Michael Futch

Leibniz's metaphysics of time and space

Chapter 1: A Brief History of the Philosophy of Space and Time Chapter 2: Leibnizs Reductionism Chapter 3: The Unity of Space and Time Chapter 4: The Bounds of Space and Time Chapter 5: Causal and Temporal Asymmetry Chapter 6: The Unreality of Temporal Becoming Chapter 7: Space, Time and Harmony Chapter 8: Space, Time and God Bibliography

Supervenience and (non-modal) reductionism in Leibniz’s philosophy of time

Abstract It has recently been suggested that, for Leibniz, temporal facts globally supervene on causal facts, with the result that worlds differing with respect to their causal facts can be indiscernible with respect to their temporal facts. Such an interpretation is at variance with more traditional readings of Leibniz’s causal theory of time, which hold that Leibniz reduces temporal facts to causal facts. In this article, I argue against the global supervenience construal of Leibniz’s philosophy of time. On the view of Leibniz defended here, he adopts a non-modal reduction of time to events, a form of reductionism that entails a strong covariation between a world’s temporal facts and its causal facts. Consequently, worlds discernible with respect to their temporal facts must be discernible with respect to their causal facts, and worlds discernible with respect to their causal facts must be discernible with respect to their temporal facts. This position strongly favors the standard identificatory reduction of time to causation often imputed to Leibniz.

Leibniz on the Logical Order of Time

As regards the question of the nature of time, Leibnizs account of monads raises the question of whether they have a temporal order and what this temporal order derives from. His account is generally taken to be an attempt to ground the asymmetric direction of time in a non-temporal sequence, such a chain of causes or reasons. The problem is whether such chains can ground temporal sequences without presupposing what it is that they are supposed to ground. Is his attempt circular, as many commentators have argued? A case can be made that monadic states can be individuated without presupposing time, which would enable him to account for temporal sequences in terms of a non-temporal one.

Leibniz's non-tensed theory of time

Leibnizs philosophy of time, often seen as a precursor to current forms of relationalism and causal theories of time, has rightly earned the admiration of his more recent counterparts in the philosophy of science. In this article, I examine Leibnizs philosophy of time from a new perspective: the role that tense and non-tensed temporal properties/relations play in it. Specifically, I argue that Leibnizs philosophy of time is best (and non-anachronistically) construed as a non-tensed theory of time, one that dispenses with tensed temporal properties such as past, present, and future. In arguing for this thesis, I focus on the three facets of Leibnizs philosophy most relevant for evaluating his commitment to a B-theory of time: (1) the nature of change, (2) the reality of the future, and (3) the truth-conditions for tensed temporal statements. Despite prima facie evidence to the contrary, I show that a close examination of Leibnizs views on these topics provides compelling evidence for interpreting his philosophy of time as a B-theory of time.