Michael F. Ferguson

On the Relation between EGARCH Idiosyncratic Volatility and Expected Stock Returns

A spurious positive relation between EGARCH estimates of expected month t idiosyncratic volatility and month t stock returns arises when the month t return is included in the estimation of model parameters. We illustrate via simulations that this look-ahead bias is problematic for empirically observed degrees of stock return skewness and typical monthly return time series lengths. Moreover, the empirical idiosyncratic-return relation becomes negligible when expected month t idiosyncratic volatility is estimated using returns only upto month t-1.

Execution Costs and Their Intraday Variation in Futures Markets

We consider trading costs in the transparent, competitive open outcry markets of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), in which market makers have no affirmative obligation to trade. We document that while CME spreads are similar in magnitude to those in other markets, realized spreads are often negative. A plausible explanation is that CME market makers are able to employ more complex trading strategies than their equity market counterparts because they are not bound by affirmative obligation. The evidence suggests that market transparency and market maker obligations are important determinants of intraday variation in trading costs. Copyright 2001 by University of Chicago Press.

Is Lending Discrimination Always Costly

How can economically costly discrimination persist in a competitive market? Previous research into this question has focused on market imperfections which prevent competitive forces from eliminating the economically costly behavior. In this paper we show that lending discrimination is not always costly (to the lender). This has two important implications. First, lending discrimination may persist indefinitely, even in a competitive market. Second, tests for lending discrimination based on profits (or default rates) may be unable to detect discrimination when it exists.

Deal Risk, Liquidity Risk, and the Profitability of Risk Arbitrage

Previous research documents that risk-arbitrageurs earn positive abnormal returns. However, this research treats the sum of two risks, deal risk and liquidity risk, as a measure of deal risk alone. We employ a forward looking measure of liquidity risk – the VIX – and we show that arbitrageurs’ ‘abnormal’ returns are higher when liquidity risk is higher. Thus, observed risk-arbitrage spreads compensate arbitrageurs for liquidity risk and deal failure risk. We conclude that the risk in risk-arbitrage has been systematically underestimated. Finally, we document an interaction between deal risk (a technical risk) and liquidity risk (a market risk) which is consistent with the analysis of real options models.

Corporate Hedging and Financial Contracting

This paper develops a theory of corporate hedging in a financial contracting framework. In an economy with moral hazard and state uncertainty, the optimal financial contract incorporates both non-monitoring (arm’s length) finance and monitoring (bank) finance, and its payoff is equity-like. When external investors (e.g., the bank) face additional costs of holding equity, hedging mitigates incentive problems related to debt contracts and, thus, lowers the cost of debt and enables the firm to substitute debt for equity in its capital structure. The model generates empirical implications that are consistent with extant empirical evidence. For example, hedging will be more likely to be used with bank finance than with non-monitoring finance; the optimal hedge ratio will be positively related to the level of bank finance; and the optimal hedge ratio should be strictly less than 1.