Meg Russell

Women's Representation in the Scottish Parliament and National Assembly for Wales: Party Dynamics for Achieving Critical Mass

The new Scottish Parliament and National Assembly for Wales elected in May 1999 were notable for the high levels of womens representation amongst their membership. This article examines the decisions taken by the main political parties about candidate selection and specifically the promotion of women candidates, exploring some of the inter and intra party dynamics influencing this result. The most significant changes were achieved in those parties that adopted rigid policies of positive action in favour of women. The decisions to adopt such systems were influenced by party ideology, degree of centralised leadership control and presence of women in positions of power within party elites. The environment in which such measures were considered was also highly influenced by the new electoral system and the presence of women activists in the design of the new institutions, particularly in Scotland. Together, these factors made womens representation a central feature in party competition.

Reforming the House of Lords: Lessons from Overseas

Introduction PART ONE: CONTEXTS 1. Reforming the House of Lords 2. Second chambers worldwide PART TWO: SEVEN SECOND CHAMBERS 3. The composition and context of the chamber 4. Politics and personalities in the chamber 5. Organisation and administration 6. The legislative role of the chamber 7. Committees and investigative work 8. Constitutional and constituency 9. Government and the second chamber 10. Binding different levels of government together 11. Public Perceptions and calls for reform PART THREE: LESSONS FOR LORDS REFORM 12. Principles of reform 13. The role and functions of the new chamber 14. The composition of the new chamber Epilogue: Prospects for reform

The Territorial Role of Second Chambers

Upper houses of parliament classically perform scrutiny and revising functions with respect to government policy and legislation. In this they are generally the junior parliamentary partner, shadowing the work of the lower house, and often possessing considerably lesser powers. However, many also have a unique function, not shared by the lower house, of representing the territorial interests of provinces, regions or states at the national level. The origins of this territorial role of upper houses, the extent to which it is a feature today, and whether such chambers in practice fulfil a territorial role are investigated. Finally, the future, and the extent to which the territorial model may be becoming the standard one for upper house design is discussed.

None of the Above The UK House of Commons votes on Reforming the House of Lords, February 2003 ⁄

In February 2003, members of the UK House of Commons voted on seven resolutions as to the future of the House of Lords. In quick succession, each possibility for reform was considered and then rejected at division. This paper examines plausible causes of this strange result. Inter alia, we reject notions of a voting cycle. We find that myopic and/or strategic voting by MPs was salient. We then explore the main voting groups and their party compositions.

Parliamentary party cohesion Some explanations from psychology

High levels of party voting cohesion are common in modern legislatures. Current explanations divide into sociological (based on norms and roles) and rational choice (based on systems of punishment and reward). The latter approach dominates, but cannot explain cohesion in systems with weak disciplinary sanctions, such as the British House of Lords. Social psychology has provided a great deal of insight into conformity in groups, but this has rarely been deployed in studying parties. Neuroscience now also allows us better to understand the physiological mechanisms underlying responses such as need to belong and fear of ostracism. This article outlines key theories and findings from psychology relevant to parliamentary party cohesion, and then explores these using survey data from the relatively ‘discipline free’ House of Lords. It is suggested that psychological factors such as social identity are important to the operation of party groups, and stronger interdisciplinary links are proposed between political science and psychology.

Why are Second Chambers so Difficult to Reform

The experiences of second chambers in Canada, Australia, Italy and Ireland suggest that second chamber reform faces a number of inherent problems. It must frequently negotiate exacting procedures for constitutional change, may be caught up in wider constitutional issues and often comes a long way down the list of a governments priorities: an ineffective second chamber, or one with low public legitimacy, can be of value to the government. In the UK the public commitment of the current Government, based on decades of Labour Party tradition, together with the absence of a written constitution, may increase the likelihood of these obstacles being overcome.

Pre-Appointment Scrutiny Hearings in the British House of Commons: All Bark, or Some Bite?

In 2007 British Prime Minister Gordon Brown agreed that House of Commons committees should start holding pre-appointment hearings for key public appointments. This was initially welcomed by MPs, who viewed it as an important step towards limiting executive power and strengthening the role of parliament. However, following the appointment of the Childrens Commissioner against the advice of the relevant select committee, many MPs became disillusioned with the hearings. Based on extensive interviews with those involved in the appointments process, this article argues that while committees may lack formal veto power over appointments, they do have considerable influence. Most candidates said they would not have taken up their appointment against the advice of the select committee. So pre-appointment hearings should not be dismissed as pointless, but rather seen as an important mechanism through which committees can exert influence over public appointments. This tells us two important things about the powers of legislatures. First, it confirms that legislative influence is far more subtle than the simple exercise of veto powers, as scholars have long noted. But second, it also demonstrates that even the most central actors in the process (the MPs) may not appreciate this fact.

(Re)assessing Parliamentary Policy Impact: The Case of the Australian Senate

A recent article in this Journal suggested that assumptions about the legislative influence of the Australian Senate may overstate its de facto power. Stanley Bach indicated that compromise with the Senate was relatively rare, and pointed out that most successful Senate amendments were government amendments. This paper provides an alternative view. We suggest that legislative influence is more subtle than Bach acknowledged, and that it is necessary to dig deeper in the data to fully understand the Senates role. We therefore supplement his analysis in two ways: (1) through tracking the ultimate outcome of government defeats in the Senate; and (2) through analysis of two case study bills. We find that in confrontations with government the Senate ‘wins’ the great majority of the time. This shapes government behaviour in the chamber, such that many government amendments actually respond to non-government concerns. The most important element of Senate influence is therefore ‘soft power’– exercised through negotiation – backed up only in extremis by the ‘hard power’ of government defeat. This holds important lessons for the study of legislative influence more broadly, as well as demonstrating the true power of the Australian Senate.

Parliament: The House of Lords — A More Representative and Assertive Chamber?

The year 2005 may well be seen as a highly significant year for the House of Lords, though not for reasons that might have been expected. During Labour’s first term of office, and the early part of its second, many had hoped that this general election would see the first directly elected members of the UK’s second chamber. However, thanks to lack of agreement over Lords’ reform, this did not occur. Neither Labour’s 2005 manifesto nor post-election announcements provided any greater prospect of reform in the third term. If anything, a settlement looked further away than ever. By 2005, the notion that the chamber, dubbed ‘transitional’ in 1999 (with the departure of most hereditary peers), might continue to exist for many years was starting to take hold.

Responsibilities of Second Chambers: Constitutional and Human Rights Safeguards

Second chambers – even those which are otherwise weak – are often given particular responsibility for protecting the constitution. This responsibility flows naturally from both of the original models of second chambers – as either conservative or federal houses. This contribution discusses the constitutional and human rights roles of second chambers in seven Western democracies. The chambers selected are intended to represent a spectrum of different models, and a range from effective to ineffective upper houses. The countries considered are Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy and Spain. The original purpose of this comparative piece was to inform the debate on House of Lords reform in the United Kingdom. The constitutional role of the House of Lords is limited, although the Lords does have the power to veto a bill which attempts to extend the life of a parliament. However, the chamber does see one of its roles as constitutional protection, and at times has taken a particular interest in constitutional matters. The house is also closely linked to the judiciary, acting – through the Law Lords – as the UK’s highest court of appeal. The House of Lords, and members appointed from it to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, perform many of the functions which in other countries are assigned to supreme courts. The proposed reform of the House of Lords, coming alongside other major constitutional reforms in the UK – including devolution and the coming into force of the Human Rights Act – offers a major opportunity to re-evaluate the constitutional role of the upper house. This opportunity was to a large extent missed by the Royal Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords, which reported in January 2000. As this study shows, the UK’s arrangements are highly unusual, with many upper chambers playing a stronger role in constitutional protection. Connections between the judiciary and the upper house are also relatively common in parliaments overseas, though in quite a different form to that in the UK.