo, o Judiciario pode impor, ex-post , reducao de preco a uma empresa. Nesse caso, dois possiveis equilibrios podem surgir. Se a intervencao judicial for moderada, a regulacao e o sistema judicial se complementam, incrementando o bem-estar social. Mas, se o ativismo judicial for exagerado, os dois mecanismos sao opostos: a coexistencia de regulacao ex-ante e ativismo judicial ex-post reduz o bem-estar social. A contribuicao do estudo e analisar o efeito conjunto desses dois tipos de intervencao publica, prevendo seu impacto sobre o bem-estar social e sinalizando como o Estado deve atuar.