Micael Castanheira

The Optimal Speed of Transition: A General Equilibrium Analysis

A structure which achieves a sloped topography where a layer of polycrystalline silicon contacts a single crystal silicon substrate and a process for fabricating the structure are disclosed. The structure comprises a sloped tip of a single crystal silicon material located at the end of the polycrystalline silicon layer and making contact with the single crystal silicon substrate. The process involves defining the polycrystalline silicon layer by applying an orientation-selective etch which etches unwanted polycrystalline silicon preferentially to single crystal silicon so that the sloped tip remains essentially intact to achieve said sloped topography contact area.

One person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation

In elections, majority divisions pave the way to focal manipulations and coordination failures, which can lead to the victory of the wrong candidate. This paper shows how this flaw can be addressed if voter preferences over candidates are sensitive to information. We consider two potential sources of divisions: majority voters may have similar preferences but opposite information about the candidates, or opposite preferences. We show that when information is the source of majority divisions, Approval Voting features a unique equilibrium with full information and coordination equivalence. That is, it produces the same outcome as if both information and coordination problems could be resolved. Other electoral systems, such as Plurality and Two-Round elections, do not satisfy this equivalence. The second source of division is opposite preferences. Whenever the fraction of voters with such preferences is not too large, Approval Voting still satisfies full information and coordination equivalence.

INFORMATION AND STRATEGIC POLITICAL POLARISATION

We develop a model of electoral competition in which two opportunistic candidates select their policy position and invest in quality. Policy positions are observed and, during the campaign, the press reveals some information about quality. We demonstrate that when information is imperfect, the Black-Downs median voter theorem fails to hold. For intermediate information levels, the unique equilibrium is such that candidates propose policies different from the median voters bliss point. By contrast, convergence to the median occurs when quality is (almost) always or (almost) never revealed. We also show that a profit-maximising press may collect more information than socially optimal. Copyright

Victory margins and the paradox of voting

This paper addresses a simple question: why do people vote? Though simple, this question remains unanswered despite the considerable attention it has received. In this paper, I show that purely rational-instrumental factors explain a large fraction of turnout variations, provided that the effect of the margin of victory on implemented policy is considered. I extend Myersons models of elections based on Poisson games, and show that, when platforms are responsive to vote shares, the predictions of the model become consistent with several stylized facts, including the secular fall in turnout rates in the US.

Political economy of growth: lessons learned and challenges ahead

This chapter examines the lessons of recent research on the political economy of growth in light of regional survey papers commissioned by the Global Research Project on Growth.1 We develop a relatively general framework that encompasses a variety of issues highlighted in those papers based on regional experiences. We then review the existing evidence and assess the hypotheses put forward in those papers. In the last section, we present conclusions and offer suggestions for further research on critical issues in the political economy of growth that are not yet well-understood. The purpose of this exercise is to assess current findings and identify the theoretical and empirical work needed at the country and cross-country levels in order for the political economy of growth analysis to provide a deeper perspective on the process of growth.

Public Finance and the Optimal Speed of Transition

We develop a general equilibrium model that jointly considers the influence of capital accumulation constraints and of labour market frictions on the process of transition. We endogenize the economic and budgetary costs of different government policies and show that, early in transition, governments ought to subsidize state firms. Provided that intertemporal commitment is feasible, this policy limits the initial output fall, which relaxes capital accumulation constraints, accelerates transition, and increases welfare. Moreover, by resorting to indirect - instead of direct - taxes, governments can bring the path of transition closer to the first best. Yet, political pressures may induce a policy of suboptimal subsidization.

Multicandidate elections: Aggregate uncertainty in the laboratory

The rational-voter model is often criticized on the grounds that two of its central predictions (the paradox of voting and Duvergers Law) are at odds with reality. Recent theoretical advances suggest that these empirically unsound predictions might be an artifact of an (arguably unrealistic) assumption: the absence of aggregate uncertainty about the distribution of preferences in the electorate. In this paper, we propose direct empirical evidence of the effect of aggregate uncertainty in multicandidate elections. Adopting a theory-based experimental approach, we explore whether aggregate uncertainty indeed favors the emergence of non-Duvergers law equilibria in plurality elections. Our experimental results support the main theoretical predictions: sincere voting is a predominant strategy under aggregate uncertainty, whereas without aggregate uncertainty, voters massively coordinate their votes behind one candidate, who wins almost surely.