Meng-Day (Mandel) Yu
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
Network
Latest external collaboration on country level. Dive into details by clicking on the dots.
Publication
Featured researches published by Meng-Day (Mandel) Yu.
Proceedings of the IEEE | 2014
Charles Herder; Meng-Day (Mandel) Yu; Farinaz Koushanfar; Srinivas Devadas
This paper describes the use of physical unclonable functions (PUFs) in low-cost authentication and key generation applications. First, it motivates the use of PUFs versus conventional secure nonvolatile memories and defines the two primary PUF types: “strong PUFs” and “weak PUFs.” It describes strong PUF implementations and their use for low-cost authentication. After this description, the paper covers both attacks and protocols to address errors. Next, the paper covers weak PUF implementations and their use in key generation applications. It covers error-correction schemes such as pattern matching and index-based coding. Finally, this paper reviews several emerging concepts in PUF technologies such as public model PUFs and new PUF implementation technologies.
hardware-oriented security and trust | 2014
Meng-Day (Mandel) Yu; David M'Raïhi; Ingrid Verbauwhede; Srinivas Devadas
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) allow a silicon device to be authenticated based on its manufacturing variations using challenge/response evaluations. Popular realizations use linear additive functions as building blocks. Security is scaled up using non-linear mixing (e.g., adding XORs). Because the responses are physically derived and thus noisy, the resulting explosion in noise impacts both the adversary (which is desirable) as well as the verifier (which is undesirable). We present the first architecture for linear additive physical functions where the noise seen by the adversary and the noise seen by the verifier are bifurcated by using a randomized decimation technique and a novel response recovery method at an authentication verification server. We allow the adversarys noise ηa → 0.50 while keeping the verifiers noise ηv constant, using a parameter-based authentication modality that does not require explicit challenge/response pair storage at the server. We present supporting data using 28nm FPGA PUF noise results as well as machine learning attack results. We demonstrate that our architecture can also withstand recent side-channel attacks that filter the noise (to clean up training challenge/response labels) prior to machine learning.
ACM Queue | 2016
Meng-Day (Mandel) Yu; Srinivas Devadas
Authentication of physical items is an age-old problem. Common approaches include the use of bar codes, QR codes, holograms, and RFID (radio-frequency identification) tags. Traditional RFID tags and bar codes use a public identifier as a means of authenticating. A public identifier, however, is static: it is the same each time when queried and can be easily copied by an adversary. Holograms can also be viewed as public identifiers: a knowledgeable verifier knows all the attributes to inspect visually. It is difficult to make hologram-based authentication pervasive; a casual verifier does not know all the attributes to look for. Further, to achieve pervasive authentication, it is useful for the authentication modality to be easy to integrate with modern electronic devices (e.g., mobile smartphones) and to be easy for non-experts to use.
IEEE | 2010
Srinivas Devadas; Meng-Day (Mandel) Yu
Archive | 2012
Meng-Day (Mandel) Yu; Srinivas Devadas; David M'Raïhi; Eric Duprat
Archive | 2010
Srinivas Devadas; Meng-Day (Mandel) Yu
GOMACTech conference | 2013
Meng-Day (Mandel) Yu; David M'Raïhi; Srinivas Devadas; Ingrid Verbauwhede
Archive | 2010
Meng-Day (Mandel) Yu; Srinivas Devadas
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive | 2014
Charles Herder; Ling Ren; Marten van Dijk; Meng-Day (Mandel) Yu; Srinivas Devadas
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive | 2015
Charles Herder; Ling Ren; Marten van Dijk; Meng-Day (Mandel) Yu; Srinivas Devadas