Michael A. Gilbert
York University
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Philosophy of the Social Sciences | 1994
Michael A. Gilbert
The main stream of formal and informal logic as well as more recent work in discourse analysis provides a way of understanding certain arguments that particularly lend themselves to rational analysis. I argue, however, that these, and allied modes of analysis, be seen as heuristic models and not as the only proper mode of argument. This article introduces three other modes of argumen tation that emphasize distinct aspects of human communication, but that, at the same time, must be considered for the full understanding of argumentation. These modes are (1) the emotional, which relates to the realm of feelings, (2) the visceral, which stems from the area of the physical, and (3) the kisceral, which covers the intuitive and non-sensory arenas. At its most extreme the view holds that arguments may be given (almost) wholly within one mode and not be at all susceptible to those methods of argument analysis previously used. A more cautious statement allows that any interactive argument will (possibly) contain elements from various modes, and that to attempt to reduce these all to the rational is prejudiced reductionism.
Argumentation | 2002
Michael A. Gilbert
Words, just because they are words, are not inherently clear. The message they contain becomes clear to those who speak the language and are familiar with the issues and contexts. If the message lacks linguistic clarity the recipient of the message will typically make a query that will bring forth further information intended to clarify. The result might be more words, but it might also involve pointing or drawing, or words that utilize other modes such as references to context, history, and so on. If the ambiguity derives from an inconsistency between, say, words and behaviour, one may look to either mode for clarity. Communication, we must accept, actually occurs in messages, and our ability to transmit information may be limited by any number of factors. When we focus entirely on discursive aspects of communication we limit both the ways in which we receive and ways in which we transmit information. The logocentric fallacy is committed when language, especially in its most logical guise, is seen to be the only form of rational communication.
Argumentation Machines | 2003
Michael A. Gilbert; Floriana Grasso; Leo Groarke; Corin A. Gurr; Janne M. Gerlofs
The aim of this chapter is to explore the problems and challenges of creating a ‘Persuasion Machine’ that is intended to engage a user in an argument in order to persuade her of some point of view. The approach is to start with a focus upon breadth, and to bring structure to an ill-structured problem. From there, for each component and each subproblem, the linguistic, computational, rhetorical and argumentation-theoretic theory drivers are integrated, to develop scaffolding and solutions that work not only as an environment in which to assess new theoretical developments, but also as a route to implementation and evaluation.
Philosophy of the Social Sciences | 1995
Michael A. Gilbert
embracing of the realities of everyday argumentation and in its reference to and use of state-of-the-art techniques of analysis. The title of Walton’s book aptly describes its main purpose: the investigation of the place of emotion in argumentation. His method involves the detailed analysis of four fallacies that essentially rely on emotion. In each case, the particular fallacy is described as an argument form rather than a simple fallacy. That is, the &dquo;fallacy&dquo; is shown to have both fallacious and nonfallacious instances of use. This is
Philosophy of the Social Sciences | 1993
Michael A. Gilbert
was published in 1983 by the same press. In it, Willard argues for a strong notion of field theory that includes incommensurablity on the metalevel as well as on the object level. That is, the rules of argument, as well as beliefs and facts, may change from field to field. As a result, argument must be studied in situ rather than being viewed, as, say, formal logic views it, as an objective context-independent set of overarching rules. In this new book, Willard continues the exploration begun earlier, only now the subject is not the field
Informal Logic | 1994
Michael A. Gilbert
Informal Logic | 2004
Michael A. Gilbert
Archive | 1996
Michael A. Gilbert
Archive | 1997
Michael A. Gilbert
FAPR '96 Proceedings of the International Conference on Formal and Applied Practical Reasoning | 1996
Michael A. Gilbert