Md. Borhan Uddin Bhuiyan

Do problem directors affect firm operating performance

Purpose - – The purpose of this paper is to examine empirically the consequences of having problem directors on the board with respect to operating performance. Problem directors are directors who have a past history of managerial integrity weakness. Design/methodology/approach - – This paper uses three measures of operating performance to investigate the impact of problem directors and applies regression analysis to data from S & - P 500 companies from 2004 to 2009. Findings - – The author found evidence for the problem that director affiliated firms have more board and independent members. The CEO dual firm has a comparatively higher number of problem directors on the board. Firm operating performance is reduced when a board is served by a problem director. The results are consistent for a number of sensitivity tests. Practical implications - – Results provide evidence that firms have negative performance consequences when monitored by a director with a lack of managerial integrity. The practical implication of this study is that corporate boards should appoint directors who have a clean professional background so that more vigilant monitoring by directors can be ensured. Originality/value - – This study goes beyond the traditional focus on corporate governance and firm performance. The author uses problem directors as an indicator of governance quality to measure firm performance. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this paper is the first to investigate the consequences of firms holding problem directors on the board. This issue has implications for investors, auditors, directors and regulators.

Underlying profit in New Zealand

Purpose This paper aims to identify and explain the composition, determinants, relevance and effects of underlying profit and emphasis placed on underlying profit in annual reports. Design/methodology/approach The paper uses multivariate analysis of data from New Zealand listed companies from 2006 to 2010 disclosing both generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) profit and underlying profit. Value relevance is measured in relation to annual stock returns of companies. Findings Tax, financial cost and depreciation and amortization are the three main items excluded from GAAP profit to derive underlying profit. Firms that have lower audit quality and industries prone to higher price fluctuation of assets and higher depreciation and amortization expenses use underlying profit. Also, underlying profit is used by firms with higher differences between statutory and target profits, higher analyst following and higher proportion of independent board of directors. Underlying profit has a weak negative association with annual market returns and significant positive association with volume of shares traded. Finally, the relevance of underlying profit is lower for firms that emphasize underlying profit in their annual reports. Practical implications Underlying profit is negatively related to the economic performance of the company in the market, whereas GAAP profit is positively related. Originality/value New Zealand has experienced a sharp increase in the use of underlying profits in annual reports. This research adds to our understanding of the use of underlying profit by New Zealand listed companies.

Related party transactions and finance company failure: New Zealand evidence

Purpose This paper aims to examine the existence of related party transactions (RPTs) in failed financial companies in New Zealand when firms have interlocking directors on the board. We also examine the role of auditors in the review of RPTs. We anticipate that inter-company director relationships promote RPTs, while reputable large auditors (i.e. Big4) restrict the practice. Design/methodology/approach This study uses multivariate analysis to examine the determinants of RPTs. We use an unique, hand-collected database of New Zealand finance companies all of which collapsed during the years 2006-2011. Findings Using a sample of 65 firms (including 38 failed finance firms) and 219 firm-year observations, we found that almost half of the failed finance firms were engaged in RPTs. For the failed firms, those that were engaged in RPTs were mostly represented by interlocking directors and were audited by non-Big4 auditors, implying lower monitoring quality may facilitate RPTs. Using a sub-sample, we also found evidence that firms engaged in RPTs were later convicted of questionable accounting and disclosure practices. Practical implications This research is beneficial to regulators and audit professionals in understanding the potential for adverse outcomes associated with interlocking directors and undisclosed RPTs. While interlocking directors could enrich the external connections of a firm which might facilitate capital resourcing, this study suggests regulators might encourage firms to disclose RPTs when the firm has higher interlocked directors. Originality/value This study is the first to examine the association between RPTs and interlocking directors using a sample of failed finance companies. RPTs and lack of disclosure were widely attributed with being the determinants of corporate failure in the finance sector. However, failed finance firms remain widely under-researched because of a lack of available data. This study circumvent this limitation by using print media and business news portals to collate information on RPTs and interlocking directors. While prior research indicates that weak corporate governance leads to poor accounting practice, using the interlocking board as a proxy for weak corporate governance, this study is the first to substantiate the adverse effect of interlocking boards and undisclosed RPTs with corporate failure.

Firm Life Cycle and Advisory Directors

This article investigates whether the presence of advisory directors and monitoring directors varies across firm life cycle stages. We follow a parsimonious life cycle proxy based on the predicted behaviour of operating, investing and financing cash flows across the different life cycle stages that result from firm performance and the allocation of resources. Using an Australian sample, this study shows that compared to mature-stage firms, firms in the introduction, shake-out and decline stages have more advisory directors. With respect to the demand for monitoring directors, we find that compared to mature-stage firms, firms in the introduction, shake-out and decline stages have fewer monitoring directors on the board. We contribute to the literature on boards of directors by documenting that firms choose an optimal board structure based on their economic characteristics. JEL Classification: D22, G38, M14

Operational “problem” directors and environmental performance

Purpose The way in which a firm’s actions are perceived by others is driven by the individual values and ethics of directors (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of “problem” directors on the environmental performance of firms. The authors argue that if a board member has a tainted reputation, then environmental performance will be higher as the problem director seeks to rebuild his/her reputation. Design/methodology/approach The authors use a sample of the top 500 US companies for 2010 and 2011 and an ordinary least square (OLS) model to capture the impact of “problem” directors on environmental performance. The authors use an independent measure of environmental performance which includes three categories: environmental impact, environmental management (green policies) and environmental reputation (which is affected by disclosure). Findings The findings of this paper show that the average environmental impact score is 53.32 per cent, the environmental management green policy score is 35.39 per cent and environmental reputation is 49.86 per cent. A firm which is operated by a problem director has a higher score for environmental management and environmental reputation than non-problem director-affiliated firms. Firms which are managed by a problem director(s) have lower scores for environmental impact than non-problem director-affiliated firms in the USA, indicating a higher level of emissions, water use, waste disposal, etc. Practical implications The authors posit that problem directors promote environmental performance as a means to enhance their reputation and divert attention from allegations of previous poor professional behaviour. Regulators and investors should interpret the environmental performance of a firm with caution when a problem director is on the board. Originality/value Prior research on the relationship between environmental performance and corporate governance has been based on board composition and characteristics. However, board decision-making reflects the professional experience and personal values of the directors. These factors have not been addressed in the literature to-date and, hence, form this paper’s contribution.

Customer Concentration, Corporate Social Responsibility and Idiosyncratic Risk

This paper investigates the effect of customer concentration on corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosures for a large sample of US firms. Using both corporate and government customer concentration, we find that firms with concentrated corporate customer are associated with significantly higher CSR scores, while firms with concentrated government customer are associated with significantly lower CSR scores. Our findings also suggest that corporate customer concentration is associated with significantly less CSR concern, whereas government customer concentration is associated not only with significantly less CSR strength, but also with significantly more CSR concern. Finally, we find that CSR activities mitigate the idiosyncratic risk for firms with corporate customer concentration, lending support to the arguments that firms with socially responsible practices have lower risk.