Michael Huemer

Explanationist Aid for the Theory of Inductive Logic

A central problem facing a probabilistic approach to the problem of induction is the difficulty of sufficiently constraining prior probabilities so as to yield the conclusion that induction is cogent. The Principle of Indifference, according to which alternatives are equiprobable when one has no grounds for preferring one over another, represents one way of addressing this problem; however, the Principle faces the well-known problem that multiple interpretations of it are possible, leading to incompatible conclusions. I propose a partial solution to the latter problem, drawing on the notion of explanatory priority. The resulting synthesis of Bayesian and inference-to-best-explanation approaches affords a principled defense of prior probability distributions that support induction. 1. A Probabilistic Formulation of the Problem of Induction2. A Problem with Objective Bayesianism2.1. Intuitive motivation for the Principle of Indifference2.2. The inconsistency objection2.3. An effort to contain the problem3. Explanationist Relief for Objective Bayesianism3.1. Explanation and explanatory priority3.2. Explanatory priority and the assignment of priors3.3. In defense of Laplace3.4. The metaphysics of the explanationist defense: causation and laws3.5. Inference to the best explanation?4. Problems and objections4.1. Unknown explanatory possibilities4.2. Empirical reasoning about explanatory priority4.3. The probability of deterministic laws4.4. Changing chances4.5. Scruples concerning a priori probability A Probabilistic Formulation of the Problem of Induction A Problem with Objective Bayesianism2.1. Intuitive motivation for the Principle of Indifference2.2. The inconsistency objection2.3. An effort to contain the problem Intuitive motivation for the Principle of Indifference The inconsistency objection An effort to contain the problem Explanationist Relief for Objective Bayesianism3.1. Explanation and explanatory priority3.2. Explanatory priority and the assignment of priors3.3. In defense of Laplace3.4. The metaphysics of the explanationist defense: causation and laws3.5. Inference to the best explanation? Explanation and explanatory priority Explanatory priority and the assignment of priors In defense of Laplace The metaphysics of the explanationist defense: causation and laws Inference to the best explanation? Problems and objections4.1. Unknown explanatory possibilities4.2. Empirical reasoning about explanatory priority4.3. The probability of deterministic laws4.4. Changing chances4.5. Scruples concerning a priori probability Unknown explanatory possibilities Empirical reasoning about explanatory priority The probability of deterministic laws Changing chances Scruples concerning a priori probability

Causation as Simultaneous and Continuous

We propose that all actual causes are simultaneous with their direct effects, as illustrated by both everyday examples and the laws of physics. We contrast this view with the sequential conception of causation, according to which causes must occur prior to their effects. The key difference between the two views of causation lies in differing assumptions about the mathematical structure of time.

Epistemology : contemporary readings

J.Locke, G. Berkeley, D. Hume, T. Reid, B.Russell, J.L. Austin, N. Malcolm, J. Pollock, M. Huemer, Plato, I. Kant, A.J. Ayer, W.V.O. Quine, R. Carnap, L. BonJour, C.A.J. Coady, L. Carroll, R. Fumerton, H. Kornblith, P. Edwards, N. Goodman, J. Foster, C.Howson, P.Urbach, D. Stove, Sextus Empiricus, I.T. Oakley, W. Alston, S. Haack, E. Gettier, M. Clark, A. Goldman, K. Lehrer, T. Paxson, R. Nozick, K. DeRose, R. Descartes, H. Putnam, F. Dretske, P. Klein, M. Huemer, R. Chisholm, G.E. Moore

Weak Bayesian coherentism

Recent results in probability theory have cast doubt on coherentism, purportedly showing (a) that coherence among a set of beliefs cannot raise their probability unless individual beliefs have some independent credibility, and (b) that no possible measure of coherence makes coherence generally probability-enhancing. I argue that coherentists can reject assumptions on which these theorems depend, and I derive a general condition under which the concurrence of two information sources lacking individual credibility can raise the probability of what they report.

Transitivity, Comparative Value, and the Methods of Ethics*

Rethinking the Good is, as its author twice notes ð5, 477Þ, a long book. This unusual length is not entirely due to excessive prolixity on the part of the book’s author; it is also partly due to the number of ideas and arguments that Temkin has collected together. In what follows, I shall discuss a few of the most important and ðto meÞ interesting of these ideas and arguments. Most of the book concerns what might be viewed as a collection of challenges to the following principle:

An ontological proof of moral realism

The essay argues that while there is no general agreement on whether moral realism is true, there is general agreement on at least some of the moral obligations that we have if moral realism is true. Given that moral realism might be true, and given that we know some of the things we ought to do if it is true, we have a reason to do those things. Furthermore, this reason is itself an objective moral reason. Thus, if moral realism might be true, then it is true.

Self-Locating Beliefs

Beauty is put to sleep and woken up either once or twice, depending on the flip of a coin; after each waking, she will fall asleep and forget having woken. Upon waking, what should be her credence that the coin came up heads? Some say 1/2; others say 1/3. I propose that evidence supports a theory for you when your having that qualitative evidence would be more likely if the theory were true than if it were false. This view supports the “1/3” answer to the Sleeping Beauty problem. It also has applications to other arguments concerning self-locating beliefs: the Doomsday Argument fails, and the Fine Tuning Argument supports the Multiverse theory, if and only if it would be metaphysically possible for you to exist in a different universe.

Elusive Freedom? A Reply to Helen Beebee

Lewisians (including Beebee) accept (2), since they think that my doing B would have to have been caused by a divergence miracle shortly before the time at which I did B (a violation of the actual worlds laws of nature just sufficient to lead to my doing B instead of A). In my original article, I motivated premise (1) with some intuitive examples, whose force Beebee acknowledges. Surprisingly, then, Beebee proposes to defend compatibilism without denying either of the two premises in the above argument. Beebee contends, not without justice, that I neglected to attend to the different times at which a person might be said to have the ability to perform an action. She correctly notes that a person may at one time have the ability to perform some future action, but at a later time (prior to the time at which the action would have occurred) lose that ability.

The Two Envelopes

You are given a choice between two indistinguishable envelopes, each containing money, one with twice as much as the other. It can be argued that each envelope has an expected value of 5/4 the value in the other envelope; thus, whichever envelope you have, you should prefer the other. The paradoxical reasoning confuses variables with constants. A correct analysis would assign a coherent probability distribution to each possible way of distributing money across the two envelopes. This leads to both envelopes having the same expected value.

Newcomb’s Problem

You are asked to choose between taking box A and taking both A and B, where B contains