Michael Conlin

A Group Rule-Utilitarian Approach to Voter Turnout: Theory and Evidence

This paper explores a group rule–utilitarian approach to understanding voter turnout, inspired by the theoretical work of John C. Harsanyi (1980) and Timothy J. Feddersen and Alvaro Sandroni (2002). It develops a model based on this approach and studies its performance in explaining turnout in Texas liquor referenda. The results are encouraging: the comparative static predictions of the model are broadly consistent with the data, and a structurally estimated version of the model yields reasonable coefficient estimates and fits the data well. The structurally estimated model also outperforms a simple expressive voting model.

The norm of restaurant tipping

Abstract Using survey data, we identify a variety of factors that influence tipping behavior and in the process lay out a simple theoretical framework to help to interpret our empirical observations. We first investigate the efficiency of observed tipping behavior. While there are elements of efficiency—notably, percent tip depends on service quality—it does not appear fully efficient. We then posit a model in which customers trade off material well-being against disutility from not adhering to the norm, and we use this model to reinterpret initial empirical findings and make additional empirical predictions.

Slippery When Wet: The Effects of Local Alcohol Access Laws on Highway Safety

Using detailed panel data on local alcohol policy changes in Texas, this paper tests whether the effect of these changes on alcohol-related accidents depends on whether the policy change involves where the alcohol is consumed and the type of alcohol consumed. After controlling for both county and year fixed effects, we find evidence that: (i) the sale of beer and wine may actually decrease expected accidents; and (ii) the sale of higher alcohol-content liquor may present greater risk to highway safety than the sale of just beer and wine.

Entry-Deterring Capacity in the Texas Lodging Industry

This paper empirically tests whether capacity is used to deter entry and whether the amount invested in entry-deterring capacity is related to market concentration and market presence. We use a unique dataset containing 3,830 lodging properties in Texas from 1991 through 1997. We find that there is higher investment in capacity relative to demand (i.e., idle capacity) in markets with a larger Herfindahl index and by firms with a larger share of market capacity. These results are consistent with the entry deterrence literature that suggests firms in more concentrated markets and firms with a larger market share have greater incentive to invest in entry-deterring capacity.

The effect of alcohol prohibition on illicit-drug-related crimes

We evaluate the effect of alcohol access on drug‐related crime and mortality using detailed information on access laws in Texas between 1978 and 1996. Counties with alcohol access have higher average levels of drug‐related crimes. However, after controlling for both county and year fixed effects, we find that having local alcohol access decreases crime associated with illicit drugs. This basic finding is replicated in two alternative analyses. First, we find that prohibiting the sale of beer to persons under 21, which arguably increases the implicit price of liquor more for juveniles in wet counties than for those in dry counties, increases the fraction of drug‐related arrests involving juveniles more in wet counties than in dry counties. Second, we find that after controlling for both county and year fixed effects, local alcohol access decreases mortality associated with illicit drugs. Alcohol access and illicit‐drug‐related outcomes appear to be substitutes.

Peer group micro-lending programs in Canada and the United States

Abstract There are numerous theoretical models that consider peer group micro-lending programs. These models use monitoring, peer pressure, mutual insurance, information transfer and the costs of entering new relationships to explain the success of peer group micro-lending programs outside Canada and the United States (such as the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh). While these explanations may be applicable to programs abroad, they do not adequately describe the dynamics of many programs in Canada and the United States due to the vast difference in economic environment. I present a model that relies on screening and the reduction of overhead costs to explain the existence of peer group micro-lending programs in Canada and the United States. Evidence from these programs is presented to support the model.

The Performance of REIT-owned Properties and the Impact of REIT Market Power

Using a unique, detailed panel dataset of lodging properties, this paper tests whether properties owned by real estate investment trusts (REITs) perform differently than other properties and whether the concentration of real estate ownership brought about by REITs has increased market power. Our results demonstrate that REIT-owned properties, which are primarily mid-scale and high-end hotels, did not perform significantly better, on average, than other mid-scale or high-end hotels in the same geographic area. However, because of the superior overall performance of mid-scale and high-end hotels, REIT properties as a whole did perform better, on average, than non-REIT properties. From these results we conclude that the superior performance of REIT properties was due to the fact that REITs tended to acquire properties in market segments that performed well; REIT ownership in itself does not appear to have increased performance. Our results also suggest that the superior performance of the market segments in which REITs have a significant presence is not attributable to the market power of the REITs.

Strategic delegation and delay in negotiations over the bargaining agenda

This paper develops a game‐theoretic model that endogenizes the items included in the bargaining agenda. The models equilibria suggest two possible sources of inefficiency: (1) exclusion of items from the bargaining agenda and (2) delay to agreement due to negotiations over the bargaining agenda. Evidence from union contract negotiations is provided to demonstrate the relevance of these sources of inefficiency. The model also allows strategic delegation by the union. In certain equilibria, the surplus‐maximizing union selects wage‐maximizing delegates (such as senior union members) to negotiate the contract.

Empirical Test of a Separating Equilibrium in National Football League Contract Negotiations

I empirically test for a separating equilibrium in the bargaining contract of National Football League (NFL) contract negotiations. The separating equilibrium predicts that a player who delays contractual agreement signs a more lucrative contract and has positive private information on his ability level at the time of contract negotiations. These predictions are tested using data on 1,873 players selected in the 1986 through 1991 NFL drafts. The empirical results support the implications of the separating equilibrium.

Multidimensional separating equilibria and moral hazard: An empirical study of National Football League contract negotiations

This paper empirically tests for a multidimensional separating equilibrium in contract negotiations and tests for evidence of the moral hazard inherent in many contracts. Using contract and performance data on players drafted into the National Football League from 1986 through 1991, we find evidence that players use delay to agreement and incentive clauses to reveal their private information during contract negotiations. In addition, our empirical tests of the moral hazard issue indicate that a players effort level is influenced by the structure of his contract.