Michael A. Bishop

Why Thought Experiments Are Not Arguments

Are thought experiments nothing but arguments? I argue that it is not possible to make sense of the historical trajectory of certain thought experiments if one takes them to be arguments. Einstein and Bohr disagreed about the outcome of the clock-in-the-box thought experiment, and so they reconstructed it using different arguments. This is to be expected whenever scientists disagree about a thought experiments outcome. Since any such episode consists of two arguments but just one thought experiment, the thought experiment cannot be the arguments.

50 Years of Successful Predictive Modeling Should Be Enough: Lessons for Philosophy of Science

Our aim in this paper is to bring the woefully neglected literature on predictive modeling to bear on some central questions in the philosophy of science. The lesson of this literature is straightforward: For a very wide range of prediction problems, statistical prediction rules (SPRs), often rules that are very easy to implement, make predictions than are as reliable as, and typically more reliable than, human experts. We will argue that the success of SPRs forces us to reconsider our views about what is involved in understanding, explanation, good reasoning, and about how we ought to do philosophy of science.

In praise of epistemic irresponsibility: How lazy and ignorant can you be'?

Epistemic responsibility involves at least two central ideas. (V) To be epistemically responsible is to display the virtue(s) epistemic internalists take to be central to justification (e.g., coherence, having good reasons, fitting the evidence)

The Flight to Reference, or How Not to Make Progress in the Philosophy of Science

The flight to reference is a widely-used strategy for resolving philosophical issues. The three steps in a flight to reference argument are: (1) offer a substantive account of the reference relation, (2) argue that a particular expression refers (or does not refer), and (3) draw a philosophical conclusion about something other than reference, like truth or ontology. It is our contention that whenever the flight to reference strategy is invoked, there is a crucial step that is left undefended, and that without a defense of this step, the flight to reference is a fatally flawed strategy; it cannot succeed in resolving philosophical issues. In this paper we begin by setting out the flight to reference strategy and explaining what is wrong with arguments that invoke the strategy. We then illustrate the problem by considering arguments for and against eliminative materialism. In the final section we argue that much the same problem undermines Philip Kitchers attempt to defend scientific realism.

The pessimistic induction, the flight to reference and the metaphysical zoo

Scientific realism says of our best scientific theories that (1) most of their important posits exist and (2) most of their central claims are approximately true. Antirealists sometimes offer the pessimistic induction in reply: since (1) and (2) are false about past successful theories, they are probably false about our own best theories too. The contemporary debate about this argument has turned (and become stuck) on the question, Do the central terms of successful scientific theories refer? For example, Larry Laudan offers a list of successful theories that employed central terms that failed to refer, and Philip Kitcher replies with a view about reference in which the central terms of such theories did sometimes refer. This article attempts to break this stalemate by proposing a direct version of the pessimistic induction, one that makes no explicit appeal to a substantive notion or theory of reference. While it is premature to say that this argument succeeds in showing that realism is probably false, the direct pessimistic induction is not subject to any kind of reference-based objection that might cripple a weaker, indirect version of the argument. Any attempt to trounce the direct pessimistic induction with a theory of reference fails.

The theory theory thrice over: the child as scientist, Superscientist or social institution?

Alison Gopnik and Andrew Meltzoff have argued for a view they call the ‘theory theory’: theory change in science and children are similar. While their version of the theory theory has been criticized for depending on a number of disputed claims, we argue that there is a fundamental problem which is much more basic: the theory theory is multiply ambiguous. We show that it might be claiming that a similarity holds between theory change in children and (i) individual scientists, (ii) a rational reconstruction of a Superscientist, or (iii) the scientific community. We argue that (i) is false, (ii) is non-empirical (which is problematic since the theory theory is supposed to be a bold empirical hypothesis), and (iii) is either false or doesn’t make enough sense to have a truth-value. We conclude that the theory theory is an interesting failure. Its failure points the way to a full, empirical picture of scientific development, one that marries a concern with the social dynamics of science to a psychological theory of scientific cognition.  2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Theory-Ladenness of Perception Arguments

The first aim of this paper is to adduce a framework for understanding theory-ladenness of perception arguments. The second aim is to begin to assess an important cluster of theory-ladenness arguments-those that begin with some psychological phenomenon and conclude that scientific controversies are resolved without appeal to theory-neutral observations. Three of the arguments (from expectation effects, ambiguous figures, and inverting lenses) turn out to be either irrelevant to or subversive of theory-ladenness. And even if we grant the premises of the fourth argument (from the penetrability of the visual system), it will support at best a mild version of theory-ladenness.

Epistemology's search for significance

Epistemology is supposed to guide our reason. This means that epistemology is practically important because our beliefs so often play a decisive role in how we decide to act. We argue that in order to be effectively action-guiding, traditional epistemological theories must be supplemented with an account of significance—of what makes one reasoning problem significant and another reasoning problem insignificant. We sketch the beginning of an account of significance that employs Signal Detection Theory. We then argue that any internalist theory of justification is not going to fit smoothly with a plausible account of significance. This calls into question the power of internalist theories of justification to effectively guide reason and action.

Tychomancy: Inferring Probability from Causal Structure, by Michael Strevens

why does this speak in favour of events of perceptual acquaintance? Soteriou suggests that states that constitutively depend upon events are ‘occurrent states’ [2, and passim], which borrow something of the dynamic character of the events upon which they depend. But if perceptual states can borrow the dynamic structure of events, why can’t they just borrow the dynamic structure of the events that are their objects? (That might require taking states of event-perception to be event-dependent; but given that many philosophers require perceptual states to be object dependent anyway, it is not clear we should baulk at this.) Here, too, further discussion would have been welcome. The Mind’s Construction is not likely to be the final word on the many topics it touches upon. Nevertheless, in making a convincing case for the importance of distinctions in temporal structure in the philosophy of mind, it is an important contribution to the literature.