Michael E. Flynn

Putting our best boots forward: US military deployments and host-country crime

The deployment of military forces abroad has been a major component of the US’s grand strategy since the beginning of the Cold War. However, some scholars have argued that the presence of US military personnel abroad creates a series of negative externalities afflicting local communities. We put some of these claims to the test by looking at the effect of US military deployments on crime rates in the host-state. Using cross-national crime statistics from the United Nations and data on US troop deployments, we examine whether US military deployments are associated with higher levels of criminal activity across a large subset of crimes. In aggregate, the mere presence of troops does not increase the criminal activity in a state; however, there is a conditional effect when we account for a difference in culture between the host-state and the US; the presence of foreign deployed troops is associated with higher levels of property-related crimes in a country. Consequently, this paper contributes to a better understanding of the impact that US military deployments, and US foreign policy more broadly, have had on other countries, and also enhances our understanding of the micro-level factors that might affect relationships between alliance partners

Freedom of foreign movement, economic opportunities abroad, and protest in non-democratic regimes

Allowing or restricting foreign movement is a crucial policy choice for leaders. We argue that freedom of foreign movement reduces the level of civil unrest under non-democratic regimes, but only in some circumstances. Our argument relies on the trade-offs inherent in exit and voice as distinct strategies for dealing with a corrupt and oppressive state. By permitting exit and thereby lowering its relative costs, authoritarians can make protest and other modes of expressing dissatisfaction less attractive for potential troublemakers. Liberalizing foreign movement can thus function as a safety valve for releasing domestic pressure. But the degree to which allowing emigration is an effective regime strategy is shaped by the economic opportunities offered by countries receiving immigrants. We find that freedom of foreign movement and the existence of economic opportunities abroad reduce civil unrest in non-democratic states. However, at high levels of unemployment in the developed world, greater freedom of foreign movement actually increases protest.

Regions of Hierarchy and Security: US Troop Deployments, Spatial Relations, and Defense Burdens

ABSTRACT Recent work has begun exploring the effects of foreign military deployments on host-state foreign policies. However, research mostly focuses on dyadic relationships between major powers and host-states, ignoring the broader regional security environment of host-states. We develop a theory of spatial hierarchies to understand how security relationships throughout the region surrounding the host-state affect host-state foreign policy. Using data on US military deployments from 1950–2005, we show that regional security considerations condition how host-states respond to the deployment of military forces to their territory. Consequently, regional analyses are fundamental in understanding monadic and dyadic decisions about security, alliance behavior, and conflict.

From on High: The Effect of Elite Polarization on Mass Attitudes and Behaviors: 1972–2012

There is widespread agreement that American political elites have become increasingly ideologically polarized. However, there is disagreement about how the mass electorate has responded to the increase in polarization at the elite level. We argue that individuals’ expressions of ideology and partisanship respond to changes in elite-level polarization. Because party elites have become more polarized, individuals are better able to the party that best matches their own ideological positions, thereby contributing to polarization at the mass level. We test this argument using 36 years of ANES and DW-NOMINATE data. Placing voters in policy space using a measurement model, we assess whether or not elite-level factors condition how individuals’ underlying ideology translates into political behavior. We find that the relationship between a voter’s position in policy space and their political behavior is indeed conditional upon polarization at the elite level.

Economic Interests and Threat Assessment in the US Congress, 1890–1914

ABSTRACT Why do some domestic actors see the international environment as a threatening place populated by untrustworthy powers, when others find opportunities for peaceful cooperation in the same conditions? Because these actors confront the same international environment, the reasons for their divergent evaluations must rest on differences in their own beliefs and interests. In this article, we consider the impact of societal interests in trade and trade protection on elite assessments of the international environment. We examine evaluations of the international environment in speeches given in the US Congress during naval appropriations debates between 1890 and 1914. The manufacturing sector’s interest in trade protection led political leaders who represented manufacturing regions to offer more negative assessments of the international environment, while those representing export-oriented agricultural areas of the country gave more positive evaluations. These effects were roughly comparable to those associated with party, as well as individual-level characteristics, such as having served as a military officer.

Before the dominos fall: Regional conflict, donor interests, and US foreign aid:

In this article I examine how a state’s conflict environment affects the amount of foreign aid it receives. Specifically, conflict in the recipient state’s neighborhood can have a wide range of externalities that negatively affect the recipient state, but also the interests of donor countries. I argue that the presence of conflict in a state’s region generally leads to an increase in the demand for aid funds and should correlate with an increase in the amount of aid a state receives. I further argue that the degree to which the donor state will increase aid funds to meet this demand depends upon the donor’s economic and political interests in the recipient state.