Michael D. Christian

Development of a triage protocol for critical care during an influenza pandemic

Background: The recent outbreaks of avian influenza (H5N1) have placed a renewed emphasis on preparing for an influenza pandemic in humans. Of particular concern in this planning is the allocation of resources, such as ventilators and antiviral medications, which will likely become scarce during a pandemic. Methods: We applied a collaborative process using best evidence, expert panels, stakeholder consultations and ethical principles to develop a triage protocol for prioritizing access to critical care resources, including mechanical ventilation, during a pandemic. Results: The triage protocol uses the Sequential Organ Failure Assessment score and has 4 main components: inclusion criteria, exclusion criteria, minimum qualifications for survival and a prioritization tool. Interpretation: This protocol is intended to provide guidance for making triage decisions during the initial days to weeks of an influenza pandemic if the critical care system becomes overwhelmed. Although we designed this protocol for use during an influenza pandemic, the triage protocol would apply to patients both with and without influenza, since all patients must share a single pool of critical care resources.

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome

Abstract The first cases of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) occurred in China in November 2002. The agent causing this illness has been identified as a novel coronavirus, SARS-coronavirus. Since its introduction <1 year ago, this virus has infected 8098 people in 26 countries, killing 774 of them. We present an overview of the epidemiology, clinical presentation, diagnosis, and treatment of SARS based on the current state of knowledge derived from published studies and our own personal experience.

Possible SARS Coronavirus Transmission during Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation

Infection of healthcare workers with the severe acute respiratory syndrome–associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV) is thought to occur primarily by either contact or large respiratory droplet transmission. However, infrequent healthcare worker infections occurred despite the use of contact and droplet precautions, particularly during certain aerosol-generating medical procedures. We investigated a possible cluster of SARS-CoV infections in healthcare workers who used contact and droplet precautions during attempted cardiopulmonary resuscitation of a SARS patient. Unlike previously reported instances of transmission during aerosol-generating procedures, the index case-patient was unresponsive, and the intubation procedure was performed quickly and without difficulty. However, before intubation, the patient was ventilated with a bag-valve-mask that may have contributed to aerosolization of SARS-CoV. On the basis of the results of this investigation and previous reports of SARS transmission during aerosol-generating procedures, a systematic approach to the problem is outlined, including the use of the following: 1) administrative controls, 2) environmental engineering controls, 3) personal protective equipment, and 4) quality control.

Recommendations for intensive care unit and hospital preparations for an influenza epidemic or mass disaster: Summary report of the European Society of Intensive Care Medicine's Task Force for intensive care unit triage during an influenza epidemic or mass disaster

PurposeTo provide recommendations and standard operating procedures for intensive care units and hospital preparedness for an influenza pandemic.MethodsBased on a literature review and expert opinion, a Delphi process was used to define the essential topics.ResultsKey recommendations include: Hospitals should increase their ICU beds to the maximal extent by expanding ICU capacity and expanding ICUs into other areas. Hospitals should have appropriate beds and monitors for these expansion areas. Establish a management system with control groups at facility, local, regional and/or national levels to exercise authority over resources. Establish a system of communication, coordination and collaboration between the ICU and key interface departments. A plan to access, coordinate and increase labor resources is required with a central inventory of all clinical and non-clinical staff. Delegate duties not within the usual scope of workers’ practice. Ensure that adequate essential medical equipment, pharmaceuticals and supplies are available. Protect patients and staff with infection control practices and supporting occupational health policies. Maintain staff confidence with reassurance plans for legal protection and assistance. Have objective, ethical, transparent triage criteria that are applied equitably and publically disclosed. ICU triage of patients should be based on the likelihood for patients to benefit most or a ‘first come, first served’ basis. Develop protocols for safe performance of high-risk procedures. Train and educate staff.ConclusionsMortality, although inevitable during a severe influenza outbreak or disaster, can be reduced by adequate preparation.

Definitive Care for the Critically Ill During a Disaster: A Framework for Allocation of Scarce Resources in Mass Critical Care: From a Task Force for Mass Critical Care Summit Meeting, January 26–27, 2007, Chicago, IL

BACKGROUNDnAnticipated circumstances during the next severe influenza pandemic highlight the insufficiency of staff and equipment to meet the needs of all critically ill victims. It is plausible that an entire country could face simultaneous limitations, resulting in severe shortages of critical care resources to the point where patients could no longer receive all of the care that would usually be required and expected. There may even be such resource shortfalls that some patients would not be able to access even the most basic of life-sustaining interventions. Rationing of critical care in this circumstance would be difficult, yet may be unavoidable. Without planning, the provision of care would assuredly be chaotic, inequitable, and unfair. The Task Force for Mass Critical Care Working Group met in Chicago in January 2007 to proactively suggest guidance for allocating scarce critical care resources.nnnTASK FORCE SUGGESTIONSnIn order to allocate critical care resources when systems are overwhelmed, the Task Force for Mass Critical Care Working Group suggests the following: (1) an equitable triage process utilizing the Sequential Organ Failure Assessment scoring system; (2) the concept of triage by a senior clinician(s) without direct clinical obligation, and a support system to implement and manage the triage process; (3) legal and ethical constructs underpinning the allocation of scarce resources; and (4) a mechanism for rapid revision of the triage process as further disaster experiences, research, planning, and modeling come to light.

Definitive care for the critically ill during a disaster: current capabilities and limitations: from a Task Force for Mass Critical Care summit meeting, January 26-27, 2007, Chicago, IL.

n n In the twentieth century, rarely have mass casualty events yielded hundreds or thousands of critically ill patients requiring definitive critical care. However, future catastrophic natural disasters, epidemics or pandemics, nuclear device detonations, or large chemical exposures may change usual disaster epidemiology and require a large critical care response. This article reviews the existing state of emergency preparedness for mass critical illness and presents an analysis of limitations to support the suggestions of the Task Force on Mass Casualty Critical Care, which are presented in subsequent articles. Baseline shortages of specialized resources such as critical care staff, medical supplies, and treatment spaces are likely to limit the number of critically ill victims who can receive life-sustaining interventions. The deficiency in critical care surge capacity is exacerbated by lack of a sufficient framework to integrate critical care within the overall institutional response and coordination of critical care across local institutions and broader geographic areas.n n

Definitive care for the critically III during a disaster: A framework for allocation of scarce resources in mass critical care

BACKGROUNDnAnticipated circumstances during the next severe influenza pandemic highlight the insufficiency of staff and equipment to meet the needs of all critically ill victims. It is plausible that an entire country could face simultaneous limitations, resulting in severe shortages of critical care resources to the point where patients could no longer receive all of the care that would usually be required and expected. There may even be such resource shortfalls that some patients would not be able to access even the most basic of life-sustaining interventions. Rationing of critical care in this circumstance would be difficult, yet may be unavoidable. Without planning, the provision of care would assuredly be chaotic, inequitable, and unfair. The Task Force for Mass Critical Care Working Group met in Chicago in January 2007 to proactively suggest guidance for allocating scarce critical care resources.nnnTASK FORCE SUGGESTIONSnIn order to allocate critical care resources when systems are overwhelmed, the Task Force for Mass Critical Care Working Group suggests the following: (1) an equitable triage process utilizing the Sequential Organ Failure Assessment scoring system; (2) the concept of triage by a senior clinician(s) without direct clinical obligation, and a support system to implement and manage the triage process; (3) legal and ethical constructs underpinning the allocation of scarce resources; and (4) a mechanism for rapid revision of the triage process as further disaster experiences, research, planning, and modeling come to light.

Definition and Functions of Health Unified Command and Emergency Operations Centers for Large-scale Bioevent Disasters Within the Existing ICS

The incident command system provides an organizational structure at the agency, discipline, or jurisdiction level for effectively coordinating response and recovery efforts during most conventional disasters. This structure does not have the capacity or capability to manage the complexities of a large-scale health-related disaster, especially a pandemic, in which unprecedented decisions at every level (eg, surveillance, triage protocols, surge capacity, isolation, quarantine, health care staffing, deployment) are necessary to investigate, control, and prevent transmission of disease. Emerging concepts supporting a unified decision-making, coordination, and resource management system through a health-specific emergency operations center are addressed and the potential structure, function, roles, and responsibilities are described, including comparisons across countries with similar incident command systems.

An antimicrobial stewardship program improves antimicrobial treatment by culture site and the quality of antimicrobial prescribing in critically ill patients

IntroductionIncreasing antimicrobial costs, reduced development of novel antimicrobials, and growing antimicrobial resistance necessitate judicious use of available agents. Antimicrobial stewardship programs (ASPs) may improve antimicrobial use in intensive care units (ICUs). Our objective was to determine whether the introduction of an ASP in an ICU altered the decision to treat cultures from sterile sites compared with nonsterile sites (which may represent colonization or contamination). We also sought to determine whether ASP education improved documentation of antimicrobial use, including an explicit statement of antimicrobial regimen, indication, duration, and de-escalation.MethodsWe retrospectively analyzed consecutive patients with positive bacterial cultures admitted to a 16-bed medical-surgical ICU over 2-month periods before and after ASP introduction (April through May 2008 and 2009, respectively). We evaluated the antimicrobial treatment of positive sterile- versus nonsterile-site cultures, specified a priori. We reviewed patient charts for clinician documentation of three specific details regarding antimicrobials: an explicit statement of antimicrobial regimen/indication, duration, and de-escalation. We also analyzed cost and defined daily doses (DDDs) (a World Health Organization (WHO) standardized metric of use) before and after ASP.ResultsPatient demographic data between the pre-ASP (n = 139) and post-ASP (n = 130) periods were similar. No difference was found in the percentage of positive cultures from sterile sites between the pre-ASP period and post-ASP period (44.9% versus 40.2%; P = 0.401). A significant increase was noted in the treatment of sterile-site cultures after ASP (64% versus 83%; P = 0.01) and a reduction in the treatment of nonsterile-site cultures (71% versus 46%; P = 0.0002). These differences were statistically significant when treatment decisions were analyzed both at an individual patient level and at an individual culture level. Increased explicit antimicrobial regimen documentation was observed after ASP (26% versus 71%; P < 0.0001). Also observed were increases in formally documented stop dates (53% versus 71%; P < 0.0001), regimen de-escalation (15% versus 23%; P = 0.026), and an overall reduction in cost and mean DDDs after ASP implementation.ConclusionsIntroduction of an ASP in the ICU was associated with improved microbiologically targeted therapy based on sterile or nonsterile cultures and improved documentation of antimicrobial use in the medical record.

Pandemic H1N1 Influenza Infection and Vascular Thrombosis

During the summer and fall of 2009, significant thrombotic events were observed in patients infected with the pandemic H1N1 influenza A virus. In a retrospective chart review of 119 individuals admitted to the hospital with H1N1 virus infection, 7 patients (5.9%) were found to have experienced thrombotic vascular events.