Michael I. Handel

Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise

ISSN: 0140-2390 (Print) 1743-937X (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fjss20 Intelligence and the problem of strategic surprise Michael I. Handel To cite this article: Michael I. Handel (1984) Intelligence and the problem of strategic surprise , Journal of Strategic Studies, 7:3, 229-281, DOI: 10.1080/01402398408437190 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402398408437190

The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise

The first part of this paper is a theoretical discussion of some of the problems facing intelligence communities and decision makers in their efforts to guard against a surprise attack. These difficulties are examined in the light of three “noise levels” (three environmental background noises), as well as in relation to the complexities involved in the mutual evaluation of intentions and capabilities of opposing sides. The authors pessimistic conclusions regarding the possibilities of preventing a surprise attack are summarized by five intelligence paradoxes (or contradictions), three of which appear in the theoretical section and the other two in the case study of the Yom Kippur War. The second part of this article is a case study of the conditions and perceptions of Israeli decision makers which made surprise inevitable at the outbreak of the war. The conclusion is a summary of the lessons which, even if they cannot provide a foolproof guarantee against surprise, can dampen the effects of a surprise attack and supply decision makers with some guidelines for improving their alertness and readiness to face surprise.

Intelligence and military operations

Part 1 The US Civil War: the role of intelligence in the Chancellorsville Campaign, 1863, Jay Luvaas Lee at Gettysburg - a general without intelligence, Jay Luvaas. Part 2 The First World War: British intelligence in Mesopotamia, 1914-16, Richard Popplewell institutionalized deception and perception reinforcement - Allenbys campaigns in Palestine, 1917-18, Yigal Sheffy. Part 3 The Second World War: flawed perception and its effect upon operational thinking - the case of the Japanese army, 1937-41, Alvin D. Coox the British Army, signals and security in the desert campaign, 1940-42, John Ferris Convoy PQ17 - a study of intelligence and decision-making, Patrick Beesley Ultra intelligence and General Macarthurs leap to Hollandia, January-April 1944, Edward J. Drea German air intelligence in World War II, Horst Boog a comparative analysis of RAF and Luftwaffe intelligence in the Battle of Britain, 1940, Sebastian Cox intelligence and strategy - some observations on the war in the Mediterranean, 1941-45, Ralph Bennet.