Max Klimm

Strong Nash Equilibria in Games with the Lexicographical Improvement Property

We provide an axiomatic framework for the the well studied lexicographical improvement property and derive new results on the existence of strong Nash equilibria for a very general class of congestion games with bottleneck objectives. This includes extensions of classical load-based models, routing games with splittable demands, scheduling games with malleable jobs, and more.

Characterizing the Existence of Potential Functions in Weighted Congestion Games

Since the pioneering paper of Rosenthal a lot of work has been done in order to determine classes of games that admit a potential. First, we study the existence of potential functions for weighted congestion games. Let

Strong equilibria in games with the lexicographical improvement property

\mathcal{C}

On the existence of pure nash equilibria inweighted congestion games

be an arbitrary set of locally bounded functions and let

Computing pure Nash and strong equilibria in bottleneck congestion games

\mathcal{G}(\mathcal{C})

Improving the H k -bound on the price of stability in undirected Shapley network design games

be the set of weighted congestion games with cost functions in

Congestion Games with Player-Specific Costs Revisited

\mathcal{C}

Optimal impartial selection

. We show that every weighted congestion game

Congestion Games with Variable Demands

G\in\mathcal{G}(\mathcal{C})

Resource Competition on Integral Polymatroids

admits an exact potential if and only if