Merrilee H. Salmon

What Can Systems Theory Do for Archaeology

This paper examines the relevance of systems theory to archaeology. General Systems Theory and Mathematical Systems Theory are considered. Although it is important for archaeologists to look at the materials they study as components of a larger cultural and ecological context, neither version of systems theory can offer archaeologists much help in constructing archaeological theories or in providing models of archaeological explanation.

Déductive Versus Inductive Archaeology

Disagreements among archaeologists about whether inductive or deductive methods are appropriate for establishing archaeological hypotheses are often founded in a misunderstanding of the nature of inductive reasoning. In this paper several cases of confirmation of archaeological hypotheses are examined in order to expose the logical structure of the reasoning involved. In all these cases the structure is basically inductive. In actual practice the methodology adopted by archaeologists is far more sophisticated than the account of this methodology presented by archaeologists.

Mathematics and culture

Crump, Thomas. The Anthropology of Numbers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. x + 201 pp. including bibliography and index.

Theory Building in Archaeology

49.50 cloth. Ascher, Marcia. Ethnomathematics: A Multicultural View of Mathematical Ideas. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishers, 1991. ix + 203 pp. including notes and index.

Philosophy of archaeology: Current issues

36.95 cloth.

Ascribing Functions to Archaeological Objects

Widespread agreement exists that archaeology lacks well developed theories that command acceptance. This chapter discusses several issues related to the development of a theory of archaeology. Attempts based on reforms of definitions or revisions of classificatory schemes are examined and criticized for their neglect of some complexities in the problem of formulating adequate definitions. In particular, the view that providing clear definitions is a necessary preamble to theory construction has been rejected in light of the strong interdependence between these two activities. In theory construction, one should be especially attentive to definitions, sometimes rejecting or revising old definitions, sometimes formulating new ones. But it is not feasible to resolve definitional problems first and then persevere with theory building. The two activities should proceed simultaneously. Another approach to theory building claims that it is both possible and advantageous to construct formal or axiomatic theories of archaeology. Any set of sentences with a specified vocabulary that meets certain formal criteria constitutes a formal theory. Although formal theories that deal with archaeological subject matter, such as the relation between habitation area and population size, are constructible, no case has been made for their explanatory value.

PHILOSOPHY OF ARCHAEOLOGY

Recent literature reflects continuing concern with problems such as explanation, skepticism, and objective knowledge. Some authors urge archaeologists to abandon “positivism” in favor of new “philosophical” approaches, such as feminism, Marxism, hermeneutics, and critical theory. Ethical issues have received increased attention as archaeologists have become involved in determining public policy with regard to disposition of artifacts and uncovering of human burials.

Explanation in Archaeology

Reliable ascription of functions to items found in archaeological sites can be a serious problem for archaeologists concerned with understanding human behaviour on the basis of material remains. Obviously there is no opportunity to question the makers of the artifacts with respect to their purposes, nor is there any direct observation of how these items functioned in the society which produced and used them. How do we know, forexample, that the function of the so-called smoke hole was to let smoke escape from a dwelling? Perhaps the designers of the house intended the hole for some other purpose, for which the hole served admirably. Experiments with fire in the dwelling, or in a reconstruction of a similar one, might convince us that smoke could escape from such a hole, or there may be evidence that smoke did escape from the hole. But such evidence is not as convincing as it might be, for we can distinguish between the function(s) of an item and other ‘accidental’ uses for it. Forexample, it is not the function of an ice pick to inflict serious wounds, even though picks have been used this way and are eRicient instruments for this task. To support assertions of function, archaeologists have long made use of analogical inferences from items of similar form, found in ethnographic situations, when the functions of the ethnographically found items are well known. When pieces of stone at an archaeological site are classified as metates or as grinding stones, analogical inferences of this type provide the basis. Many items found in archaeological contexts are so similar in form to those used in ethnographic contexts that functions are attributed without hesitation. Flannery (1%8, p. 69) cites certain implements, such as projectiles, fibre shredders, collecting tongs: and facilities, such as baskets, carrying bags, and storage pits as examples of items, associated with food procurement in contemporary societies, which have archaeological counterparts. Very often, the context of association is important when ascribing functions. In the case just mentioned, the implements and facilities were found in dry caves in close association with food remains, and this context, in addition to similarities of form, supports Flannery’s ascription of functions to them. Context can be particularly helpful in assigning some ritual function to an object when there are no ethnographically known items of similar form. When a Particular kind of item is found only, orchiefly, associated with burials, then it is reasonable to infer that it played a role in some burial ritual. Flannery suggests that when a type ofitem is found mainly with ‘elite’ households it may have had the ritual function of communicating the elite state of inhabitants of the household (1976, p. 333).

Numbers out of school

The philosophy of archaeology addresses philosophical issues as they arise in the discipline of archaeology. This article takes up several epistemological and ethical concerns. The former include problems concerning definition and classification, evidence and confirmation, and the nature of explanation. Ethical issues in this article focus on the principles that govern the acquisition and preservation of archaeological materials and the dissemination of archaeological knowledge.

Reasoning in the social sciences

Archaeology is an interdisciplinary field of study with implications that reach far beyond academia. Today, most people recognize the close connections between archaeology and the state. Governments regulate, at least indirectly, most archaeological work since they are charged with preserving their countries’ cultural heritage. Archaeological excavation is so expensive that government money is required to support any large scale project. Archaeological work is politically important because archaeologists can trace the occupation of ethnic groups in particular territories over significant periods of time. By combining archaeological information about former inhabitants of a land with politicians’ contemporary cultural views about the continuity of property rights, governments attempt to challenge or to defend present political boundaries.1