Michael J. Almeida

Sceptical Theism and Evidential Arguments from Evil

Sceptical theists--e.g., William Alston and Michael Bergmann--have claimed that considerations concerning human cognitive limitations are alone sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil. We argue that, if the considerations deployed by sceptical theists are sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil, then those considerations are also sufficient to undermine inferences that play a crucial role in ordinary moral reasoning. If cogent, our argument suffices to discredit sceptical theist responses to evidential arguments from evil.

Reply to Trakakis and Nagasawa

Abstract Nick Trakakis and Yujin Nagasawa (2004) criticise the argument in Almeida and Oppy (2003). According to Trakakis and Nagasawa, we are mistaken in our claim that the sceptical theist response to evidential arguments from evil is unacceptable because it would undermine ordinary moral reasoning. In their view, there is no good reason to think that sceptical theism leads to an objectionable form of moral scepticism. We disagree. In this paper, we explain why we think that the argument of Nagasawa and Trakakis fails to overthrow our objection to sceptical theism.

Supervenience and property-identical divine-command theory

Property-identical divine-command theory (PDCT) is the view that being obligatory is identical to being commanded by God in just the way that being water is identical to being H 2 O. If these identity statements are true, then they express necessary a posteriori truths. PDCT has been defended in Robert M. Adams (1987) and William Alston (1990). More recently Mark C. Murphy (2002) has argued that property-identical divine-command theory is inconsistent with two well-known and well-received theses: the free-command thesis and the supervenience thesis. I show that Murphys argument is vitiated by mistaken assumptions about the substitutivity of metaphysical identicals in contexts of supervenience. The free-command thesis and the supervenience thesis therefore pose no serious threat to PDCT.

A new cosmological argument undone

There is an intriguing recent effort to develop a valid cosmological argument on the basis of quite minimal assumptions.1 Indeed, the basis of the new cosmological argument is so slight that it is likely to make even a conscientious theist suspicious – to say nothing of our vigilant atheists. In Section 1 we present the background assumptions and central premises of the new cosmological argument. We are sympathetic to the conclusion that there necessarily exists an intelligent and powerful creator of the actual universe, but we show in Section 2 that the new cosmological argument cannot establish this claim. Specifically, we show by reductio ad absurdum that the new argument is unsound, and that every plausibly modified version of the argument is also unsound.2 We close our discussion with a diagnosis of what went wrong in the new cosmological argument. Our conclusion is that this intriguing new argument promises considerably more than it can show.

A Frightening Love: Recasting the Problem of Evil by Gleeson Andrew

ground and are simply looking for a straightforward account of tropes—what they are and why anyone would care about them—you are likely to find the book difficult and, at times, exasperating. I exaggerate. I have left untouched most of the book’s wide-ranging discussions and arguments, many of which will undoubtedly prove influential. Tropes: Properties, Objects, and Mental Causation simply reflects the currents of contemporary analytic metaphysics. Readers swimming with those currents will be borne along nicely.

Rowe's Argument from Improvability

Abstract William Rowe has argued that if there is an infinite sequence of improving worlds then an essentially perfectly good being must actualize some world in the sequence and must not actualize any world in the sequence. Since that is impossible, there exist no essentially perfectly good beings. I show that Rowes argument assumes that the concept of a maximally great being is incoherent. Since we are given no reason to believe that the concept of a maximally great being is incoherent we have no reason to believe Rowes Argument from Improvability is sound.

Ideal worlds and the transworld untrustworthy

The celebrated free-will defence was designed to show that the ideal-world thesis presents no challenge to theism. The ideal-world thesis states that, in any world in which God exists, He can actualize a world containing moral good and no moral evil. I consider an intriguing two-stage argument that Michael Bergmann advances for the free-will defence, and show that the argument provides atheologlans with no reason to abandon the ideal-world thesis. I show next that the existence of worlds in which every essence is transworld untrustworthy provides atheologians with no better reason to abandon the ideal-world thesis. I conclude that neither the free-will defence nor Bergmanns revised free-will defence is a convincing response to the atheological challenge.

Rowe's argument from freedom

The famous Free Will Defense urges us to believe that there is some world in which every creaturely essence is transworld depraved. If every creaturely essence is transworld depraved in some world w, then God cannot instantiate any free being in w that might do no wrong. Many have found that claim incredible.1 It is widely agreed that, for every essence e, there is some world or other in which e is transworld depraved.2 But, for all we know, there is in every world some essence or other that is a do-gooder. If an essence e is a do-gooder in w, then there is some set of circumstances T such that if God were to instantiate Tin w, then es instantiation might do nothing wrong. If there are do-gooders in every world, then there is no world in which every creaturely essence is transworld depraved.3 Lets formulate more precisely the position that D there are do-gooders in every possible world, and T every creaturely essence e is transworld depraved in some possible world w. D. B(3e)(e is a do-gooder) The precise English reading of D is that in every possible world there is some essence or other e that is a do-gooder. D does not entail that there is any essence e that is necessarily a do-gooder or any essence e that is a do-gooder in every world. T. Qie)O(e is transworld depraved) The precise English reading of T is that, for every essence e, there is some world or other in which e is transworld depraved. T does not entail that there is any world in which every essence is transworld depraved. William Rowe has recently advanced an intriguing argument that concludes that we cannot reasonably believe both D and T. According to his Argument from Freedom, if T is true and every creaturely essence has significant freedom, then T* is also true.4 T*. O(ie)(e is transworld depraved)

Utility Pumps and the Value of Partial Compliance

Individual act utilitarianism requires that each moral agent bring about the best world accessible to him on each occasion of choice.1 It has been known for some time that act utilitarianism permits moral agents to flout some rules of common moral inheritance. For instance, since one additional broken promise has no perceptible effect on the institution of promise keeping, there seems to exist no empirical basis for prohibiting such a violation.2 And since no single contribution to famine relief, population control or environmental protection perceptibly improves existing conditions, there seems to be no act utilitarian reason to recommend them. Of course, while individual compliance with these familiar moral prescriptions lacks empirical justification, act utilitarians acknowledge that they must forego the considerable benefits forthcoming from general compliance with (at least parts of) commonsense morality.

Why we ought to be a little less beneficent

from Hansers own, show that the central idea of Hansers principle cannot be incorporated in a fully acceptable principle of beneficence. But there are more worrisome problems facing Hansers principle of beneficence. If principles of beneficence are designed to maximize benefits, rather than maximize benefactors, then there is no uniquely correct principled approach to beneficence. The level of beneficence certain to produce the greatest overall benefits varies widely from one set of circumstances to another. It is true in many circumstances that unerring moral agents who give equal or greater consideration to others cannot guarantee maximum overall benefits, while unerring moral agents who care very little about others can make this guarantee. We are sometimes all better off when we are a little less beneficent. On Hansers view a context affords the opportunity for pure beneficence if (i) there are people in need (ii) agents could benefit these people without harming anyone (iii) the beneficiaries would gain more in receiving aid than the benefactors would sacrifice in giving it (iv) nothing else the moral agents could do would produce more well-being, and (v) no special obligations come into play. Among the possible responses to cases of pure beneficence we find the recommendation of following controversial principle.