Meredith Kolsky Lewis

The Lack of Dissent in WTO Dispute Settlement

This article analyses in detail the fact that there has been almost no dissent in World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement reports. Only a handful of articles have noted this phenomenon, even in passing. The article first examines the empirical data with respect to dissenting and concurring opinions at both the panel and Appellate Body levels. Fewer than 5% of panel reports and 2% of Appellate Body reports contain separate opinions of any kind. Second, it shows that the WTO is in fact actively discouraging dissents and discusses why this might be the case. The article argues that dissents are valuable in general and assesses whether more dissents would be a positive for the WTO. It then reviews the few dissents that have been published and demonstrates that 50% of the arguments raised in dissents at the panel level were adopted in whole or in part on appeal by the Appellate Body, thus illustrating dissents can and do make a difference. The article concludes that keeping the lid on dissents may ultimately erode the strength of the dispute settlement system and hinder the ability of the WTO Members to make appropriate changes to the Agreements. Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.

International Political Economy and the Prisoner's Dilemma: Compliance with International Law

This chapter explores the concept of the prisoner’s dilemma in the context of compliance with international law. It examines the prisoner’s dilemma in a variety of international law contexts, from which international law can be seen as explanandum in that a prisoner’s dilemma sometimes leads to the creation of international law. International law can also serve as explanans in the context of the prisoner’s dilemma, in that international law has consequences and effects for prisoner’s dilemmas while not always resolving them. The chapter also identifies some limitations of the prisoner’s dilemma, in particular by highlighting examples of political economy factors that confound the assumptions inherent to a prisoner’s dilemma analysis.

The United States’ Path to Concluding the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Will TPA + TAA = TPP?

The political economy of international trade decision-making within the United States is ever-changing and complex. The recent debates over the merits of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP,) and the associated efforts of the Obama Administration to obtain Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), highlight these complexities. This short article is an attempt to clarify the political economy dynamics in the United States with respect to the TPP. It first explains what Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) is and why President Obama needed to have TPA as a precursor to concluding the TPP negotiations. Second, it discusses some of the internal political dynamics impacting support for, or opposition to, the TPP, as well as the Administration’s previous failures to obtain TPA for the TPP negotiations. Third, the piece addresses Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) and its interplay with TPA. The article concludes with an assessment of the ramifications for the TPP of the House and Senate having passed both the TPA and TAA bills.