Max Velmans

Consciousness From a First-Person Perspective

The sequence of topics in this reply roughly follows that of the target article. The latter focused largely on experimental studies of how consciousness relates to human information processing, tracing their relation from input through to output. The discussion of the implications of the findings both for cognitive psychology and philosophy of mind was relatively brief. The commentaries reverse this emphasis, and so, correspondingly, does the reply.

Consciousness, brain and the physical world

Abstract Dualist and Reductionist theories of Mind disagree about whether or not consciousness can be reduced to a state of or function of the brain. They assume, however, that the contents of consciousness are separate from the external physical world as‐perceived. According to the present paper this assumption has no foundation, either in everyday experience or in science. Drawing on evidence for perceptual ‘projection’ in both interoceptive and exteroceptive sense modalities, the case is made that the physical world as‐perceived is a construct of perceptual processing and, therefore, part of the contents of consciousness—a finding which requires a Reflexive rather than a Dualist or Reductionist model of how consciousness relates to the brain and the physical world. The physical world as‐perceived may, in turn, be thought of as a biologically useful model of the world as described by physics. Redrawing the boundaries of consciousness to include the physical world as‐perceived undermines the conventional...

Is the Mind Conscious, Functional or Both?

This 1990 BBS commentary will be mainly of interest to those who are studying the work of John Searle. It critically examines three of Searle’s proposals: (a) that cognitive functioning is not a definitive criterion of a mental state, (b) that the only definitive criterion of a “mental” state is its potential connection to consciousness, and (c) that there are no “deep unconscious states” that lack such a connection. The commentary argues that mental processes do not only have a potential connection to consciousness (as Searle maintains) or only permit us to function in certain ways (as functionalists would claim), but under certain circumstances achieve both. A science of the mind, therefore, could never be complete without addressing this duality.

The science of consciousness : psychological, neuropsychological, and clinical reviews

(From the publisher) In The Science of Consciousness leading researchers examine how consciousness is being investigated in the key areas of cognitive psychology, neuropsychology and clinical practice. Within cognitive psychology special focus is given to the function of consciousness, and to the relation of conscious processing to nonconscious processing in perception, learning, memory and information dissemination in the human brain. The investigation of consciousness in neuropsychology includes examination of the neural conditions for consciousness and the effects of brain damage. Finally mind/body interactions in clinical and experimental settings are considered, including the somatic effects of imagery, biofeedback and placebo effects. Individual chapters, presenting the latest research findings from pioneers in the field, combine to form a stimulating and accessible overview of this emerging science. The Science of Consciousness will be invaluable for students, researchers and clinicians interested in the developments and direction of this rapidly growing field.

ERP evidence for successful voluntary avoidance of conscious recollection

We investigated neurocognitive processes of voluntarily avoiding conscious recollection by asking participants to either attempt to recollect (the Think condition) or to avoid recollecting (the No-Think condition) a previously exposed paired associate. Event-related potentials (ERPs) during Think and No-Think trials were separated on the basis of previous learning success versus failure. This separation yielded temporal and topographic dissociations between early ERP effects of a Think versus No-Think strategy, which were maximal between 200 and 300 ms after stimulus presentation and independent of learning status, and a later learning-specific ERP effect maximal between 500 and 800 ms after stimulus presentation. In this later time-window, Learned Think items elicited a larger late left parietal positivity than did Not Learned Think, Learned No-Think, and Not Learned No-Think items; moreover, Learned No-Think and Not Learned Think items did not differ in late left parietal positivity. Because the late left parietal positivity indexes conscious recollection, the results provide firm evidence that conscious recollection of recollectable information can be voluntarily avoided on an item-specific basis and help to clarify previous neural evidence from the Think/No-Think procedure, which could not separate item-specific from strategic processes.

The Acceptability of Spectrum-Preserving and Spectrum-Destroying Transposition to Severely Hearing-Impaired Listeners

Various devices have been constructed to lower the frequency of speech sounds to make them accessible to those with hearing in the low frequencies only. In the present experiment two such devices are compared. One device, the FRED (frequency recoding device) maps the 4-8 kHz region on to the 0-4 kHz region in a way that preserves the spectral pattern of transposed signals. The other device, the Oticon TP 72, converts signals in the 4-8 kHz region into low frequency noise (below 1.5 kHz). Both devices combine transposed information with conventionally amplified speech. It was found that untrained adults with acquired sensory-neural hearing losses opted to supplement conventional amplification with FRED transposition on 365 out of 576 occasions, to improve the clarity of speech sounds. Under the same conditions they opted to use Oticon transposition on significantly fewer (32 out of 576) occasions. Subjective preferences for FRED as opposed to Oticon transposition were also highly significant. It was concluded that for the subject group in question a transposition which preserves the relative spectrum of transposed sounds is initially more acceptable than one which uses high-frequency signals to modulate low-frequency noise.

When perception becomes conscious

The study of preconscious vs. conscious processing has an extensive history in cognitive psychology, dating back to the writings of William James. Much of the experimental work on this issue has focused on perception, conceived of as input analysis, and on the relation of consciousness to attentional processing. The present paper examines when input analysis becomes conscious from the perspectives of cognitive modelling, methodology, and a more detailed understanding of what is meant by ‘conscious processing’. Current evidence suggests that perception becomes conscious at a late-arising stage of focal-attentive processing concerned with information integration and dissemination. Reliable criteria for determining when perception becomes conscious combine the evidence of ‘first-person’ phenomenological reports with ‘third-person’ functional dissociations between preconscious and conscious processing. There are three distinct senses in which a process may be said to be ‘conscious’. It might be ‘conscious’ (a) in the sense that one is conscious of the process, (b) in the sense that the operation of the process is accompanied by consciousness (of its results) and (c) in the sense that consciousness enters into or causally influences the process. Consciousness of familiar stimuli, rather than entering into input analysis, appears to follow it in human information processing. Processes closely associated with the appearance of consciousness such as information integration and dissemination appear to operate unconsciously. Consequently, perception appears to be ‘conscious’ only in sense (b).

The effect of frequency transposition on the untrained auditory discrimination of congenitally deaf children

Various frequency lowering schemes have been developed for use with deaf people who have little or no measurable hearing in the high frequencies. In general, results of studies evaluating such schemes have been discouraging, except for studies evaluating a frequency recoding device devised by Velmans (1973a). Previous evaluation studies with this device have demonstrated that FRED transposition can improve the auditory discrimination of certain subjects with sensorineural deafness after training (e.g. Velmans and Marcuson, 1980; Velmans et al., 1982; Velmans et al., 1988). Using selection criteria developed in the 1988 study, the current study evaluated the effect of FRED transposition on the untrained auditory discrimination of eight congenitally deaf students, aged between 7 years 2 months and 14 years 10 months with high frequency hearing losses. Results demonstrated that FRED transposition significantly enhanced the auditory discrimination of consonants in the high speech frequencies for the subject group. This suggests that FRED transposition may produce some benefits in everyday situations even without formal training. Evaluation tests with and without transposition, such as those used in this study, may provide one means of selecting congenitally deaf people who would be likely to benefit from using FRED aids.

The Design of Speech Recoding Devices for the Deaf: University of Manchester

The paper reviews the present status of speech recoding (frequency transposition) devices and concludes that convincing evidence for the superiority of recoding devices over, for example, selective amplification, does not yet exist. A number of fundamental questions requiring answers are then outlined, upon which the design of some ‘ideal’ recoding device appears to be contingent. Some interim design principles are, however, proposed and a description is given of a recoding device designed with these principles in mind. Finally, some initial, encouraging results with the device are reported, and various questions relating to the utility of the device, requiring further investigation, are indicated.

WHY CONSCIOUS FREE WILL BOTH IS AND ISN’T AN ILLUSION

Wegner’s analysis of the illusion of conscious will is close to my own account of how conscious experiences relate to brain processes. But our analyses differ somewhat on how conscious will is not an illusion. Wegner argues that once conscious will arises it enters causally into subsequent mental processing. I argue that while his causal story is accurate, it remains a first-person story. Conscious free will is not an illusion in the sense that this first-person story is compatible with and complementary to a third-person account of voluntary processing in the mind/brain.