Michael D. Wallace

Arms Races and Escalation Some New Evidence

Although major power arms races have been the subject of a great amount of mathematical modelling, there has been little data-based research concerning their impact on international war. This study attempts to determine whether or not these arms races affect the probability that a serious dispute between major powers will escalate to all-out war. To do this, an arms race index is constructed in the following manner: a curve-fitting technique is employed to calculate changes in arms expenditures for each major power as a function of time. The smoothed rates of increase for each of the parties to a dispute are multiplied together, yielding an index whose values will be high only if the two powers have engaged in rapid and simultaneous military expansion prior to the dispute. It was found that disputes preceded by such an arms race escalated to war 23 out of 28 times, while disputes not preceded by an arms race resulted in war only 3 out of 71 times. It was concluded that at the very least, arms races are an important early warning indicator of escalation potential, and may well play a central role in the escalation process. The implications of this finding for the current debate over SALT II were noted.

Alliance Polarization, Cross-Cutting, and International War, 1815-1964

Various authors have posited the relationship between alliance polarization and violent conflict in the global system as positive, negative, and curvilinear. Unfortu nately, these hypotheses have not received a thorough test, as previous empirical studies of alliance polarization have tended to neglect (1) the configurational properties of alliance groupings, and (2) the nonmilitary dimensions of alignment. This paper attempts to construct measures of polarization and cross-cutting which take these properties into account. Configurations of alignment patterns are generated by subjecting data on military alliances, diplomatic representation, and intergovernmental organizations to Guttmann-Lingoes Smallest Space Analysis. Several mathematical procedures are developed to measure polarization and cross-cutting within and between these clusters.

Armaments and Escalation: Two Competing Hypotheses

Since earliest times national leaders have believed that “if you seek peace, prepare for war.” In the twentieth century, this belief has been challenged by those who see military “overpreparedness” not as a deterrent, but as a trigger for war-provoking arms races. This article attempts a comparative empirical test of these “preparedness” and “arms race” hypotheses with reference to serious great power disputes since 1816. It was found that, contrary to the prediction of the preparedness hypothesis, a crisis was no more likely to escalate to an all-out war when the “revisionist” great power possessed a significant military advantage vis-a-vis its “status quo” rival. Escalation was no more likely when the revisionist power was improving its relative position, nor when the revisionist power was both relatively stronger and increasing its lead. On the other hand, the existence of an arms race between the two powers prior to the dispute was very strongly associated with its subsequent escalation to full-scale hostilities. The implications of these findings for current policy debates are noted.

Leadership Performance in Crisis: The Longevity-Complexity Link

Previous studies investigatin-g the relationship between leadership performance and crisis outcome have used the cumbersome methods of content analysis. In this study we proceed by measuring a structural attribute of perception, integrative complexity. By measuring the complexity scores of archival mater-ials we were able to establish that the ability to maiintainconceptual complexity unider- the stress of crisis is closely linked with the ability to resolve the crisis without resort to war. We were also able to identify a group of leaders who possessed this ability to an unusual extent, and to identify an important correlate of this ability: lengthy tenur-e in high office. We conclude that f urther research may allow us to develop a replicable early warning indicator of leadership performance in crisis.

Armaments and Escalation

Since earliest times national leaders have believed that “if you seek peace, prepare for war.” In the twentieth century, this belief has been challenged by those who see military “overpreparedness” not as a deterrent, but as a trigger for war-provoking arms races. This article attempts a comparative empirical test of these “preparedness” and “arms race” hypotheses with reference to serious great power disputes since 1816. It was found that, contrary to the prediction of the preparedness hypothesis, a crisis was no more likely to escalate to an all-out war when the “revisionist” great power possessed a significant military advantage vis-a-vis its “status quo” rival. Escalation was no more likely when the revisionist power was improving its relative position, nor when the revisionist power was both relatively stronger and increasing its lead. On the other hand, the existence of an arms race between the two powers prior to the dispute was very strongly associated with its subsequent escalation to full-scale hostilities. The implications of these findings for current policy debates are noted.

Some Persisting Findings

I must begin by expressing my thanks to Professor Weede for his careful and thoughtful examination of my article. However, I’m afraid I must take issue with Professor Weede on each specific point. Let me begin with his doubts about the validity of my arms race index, since these are, I think, based on a misunderstanding. Specifically, my index construction procedure will not in fact result in any spurious colinearity with the dependent variable, since all of the observations on which it is

Old Nails in New Coffins: The Para Bellum Hypothesis Revisited

Earlier studies of the relationship between arms race and the escalation of conflict into war have shown strong correlations. However, it could be argued that the arms race is necessary to prevent one party gaining preponderance, and preponderance would in itself be more dangerous: the para bellum hypothesis. With the use of indices of superiority as well as of differential growth, this hypothesis can be tested, using the Correlates of War data on military expenditure and military confrontations and applying LOGIT analysis. When comparing these results to the ones achieved by an arms race index, it is clear that the latter has a far greater explanatory power.

Comments on the Articles by Sample and Diehl & Crescenzi

The recent article by Susan Sample (1997) has performed an enormous service to the debate over the arms race / war relationship In particular, two nagging issues have now been put to rest. The first concerns the best index to use when converting military expenditure data into a measurement of arms races. She makes a second important contribution by sorting out the different criteria to choose the test population of arms races in the various competing studies.

Armaments and EscalationTwo Competing Hypotheses

Since earliest times national leaders have believed that “if you seek peace, prepare for war.” In the twentieth century, this belief has been challenged by those who see military “overpreparedness” not as a deterrent, but as a trigger for war-provoking arms races. This article attempts a comparative empirical test of these “preparedness” and “arms race” hypotheses with reference to serious great power disputes since 1816. It was found that, contrary to the prediction of the preparedness hypothesis, a crisis was no more likely to escalate to an all-out war when the “revisionist” great power possessed a significant military advantage vis-a-vis its “status quo” rival. Escalation was no more likely when the revisionist power was improving its relative position, nor when the revisionist power was both relatively stronger and increasing its lead. On the other hand, the existence of an arms race between the two powers prior to the dispute was very strongly associated with its subsequent escalation to full-scale hostilities. The implications of these findings for current policy debates are noted.