Mehran Kamrava

Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East

After an intense flurry of research and publications on civil-military relations in the Middle East in the 1960s and the 1970s, recent studies on the subject are few and far between.! Despite the tapering off of academic interest, the intimate nexus between the state and the armed forces remains one of the most salient features of Middle Eastern politics. The continued pervasiveness of the militarys role in politics has, however, lately confronted Middle Eastern leaders with a paradoxical dilemma. On the one hand, in recent years Middle Eastern leaders and states have sought to professionalize the armed forces. On the other hand, they have been unable or unwilling to qualitatively reduce their connections with and reliance on the military establishment. This article examines the means and methods through which Middle Eastern leaders and/or states have implemented military professionalization-which, it argues, may significantly enhance the militarys political aspirations-while making sure that in the process they themselves are not swept away by yet another military coup. Military professionalization in the Middle East (the introduction of

Royal Factionalism and Political Liberalization in Qatar

Qatars much publicized liberalization campaign that began in the mid-1990s was a direct result of efforts by the new Amir, Shaykh Hamad, to compensate for his fragile base of support within the ruling Al Thani family by appealing to a broader base of Qataris and also to the international community. Historically, the Al Thani family had been one of the only centers of potential opposition to the reigning Amir, with merchant families or the religious establishment having been politically neutralized due to a variety of historical and structural reasons. Nevertheless, in relation to both groups the state has pursued a nuanced policy of simultaneous co-option and political incapacitation. Meanwhile, steady rises in oil and gas revenues allowed the state to significantly deepen its capacity in relation to society, and, by doing so, to ensure that groups from within civil society did not rise to positions of prominence. Within the Al Thanis, Shaykh Hamad undertook a number of significant changes, not the least of which was the creation of new institutions and offices that were staffed by his loyal supporters, including some of his sons and daughters. He also streamlined the line of succession to include only his own descendants. With the traditional political disquiet of the Al Thanis thus silenced, at least for now, all talks of liberalization have been dropped and the Qatari state remains fundamentally autocratic.

Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy

Uniquely for a country its size, Qatar has emerged as one of the worlds most proactive mediators in recent years. Motivated by a combination of international prestige and survival strategies, the country has sought to position itself as a neutral peacemaker in many of the international and intra-national conflicts brewing across the Middle East region. In three of the most notable cases in which it has involved itself — Lebanon, Sudan, and Yemen — Qatar has proven itself to be a capable mediator in reducing tensions but not, crucially, in resolving conflicts. Qatars successes have been facilitated by a combination of its perceived neutrality by the disputants, the vast financial resources at its disposal to host mediation talks and offer financial incentives for peace, and the personal commitment and involvement of the states top leaders. These successes, however, are often checked by limited capabilities to affect long-term changes to the preferences of the disputants through power projection abilities, in-depth administrative and on-the-ground resources, and apparent underestimations of the complexities of the deep-rooted conflicts at hand. Qatari mediation efforts are likely to continue in the foreseeable future, but their outcomes are also likely to remain mixed.

Civil society and democratisation in comparative perspective: Latin America and the Middle East

AbstractThe literature on civil society and democratisation has concentrated on comparative studies among those countries undergoing a similar and, in many ways, simultaneous process of democratic transition and consolidation. But few have examined comparatively the question of democratisation in two regions of the world that have seen completely different patterns of political rule and evolution in the course of the past two decades: Latin America and the Middle East. This article is a response to a clarion call for more cross-regional comparative studies. While describing the political, cultural and socioeconomic forces that contributed to the emergence and growth of a dense, democratic civil society in Latin America, particularly during the waning years of the most recent authoritarian period in the region, the article delves into examining the four broad cultural and socioeconomic clusters of forces that impeded and shielded the region from Samuel Huntingtons ‘third wave’ of democracy.

Pseudo‐democratic politics and populist possibilities: the rise and demise of Turkey's Refah party

Abstract Within the span of only a few years, Turkish politics witnessed the dramatic rise and fall of the Refah Party. This transformation from relative obscurity to the head of a ruling coalition and eventual banning was caused by a combination of features inherent in the Turkish political system and the party itself. Turkish democracy features the continued interference of the military in domestic political affairs on the one hand and a preponderance of largely centrist and bland ‘mainstream’ parties on the other. Nevertheless, the existence of ostensibly democratic institutions such as elections or a parliament enable potential political aspirants who are outside the mainstream to make bids for power through officially sanctioned channels. The Refahs rise was a product of the perceived uniqueness of its ideological platform and its unparalleled focus on grass roots voter mobilization. Its fall, however, came when the military considered it to have overstepped the bounds of acceptable political behavi...

The semi‐formal sector and the Turkish political economy

The general dichotomy in developing economies between the ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ economic sectors needs to be refined to account for the ‘semi‐formal’ sector: one whose activities appear to be governed by formal rules and procedures but are, in fact, largely unregulated and unrecorded by the state. Using Turkey as an example of a transitional, developing economy, the paper situates the semi‐formal sector in relation to the other two. Also important to examine is the level of autonomy which the semi‐formal sector enjoys in relation to the state and other economic sectors. Autonomy depends on access to resources, and the use of these resources in pursuit of economic, political, or socio‐cultural agendas. Three comparative lessons can be drawn: 1) despite state endeavours, a sizeable portion of seemingly formal economic activities go unreported and unregulated; 2) the semi‐formal sector helps the perpetuation of a mutually beneficial relationship of mutual neglect between state and society; and, 3) the sect...The general dichotomy in developing economies between the ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ economic sectors needs to be refined to account for the ‘semi‐formal’ sector: one whose activities appear to be governed by formal rules and procedures but are, in fact, largely unregulated and unrecorded by the state. Using Turkey as an example of a transitional, developing economy, the paper situates the semi‐formal sector in relation to the other two. Also important to examine is the level of autonomy which the semi‐formal sector enjoys in relation to the state and other economic sectors. Autonomy depends on access to resources, and the use of these resources in pursuit of economic, political, or socio‐cultural agendas. Three comparative lessons can be drawn: 1) despite state endeavours, a sizeable portion of seemingly formal economic activities go unreported and unregulated; 2) the semi‐formal sector helps the perpetuation of a mutually beneficial relationship of mutual neglect between state and society; and, 3) the sectors political agendas may best be characterised as one of ‘oppositional pragmatism’.

Revolution Revisited: the Structuralist-Voluntarist Debate

There are three ideal types of revolutions: spontaneous, planned and negotiated. The role and importance of structural factors versus human agency vary according to the general category to which a particular revolution belongs. In spontaneous revolutions, both the transition and conslidation phases are heavily conditioned by prevailing structural factors, especially those that result in the weakening of ruling state institutions and the political mobilization of one or more social groups. By contrast, in planned revolutions self-declared revolutionaries take the lead in both mobilizing supporters and weakening the state, in fact often having a highly elaborate ideological—as well as tactical and strategic—blueprint for the acquisition and consolidation of power. Negotiated revolutions see the greatest coalescence of forces involving both structural developments and human agency. The seeds of the revolution have germinated, but the prevailing structural developments are not by themselves sufficient to bring about the revolutions success. Actors representing both state and society must step in to negotiate, and only then might the revolution succeed and be consolidated.

Frozen Political Liberalization in Jordan: The Consequences for Democracy

Prompted by serious economic difficulties, in 1989 the Jordanian government launched a series of political liberalization measures aimed at rejuvenating the countrys parliament and party politics, and restoring freedom to the media. Despite much initial enthusiasm, the liberalization process has become frozen and there have been few substantive moves toward a meaningful transition to democracy. Two developments have combined to result in this democratization freeze. One is the reluctance of the state to give up many of its powers in relation to the forces of civil society. A second is the inability of professional associations and the emerging parliamentary opposition bloc to formulate and institute viable links within themselves and with other social actors in an attempt to pressure the monarchy for more political concessions. The hybrid, semi‐democratic, absolutist monarchy that has emerged in the process has enhanced its popular legitimacy by adopting certain democratic trappings, which, in the short ...

The Middle East’s Democracy Deficit in Comparative Perspective

The Middle Easts democracy deficit is a product of the patterns of political and economic development in the region. It is not because the region is predominantly Islamic or is somehow afflicted by purportedly undemocratic cultures. By itself, culture is not an impediment to transition to democracy as it is subject to influences from the larger polity, especially insofar as the economy and the initiatives of the state are concerned. Instead, transition to democracy is determined by the degree of societys autonomy from the state. This autonomy may result from the empowerment of society as a consequence of economic development, or the state elites devolution of power to social actors and classes, or, more commonly, a combination of both. Assumptions about the inherently undemocratic nature of cultures such as Islamic and Confucian ones are fundamentally invalid. The key to understanding democratic transitions lies instead in the nature of state-society relations rather than the nature of societys norms and values in themselves.

State-Business Relations and Clientelism in Qatar

Abstract The business community has emerged as one of the main clients of the state in Qatar. This clientelistic relationship is anchored in three main developments. First, given the multiple commercial and familial linkages between Qatari merchants and individuals occupying the central organs of the state, divisions between the “state” and “business” are more conceptual than actual in Qatar. Second, family and clan dynamics are often highly consequential in shaping patterns of interaction between Qatari merchants and the state, and specifically the Al Thani ruling family. Third, these interactions occur within and between concentric circles of power and influence that begin with a small core of political and economic decision-makers and extend to successive layers of society. In the process, the erosion of the private sector’s autonomy to the centralized, rentier state is further accentuated through its dependence on multiple and overlapping clientelistic networks and linkages connecting the state to the inner reaches of the Qatari society.