Michael Hadani

Family Matters Founding Family Firms and Corporate Political Activity

This study explores the impact of publicly traded founding family firms (FFFs) on their propensity for corporate political activity (CPA) and their choice of political approaches. Based on the behavior and characteristics of publicly traded FFFs, the author expected a positive association between FFFs and corporate political activity and a preference for relational, or long-term, over transactional, or short-term, corporate political activity. It was found that publicly traded FFFs are more likely to engage in CPA only when the firms founder is in an executive position. Furthermore, publicly traded FFFs show a preference for relational versus transactional corporate political activity. These findings are examined in light of FFF and corporate political strategy literatures.

The Governance Challenges of Corporate Political Activity

This article explains the rationale for study of the governance challenges of corporate political activity. The topic is important, especially in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2010 Citizens United decision, but understudied to date. The authors review the literature bearing on this topic. The authors separate consideration of the topic into macro-level and micro-level issues. The macro level concerns the societal perspective. At this level, key research questions concern whether corporate political activity be allowed, and how it should be regulated. The micro level covers managerial and shareholder control over corporate political activity. At this level, key research questions include concern whether the firm should practice political activity and how to regulate practice through professional self-regulation, ethical guidelines, and corporate governance systems control. The remainder of this article contains focused summaries of the articles selected for this Special Issue. Each article is introduced and evaluated against the key research questions at the macro or micro levels of analysis.

Complementary Relationships Between Corporate Philanthropy and Corporate Political Activity An Exploratory Study of Political Marketplace Contingencies

Although an important feature of firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR), the strategic pressures behind firms’ corporate philanthropy (CP) are not well researched or understood. This research note argues that firms’ CP and firms’ corporate political activity (CPA) may share common strategic antecedents; forces in firms’ political environment may shape both CP and CPA. Using S&P 500 data in a longitudinal analysis (1997-2004), the authors find evidence suggesting that industry-level political uncertainty increases firm propensity for engaging in both CP and CPA, above and beyond the propensity to engage in either as a stand-alone strategy. The authors use this preliminary evidence to explore political marketplace contingencies for the relationship between CP and CPA. CSR literature indicates that CP can benefit firms by creating and enhancing their relational wealth and institutional legitimacy. Such benefits may also serve firm interactions with government policy makers—a dynamic largely ignored until recently. The authors’ findings may indicate that, due to its institutional signaling ability and impact on firms’ reputations, CP may allow firms to differentiate themselves or stand out from others when faced with political uncertainty, and that these outcomes should be considered when firms engage in CP.

Corporate political activity, public policy uncertainty, and firm outcomes: A meta-analysis

Although significant scholarship has been devoted to the study of corporate political activity, contradictory messages emerge regarding its impact on public policy outcomes and firm performance. Using meta-analytic methods on a US-only sample of 93 studies, working papers, and books, we try to disentangle two mechanisms that explain why corporate political activity is not always beneficial to firms: (1) the uncertainty about the public policy process itself, that is, can firms get the policies they want through corporate political activity? and (2) the uncertainty about the policies’ impact on the firm, that is, whether firms effectively anticipate the implications of policies for their performance. Our results support the idea that these types of uncertainty play an important role in explaining the intermediary dynamics of corporate political activity. We find that in the United States, corporate political activity only weakly impacts public policy and at best has a (direct) weak effect on corporate outcomes.

Corporate Political Activity and Regulatory Capture How Some Companies Blunt the Knife of Socially Oriented Investor Activism

Socially oriented shareholder activism is an increasingly important mechanism through which social movement organizations seek to influence the private sector by exerting pressure on corporate activities in areas such as human rights, environmental protection, and labor policies. This activism challenges the status quo of targeted firms and potentially their institutional field, disrupting “business as usual” and often drawing negative attention to the firms. We theorize that some firms might use corporate political activity (CPA) as an indirect, nonmarket strategy aimed at regulatory capture to reduce the impact of such disruptions. We focus on one popular avenue of shareholder activism—the proxy proposal mechanism—and the role the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) plays in allowing omission of socially oriented shareholder proposals from the proxy ballot. Using two distinct data sources, we find evidence that for S&P 500 firms, the SEC allows for the omission of the proposals from proxy ballots more frequently for those firms more active in CPA. These findings inform the growing scholarship on socially oriented activism as well as suggest the indirect influence of CPA on government agency decision making.