Michael J. Geary

Navigating the Gaullist Veto

There was a definite sense of deja vu and exasperation at the end of 1967 both within and outside the Community. The second French veto presented the enlargement actors with challenges similar to those faced in January 1963. The six and the Commission had to maintain the forward momentum in light of de Gaulle’s non, while the applicants had yet again to reassess their European policy. This chapter focuses on how the Commission, as well as the British and Irish governments, responded to de Gaulle’s obstructionism between December 1967 and December 1969. It assesses the impact that the veto had on the two candidates’ European policy, and the very different approaches that Dublin and London adopted with the Commission during that period. Chapter 5 also analyses the Commission’s influence over the many bridge-building initiatives drawn up in the aftermath of the veto aimed at resolving the enlargement crisis, and assesses its effectiveness as an honest broker between the six and the applicants. Finally, the chapter explores the Commission’s attempts to steer the enlargement issue in the aftermath of de Gaulle’s sudden resignation in 1969.

La Bataille des Chiffres

The Hague summit of December 1969 paved the way for the six to begin the historic process of Community enlargement. It was believed that negotiations with the applicant governments would commence towards the middle of 1970. History was in the making. Chapter 6 examines the Commission’s role during the accession negotiations between London and the Community. It explores the negotiating positions and the procedure adopted by the six in advance of the talks. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to analyse the Commission’s position on, and influence over, each item on the negotiating table and the outcomes. However, from an analysis of the archival material, it is clear that the Commission played a role with varying degrees of influence and success in most of the issues discussed between the sides, such as dairy exports from New Zealand, Commonwealth sugar, and economic and monetary problems. Instead, Chapter 6 isolates one of the major negotiating issues that affected Britain more than the other applicants - its contribution to the Community budget — and attempts to extract the Commission’s role and influence during the discussions that followed.

The Commission and Britain’s First Application

The British application for Community membership in 1961 led to the EEC’s first major crisis. Chapter 1 explores the role played by the European Commission after Britain submitted its application in mid-1961 through to the collapse of enlargement negotiations 18 months later. Unlike most accounts of Britain’s first and unsuccessful attempt at membership, the main focus of the chapter is on how the Commission responded to the British request and its influence over the subsequent negotiations. It addresses issues central to the Commission and fundamental to the enlargement question that arose because of the British application. These include: (i) the working relationship between the EEC’s institutions and in particular between the Commission and the Council; (ii) the type of Community envisaged by the Hallstein Commission; (iii) the conflicts within the Community over Britain’s membership; (iv) the views of the Council on the Commission’s role within the enlargement negotiations; and (v) the influence of the Commission on the negotiations and their outcomes. A central question that the chapter seeks to answer is how the Commission used the enlargement question to extend its influence in the policy and decision-making process.1 While a number of issues dominated negotiations between the British and the Community, such as agriculture, the chapter, of necessity, analyses just one, namely, the problem of accommodating Britain’s Commonwealth interests. The Commission played a prominent role in each issue negotiated, but an analysis of the Commonwealth problem reveals how that institution tried to, at the same time, create a role for itself and grab a certain amount of influence inside and outside the negotiations.

Challenging the Acquis

Due to Ireland’s relative size and pro-European and Community outlook, membership negotiations with the Community should have been a straightforward affair. There were no colonial interests to be considered other than Ireland’s close economic relationship with Britain. Ireland was not a member of the Commonwealth or EFTA. There was no longer any discussion in the Community about allowing neutral countries into the EEC, due largely to the fact that Ireland’s application was not considered in the same light as those of Austria and Switzerland. Domestically, there was no serious political or social opposition to membership (unlike in Britain, Denmark, and Norway) and, therefore, the Community did not have to sidestep any sensitive issues.1 Indeed, of the four applicants, Ireland was perhaps the staunchest advocate for membership, and, as the previous chapters have argued, its position on achieving entry remained steadfast throughout the 1960s. Chapter 7 deals with the Commission’s relations with Ireland during Dublin’s second, and successful, attempt at Community membership, from 1970 to 1973. While it is beyond the scope of the chapter to adequately explore all the issues that dominated the enlargement talks, it examines one key area where the Commission’s negotiating influence was most effective. It devotes particular attention to the CFP, introduced to the Council, and then to the applicants, just as negotiations commenced in June 1970.

From Veto to Veto: Britain and the Commission

Charles de Gaulle’s determination to keep the Community’s door firmly shut to Britain and the other applicants led to the EEC’s first crisis in January 1963. This chapter examines the period between the end of the first enlargement negotiations in January and Britain’s second attempt at membership in mid-1967. It focuses on the fall-out from the veto and assesses the Commission’s response to the breakdown of the negotiations. The chapter traces the ways in which the Hallstein Commission, and later with Rey as President, dealt with the enlargement question between 1963 and 1967. In particular, Chapter 3 examines the events that led to the Commission’s avis on enlargement in 1967 and explores how its views influenced the outcome of the second attempt at membership. A continuing theme running through the chapter is the importance of the membership question to the Brussels executive and the evolution in its thinking on the policy.

Ireland and the Policy of Failure

Chapter 4 explores the European Commission’s relations with the Irish government from the breakdown of the Brussels negotiations in January 1963 through to Ireland’s second application for EEC membership in May 1967. The period witnessed a flurry of activity between the Commission and Dublin as Ireland attempted to secure interim trade deals with the six in the absence of Community membership. The chapter examines the role played by the Commission in Dublin’s foreign and economic policy formulation during this period. It sheds new light on the early initiatives taken by the Irish government in the period after the 1963 veto aimed directly at the Commission. The chapter assesses how the Commission responded within the overall enlargement debate, and contrasts these efforts with the way in which other applicants pursued their own European policy. It also highlights the limits of the Commission’s influence over policy areas not bound to the founding treaties.

The Commission and the Irish Application

Chapter 2 examines further aspects of the European Commission’s influence on the first failed attempt at Community enlargement through an analysis of Ireland’s application for membership. Ireland’s application did not generate the same level of excitement or political complexity in Brussels or elsewhere as the British application, and this is also reflected in the state of primary and secondary literature on Dublin’s application.1 Indeed, as a measure of the importance of Ireland’s application and the impact it had on the Community, it is worth noting that Robert Marjolin makes no reference to the application in his memoirs. Yet, Chapter 2 explores two significant problems that the Irish applications posed for the Community, problems that the Commission had not encountered during negotiations with the British. The first was the question of economic suitability and whether the Irish economy could compete in open markets without privileged trading agreements with Britain. The chapter focuses on the attempts made by Irish policy-makers to convince the Commission of Ireland’s economic readiness for membership. The second problem was equally important. The Irish application opened up a debate within the Community on whether it was wise to allow neutrals and non-members of NATO into the EEC. The central question in this chapter is how the Irish application helped increase the Commission’s influence over the enlargement process.

European Union Economic Policy: The Role of the EU in External Economic Relations

of such communication’ (pp. 72–73). He goes on to say that all societies need to address three basic problématiques: the epistemic or ‘the degree of certainty of knowledge’ (which could involve religion or science); the political (the balance between individual and collective autonomy); and economic (ways of satisfying human material needs) (pp. 74–75). Part II begins with a chapter, ‘The link between capitalism and democracy reconsidered’, which calls another long-held assumption into question. Wagner acknowledges that both systems have roots in the Enlightenment, but points out that they have ‘different origins, different underlying principles and, thus, different historical trajectories’ (pp. 83–84). He notes that Marx and the Frankfurt School considered capitalism basically exploitative and alienating, and democracy an expendable ‘surface feature’ of capitalist societies. Wagner points out that capitalism has existed without democracy at times in Italy, Germany, Spain and Vichy France. He discusses numerous events that could not have been predicted by earlier understandings of modernity and assumptions about its future. Among them are the international social unrest of 1968, the 1974 recession, the rise of the Japanese economy of the 1980s, the Iranian revolution of 1979, various situations in former colonies and the establishment of the European Union as well as its recent problems. He highlights the situations of Brazil and South Africa, both of which face unique and complicated problems posed by former colonial relationships and diverse population groups, and both of which have undergone conscious self-examination to develop their own economic and political strategies. The book’s final chapter, ‘Towards a world sociology of modernity’ returns again to the inadequate assumptions of fifty years ago. According toWagner, ‘Sociologists then thought that they had the means to explain “modern society”, and that this society was indeed basically stable and predictable. Today, “modernity” seems in constant flux, one crisis following another’ (p. 166). He goes on to say,