Michael H. Crespin

Redistricting and Party Polarization in the U.S. House of Representatives

The elevated levels of party polarization observed in the contemporary Congress have been attributed to a variety of factors. One of the more commonly recurring themes among observers of congressional politics is that changes in district boundaries resulting from the redistricting process are a root cause. Using a new data set linking congressional districts from 1962 to 2002, we offer a direct test of this claim. Our results show that although there is an overall trend of increasing polarization, districts that have undergone significant changes as a result of redistricting have become even more polarized. Although the effect is relatively modest, it suggests that redistricting is one among other factors that produce party polarization in the House and may help to explain the elevated levels of polarization in the House relative to the Senate.

The Media, the Campaign, and the Message

This article examines the 1996 press releases issued by Republican presidential nominee candidates during the invisible primary and the subsequent stories generated by these press releases in newspapers. We systematically examine how campaigns structure their messages, which messages are transmitted by the press to the voting public, and what factors influence the transmission of the campaigns message. We find that campaign organizations disseminate a variety of messages to the media. Our analysis demonstrates that national media organizations are most receptive to informative (logistical) messages disseminated by candidates who are at the head of the field and most hostile to substantive (issue-oriented) messages regardless of their campaign of origin. By contrast, the state press is most open to substantive messages issued by lower-tier candidates. It appears from our results that the media, more than the campaign, bear the responsibility for the emphasis on the horse race.

Dimensions, Issues, and Bills: Appropriations Voting on the House Floor

One of the fundamental findings in the congressional literature is that one or sometimes two dimensions can successfully describe roll-call voting. In this paper we investigate if we can reach the same conclusions about low dimensionality when we divide the roll-call agenda into subsets of relatively homogeneous subject matter. We are primarily interested in the degree to which the same ordering of representatives is yielded across these different groups of votes. To conduct our analysis we focus on all roll calls on the 13 annual appropriations bills across eight congresses. When we concentrate on these smaller issue areas, we find that voting is multidimensional and members do not vote in a consistent ideological fashion across all issue areas.

Parties as Procedural Coalitions in Congress: An Examination of Differing Career Tracks

We examine the degree to which parties act as procedural coalitions in Congress by testing predictions from the party cartel theory (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 1994, 2002). We gain leverage on the question of party influence in Congress by focusing on three types of House members: reelection seekers, higher-office seekers, and retiring members. We argue that retiring House members are no longer susceptible to party pressure, making them the perfect means (when compared to higher-office seekers and reelection seekers) to determine the existence of party influence. Results from a pooled, cross-sectional analysis of the 94th through 105th Congresses (1975–98) suggest that party influence is indeed present in Congress, especially where the party cartel theory predicts: on procedural, rather than final-passage, votes. Moreover, we find that procedural party influence is almost exclusively the domain of the majority party. This latter finding is especially important because most prior studies have been limited to investigating interparty influence only.

The Effect of State Redistricting Methods on Electoral Competition in United States House of Representatives Races

Legislative redistricting in the states is highly contentious due, at least in part, to its partisan implications. But does the method by which states draw legislative districts affect partisan competition in the elections that are held in these districts? We examine the effects of three methods used by states to draw district boundaries on competition in congressional elections. Specifically, we evaluate the effects on competition of legislative, judicial, and commission redistricting plans enacted prior to the 1992 and 2002 congressional elections. We find that more competitive elections occur when courts and commissions are directly involved in the redistricting process, as opposed to when redistricting is handled only in the state legislative process.

The Calculus of Concession Media Coverage and the Dynamics of Winnowing in Presidential Nominations

In this research we outline and evaluate a theory of the “calculus of concession”: when and why presidential primary candidates exit the race. Our explanation builds on prior studies of candidate attrition that traditionally emphasize money. However, we focus additional attention on the role of the press and its potential to influence a candidate’s exit decision. Data from the 2000 Republican presidential nomination campaign are used to test a Weibull model of candidate exit. Our results suggest that money is a critical component. But our research also demonstrates that the influence of money on candidates’ decisions depends on the candidate’s competitive position in the race. The availability of financial resources is far more critical to a close runner-up than to a less established long shot. Conversely, news coverage is far more critical to the decisions of longshot candidates early in the campaign than it is to big-shot candidates later on.

Measuring Variations in Party Unity Voting: An Assessment of Agenda Effects

Measures of party divisiveness have been widely used in scholarly literature for a variety of different purposes. However, conventional measures of party divisiveness, such as the percentage of party votes in a particular Congress, fail to consider important changes in the agenda from one Congress to the next. We introduce a measure that controls for such changes, drawing attention to the effect that agenda change has on observed party divisiveness and providing a more accurate account of party divisiveness across time. We analyse party voting in the U.S. House of Representatives between 1953 and 2004, and find that a sizeable amount of the fluctuation in party divisiveness identified by conventional measures is mitigated using this method. While we examine party voting in the U.S. House, our theory and method is applicable to similar measures used in the study of other legislatures (e.g. Rice and Attinà indices).

If You Can’t Join ’Em, Beat ’Em: The Gender Gap in Individual Donations to Congressional Candidates

The authors revisit the gender gap in campaign finance and find an advantage for women candidates in earning donations from individual donors due to the activities of female donor networks and the changing congressional donor pool. Women supported by these networks, especially Democratic women, receive a boost in campaign fund-raising compared to their male counterparts, whereas women not supported by these networks receive significantly less. The ideological leanings of congressional donors also advantage Democratic women. Substantial partisan gender differences in this area of campaign finance persist, and this fund-raising gap may contribute to the growing partisan gender gap in Congress.

Serving Two Masters: Redistricting and Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives

This article explores the consequences for representation after a redistricting by reexamining the finding that members of Congress will alter their voting behavior to fit their new district. Specifically, it applies partisan theories of congressional organization to test if members are changing their behavior on all or just some votes. The results indicate that representatives adjust their roll call behavior to fit their new districts on votes that are visible to their constituents. However, when it comes to votes that are important to the party for controlling the agenda (i.e., procedural votes), members do not respond to changes in the district.

Tracking the Dynamic Evolution of Participants Salience in a Discussion

We introduce a technique for analyzing the temporal evolution of the salience of participants in a discussion. Our method can dynamically track how the relative importance of speakers evolve over time using graph based techniques. Speaker salience is computed based on the eigenvector centrality in a graph representation of participants in a discussion. Two participants in a discussion are linked with an edge if they use similar rhetoric. The method is dynamic in the sense that the graph evolves over time to capture the evolution inherent to the participants salience. We used our method to track the salience of members of the US Senate using data from the US Congressional Record. Our analysis investigated how the salience of speakers changes over time. Our results show that the scores can capture speaker centrality in topics as well as events that result in change of salience or influence among different participants.