Michael J. Meyer

A deontological analysis of Peer relations in organizations

Using practical formalism a deontological ethical analysis of peer relations in organizations is developed. This analysis is composed of two types of duties derived from Kants Categorical Imperative: negative duties to refrain from the use of peers and positive duties to provide help and assistance. The conditions under which these duties pertain are specified through the development of examples and conceptual distinctions. A number of implications are then discussed.

The simple dignity of sentient life : Speciesism and human dignity

Does the very idea of “human dignity” entail some moral disrespect for nonhuman animals? Put otherwise, does the notion of “human dignity” smack of speciesism (roughly, a view whereby nonhuman, sentient individuals are denied [adequate] moral standing on essentially arbitrary grounds)? Animal advocates, like James Rachels, often allege that there is a serious clash between the traditional view of human dignity and adequate moral recognition of nonhuman animals: “The traditional doctrine of human dignity is speciesist to the core, for it implies that the interests of humans have priority over those of all other creatures.” 1 There is a further reason—beyond those put forth in a critique like Rachels’s—to be concerned with the claim that the very idea of human dignity is an impediment to the proper moral recognition of animals. The ascendancy of an important modern moral notion like human dignity should not, it seems, also become an occasion for the subjugation of animals—for example, by providing an alleged rationale for harming them. It would be a cruel irony indeed for an idea that is seen as a source of moral progress—by providing a ground for our moral respect for humans regardless of social class, race, etc.—to become a source for rationalizing harm toward nonhuman animals. This paper will first evaluate the claim that the idea of human dignity is a source of speciesist thinking. Later I will discuss a related question: can the claim that nonhuman animals “have dignity” be rendered fully consistent with a broadly kantian account of (human) dignity?