Michael J. Jung

Analyst Interest as an Early Indicator of Firm Fundamental Changes and Stock Returns

We posit that a change in analyst interest in a firm is an early indicator of the firm’s future fundamentals, capital market activities, and stock returns. We measure increases in analyst interest by observing analysts who do not cover a firm but participate in that firm’s earnings conference call, and we measure decreases in analyst interest by observing analysts who cover a firm yet are absent from that firm’s call. We find that increases in analyst interest are positively associated with future changes in firm fundamentals and capital market activities, while decreases in analyst interest are negatively associated with capital market activities. We also find that increases (decreases) in analyst interest are positively (negatively) correlated with future stock returns over the next three months and that a hedge portfolio yields a significant abnormal return. Overall, our study shows that analyst interest is a novel and early indicator of future firm fundamentals and capital market consequences.

Making Sense of One Dollar CEO Salaries

We examine the determinants and outcomes of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) accepting a

The Confirmation Effect of Analyst Recommendation Reiterations

1 salary, a compensation practice that occurs relatively frequently in high-profile firms and is debated by regulators, investors, and the media. Using a hand-collected sample of 93 CEOs from 91 firms between 1993 and 2011, we examine the triggers preceding the

The Predictability of Analyst Forecast Revisions

1 salary decision, the factors associated with the decision, subsequent stock returns, and the outcomes for the CEOs. Our evidence is consistent with two explanations for the phenomenon: 1) it is a gesture of sacrifice by CEOs of firms in crisis, and 2) it is a signal of better future performance by CEOs of growing firms. Our analyses highlight the two different circumstances and shed light on an interesting debate that has thus far been supported only by anecdotal evidence.

Conference Presentations and the Disclosure Milieu

The vast majority of reports written by sell-side equity analysts conclude with a reiteration of the analyst’s existing recommendation on a firm’s stock. Yet there is a disproportionate amount of research that focuses on the market reactions of changes in recommendations and a prevailing sense that reiterations do not matter. In this article, we test the hypothesis that reiterations of recommendations serve to resolve information uncertainty since the original recommendation was published and that they give rise to market reactions in the direction of the original recommendation, which we call a confirmation effect. Using a sample of analyst reports that do not contain any changes in recommendations, earnings forecasts, or price targets, we focus solely on reiterations and show that they are associated with proxies for information content, reductions in information uncertainty, and return reactions consistent with a confirmation effect.

Do Investors Benefit from Selective Access to Management

The most prevalent forecasts of firms’ long-term earnings issued by analysts are 2-year-ahead earnings per share (EPS) estimates. When introduced by analysts, 2-year-ahead EPS estimates set market expectations for firms’ future earnings. Subsequent revisions to these estimates are highly correlated with contemporaneous changes in stock prices. We examine whether such revisions are sufficiently predictable to enable investors to earn abnormal returns on hedged portfolios. We find that analyst forecast revisions are predictable and document an implementable strategy for investors. Consistent with investors’ fixation on unscaled EPS, the strategy earns positive abnormal returns using unscaled EPS revisions but not when revisions are scaled by the level of the EPS estimate or the stock price. Abnormal returns are found for firms with low analyst coverage, consistent with a greater initial mispricing from analyst optimism for firms with poorer information environments.