Michael C. Herron

Leadership and Pandering: A Theory of Executive Policymaking

We develop an informational theory that analyzes conditions under which a reelection-seeking executive will act in the public interest. The theory considers factors such as executive competence, challenger quality, and the likelihood that voters will learn the consequences of policy decisions before an upcoming election. We ...nd that an executive who has information suggesting that a popular policy is contrary to voters’ interests may or may not pander to voters by choosing it; under certain conditions, the executive can actually increase his probability of reelection by choosing an unpopular policy that is in the public interest. However, we also show that an executive will sometimes face electoral incentives to enact a policy that is both unpopular and contrary to voters’ interests. We illustrate our model with examples involving President Abraham Lincoln, California Governor Earl Warren, and President Gerald Ford. ¤For helpful comments we thank Steve Ansolabehere, David Austen-Smith, Dan Carpenter, Cary Covington, Patricia Conley, Daniel Diermeier, Tim Fedderson, Fred Greenstein, Keith Krehbiel, Dan Kryder, Jim Snyder, Craig Volden, and seminar participants at Berkeley, Dartmouth, Harvard, MIT, Northwestern, NYU Law School, Princeton, Stanford, and SUNY Stony Brook. yAssistant Professor of Political Science, MIT. zAssistant Professor of Political Science, Northwestern University. xCorresponding author. Assistant Professor of Political Science, Northwestern University, 601 University Place, Evanston IL 60208-1006. Email: k-shotts@nwu.edu. Phone: (847) 491-2628. Fax: (847) 491-8985. “There are some who would be inclined to regard the servile pliancy of the Executive to a prevailing current...as its best recommendation. But such men entertain very crude notions, as well of the purposes for which government was instituted, as of the true means by which the public happiness may be promoted...When occasions present themselves, in which the interests of the people are at variance with their inclinations, it is the duty of the persons whom they have appointed to be the guardians of those interests.” Alexander Hamilton, Federalist Paper 71

Leapfrog Representation and Extremism: A Study of American Voters and Their Members in Congress

We consider the relationship between the preferences of American voters and the preferences of the U.S. legislators who represent them. Using an Internet-based, national opinion survey in conjunction with legislator voting records from the 109th and 110th Congresses, we show that members of Congress are more extreme than their constituents, i.e., that there is a lack of congruence between American voters and members of Congress. We also show that when a congressional legislator is replaced by a new member of the opposite party, one relative extremist is replaced by an opposing extremist. We call this leapfrog representation, a form of representation that leaves moderates with a dearth of representation in Congress. We see evidence of leapfrog representation in states and House districts and in the aggregate as well: the median member of the 109th House was too conservative compared to the median American voter, yet the median of the 110th House was too liberal. Thus, the median American voter was leapfrogged when the 109th House transitioned to the 110th. Although turnover between the 109th and 110th Senates occurred at approximately the same rate as between the 109th and 110th Houses, the Senate appears to be a more moderate institution whose median member does not move as abruptly as that of the House.

Estimating the Economic Impact of Political Party Competition in the 1992 British Election

quences of government partisanship. major problem facing researchers who study the consequences of government partisanship is that it is difficult to ascertain the potential economic impact of governments which, because of election defeats, never existed. Consider, for instance, a Labour government in Britain in 1992, a Conservative government in 1997, or a Dole Administration in the United States. None of these governments actually took office, and, for obvious reasons, this impedes analysis of what effects they would have had on their respective national economies. Here, I present a methodology designed to estimate the economic impact that an election-losing party would have caused had it achieved office. I focus in particular on the 1992 British polity and demonstrate that campaign-period prices of London-based, publicly traded securities can be used to estimate what was expected to have happened in the British economy conditional on a 1992 Labour victory. The estimates show that a Labour government in 1992 was expected by British investors to have ushered in significantly higher interest rates and depressed stock markets compared to those witnessed under the victorious Conservative Party. These results imply that the Labour-Conservative disparity in 1992 was substantial and that, relative to the Conservative Party, Labour was truly left-wing. Prices of market-traded securities, ostensibly nonpolitical variables, can convey a great deal about political parties, electoral competition, and the consequences of government partisanship. Suppose, for example, that prices in London stock markets were unusually volatile during the 1992 British election campaign and that they jumped dramatically following polling day and the Conservative victory. According to the analytical ap-

Measurement of Political Effects in the United States Economy: A Study of the 1992 Presidential Election

This paper analyzes the link between the 1992 United States presidential election outcome and a collection of American economic sectors. Based on data from the 1992 Iowa Political Stock Market and campaign-period stock portfolio behavior, we identify 15 economic sectors, of 74 examined, whose profits varied in a statistically significant manner with movements in Iowa Market-based measures of presidential candidate standing. And, in light of 1992 campaign rhetoric pertaining to defense policy and environmental issues, we build on this finding with an analysis of selected defense firms and firms known to be toxic waste emitters. Copyright 1999 Blackwell Publishers Ltd..

Overvoting and representation: an examination of overvoted presidential ballots in Broward and Miami-Dade counties

Abstract The closeness of the 2000 presidential election, especially in the state of Florida, has drawn attention to the importance of voting anomalies caused by ballot design, voting technology, and voter errors. In this paper we focus on a particular type of voter error: casting multiple votes for president on a single ballot. Ballots cast in this way are said to contain presidential overvotes, and we examine overvoting patterns in Broward and Miami-Dade Counties, two large and prominent counties in Florida. Using a dataset which contains electronic images of all ballots cast in these counties for the 2000 election, we identify several definitive patterns among overvoted ballots. First, we show that ballots with overvotes on non-presidential races were more likely to contain presidential overvotes compared to ballots with no overvotes elsewhere. Second, we show that ballots with presidential overvotes appear to have been cast by Democratically-inclined individuals and that Al Gore, the Democratic presidential candidate in 2000, appears on a disproportionate number of these ballots. Third and finally, we show that Broward and Miami-Dade precincts with large numbers of blacks, Hispanics, and registered Democrats tended to have high presidential overvoting rates. Overall, the evidence we present implies that a disproportionate fraction of the presidential overvotes cast in Broward and Miami-Dade Counties in the 2000 election were produced by Democrats and this diminished the vote total of Al Gore.

Government Redistribution in the Shadow of Legislative Elections: A Study of the Illinois Member Initiative Grants Program

We study an Illinois state government program called �member initiative spending� and examine the extent to which three competing theories can explain the programs allocations among Illinoiss 118 House districts. We show that member initiative monies distributed before the 2000 general election were disproportionately allocated to districts that were politically competitive, represented by legislative leaders, or represented by moderate legislators. Our analysis supports theories that claim budgetary decisions made by elected officials are tactical, and it shows that the Illinois decision makers who allocated member initiative funds sought to distribute them in a way that would be most beneficial in the sense of vote buying.

Term Limits and Pork

We describe a model of electoral selection and legislative policy choice that explores the effects of term limits on legislative spending. In the model, self-interested voters in a collection of districts prefer representatives who deliver pork over representatives who maximize aggregate social welfare. Term limits can, in some cases, inhibit voters from selecting representatives who deliver particularistic benefits, and, in these cases, term limits reduce pork spending. On the other hand, when pork is extremely socially inefficient, representatives who want to deliver pork to their districts have incentives to refrain from doing so to reduce future pork in other districts. In this scenario, term limits actually prevent legislators from promoting future spending moderation and thus paradoxically increase pork spending.

Did Ralph Nader Spoil Al Gore's Presidential Bid? A Ballot-Level Study of Green and Reform Party Voters in the 2000 Presidential Election

Did Ralph Nader Spoil Al Gores Presidential Bid? A Ballot-Level Study of Green and Reform Party Voters in the 2000 Presidential Election

Race, Party, and the Consequences of Restricting Early Voting in Florida in the 2012 General Election

In mid-2011, the Florida legislature reduced the state’s early voting period from fourteen days to eight and eliminated the final Sunday of early voting. We compare observed voting patterns in 2012 with those in the 2008 General Election and find that racial/ethnic minorities, registered Democrats, and those without party affiliation had significant early voting participation drops and that voters who cast ballots on the final Sunday in 2008 were disproportionately unlikely to cast a valid ballot in 2012. Florida’s decision to truncate early voting may have diminished participation rates of those already least likely to vote.

The Effects of House Bill 1355 on Voter Registration in Florida

In mid-2011, the Florida state legislature passed House Bill 1355 (HB 1355) and in so doing placed new regulations on community organizations that historically have helped eligible Floridians register to vote. Among the legal changes promulgated by this bill were new regulations on the operations of groups like the League of Women Voters and a new oath, warning of prison time and fines, that voter registration agents were required to sign. Such changes raised the implicit costs that eligible Florida citizens faced when registering to vote, and we show that voter registrations across the state in the second half of 2011 dropped precipitously compared with registrations in the second half of 2007. This pattern is evident among registrants in general, among registrants age 20 and younger, and among individuals who registered as Democrats. Outside of HB 1355, we know of no credible explanations for these results. Our findings thus show how restrictions on the way that third-party organizations register voters can have tangible effects on actual registrations. Given that registration prior to an election is a civic necessity in Florida and in many other states, such restrictions have the potential to affect electoral outcomes as well.