Michael K. Reiter
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
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Featured researches published by Michael K. Reiter.
computer and communications security | 2009
Yao Liu; Peng Ning; Michael K. Reiter
A power grid is a complex system connecting electric power generators to consumers through power transmission and distribution networks across a large geographical area. System monitoring is necessary to ensure the reliable operation of power grids, and state estimation is used in system monitoring to best estimate the power grid state through analysis of meter measurements and power system models. Various techniques have been developed to detect and identify bad measurements, including the interacting bad measurements introduced by arbitrary, non-random causes. At first glance, it seems that these techniques can also defeat malicious measurements injected by attackers. In this paper, we present a new class of attacks, called false data injection attacks, against state estimation in electric power grids. We show that an attacker can exploit the configuration of a power system to launch such attacks to successfully introduce arbitrary errors into certain state variables while bypassing existing techniques for bad measurement detection. Moreover, we look at two realistic attack scenarios, in which the attacker is either constrained to some specific meters (due to the physical protection of the meters), or limited in the resources required to compromise meters. We show that the attacker can systematically and efficiently construct attack vectors in both scenarios, which can not only change the results of state estimation, but also modify the results in arbitrary ways. We demonstrate the success of these attacks through simulation using IEEE test systems. Our results indicate that security protection of the electric power grid must be revisited when there are potentially malicious attacks.
european conference on computer systems | 2008
Jonathan M. McCune; Bryan Parno; Adrian Perrig; Michael K. Reiter; Hiroshi Isozaki
We present Flicker, an infrastructure for executing security-sensitive code in complete isolation while trusting as few as 250 lines of additional code. Flicker can also provide meaningful, fine-grained attestation of the code executed (as well as its inputs and outputs) to a remote party. Flicker guarantees these properties even if the BIOS, OS and DMA-enabled devices are all malicious. Flicker leverages new commodity processors from AMD and Intel and does not require a new OS or VMM. We demonstrate a full implementation of Flicker on an AMD platform and describe our development environment for simplifying the construction of Flicker-enabled code.
ieee symposium on security and privacy | 2005
Jonathan M. McCune; Adrian Perrig; Michael K. Reiter
Current mechanisms for authenticating communication between devices that share no prior context are inconvenient for ordinary users, without the assistance of a trusted authority. We present and analyze seeing-is-believing, a system that utilizes 2D barcodes and camera-telephones to implement a visual channel for authentication and demonstrative identification of devices. We apply this visual channel to several problems in computer security, including authenticated key exchange between devices that share no prior context, establishment of a trusted path for configuration of a TCG-compliant computing platform, and secure device configuration in the context of a smart home.
computer and communications security | 2012
Yinqian Zhang; Ari Juels; Michael K. Reiter; Thomas Ristenpart
This paper details the construction of an access-driven side-channel attack by which a malicious virtual machine (VM) extracts fine-grained information from a victim VM running on the same physical computer. This attack is the first such attack demonstrated on a symmetric multiprocessing system virtualized using a modern VMM (Xen). Such systems are very common today, ranging from desktops that use virtualization to sandbox application or OS compromises, to clouds that co-locate the workloads of mutually distrustful customers. Constructing such a side-channel requires overcoming challenges including core migration, numerous sources of channel noise, and the difficulty of preempting the victim with sufficient frequency to extract fine-grained information from it. This paper addresses these challenges and demonstrates the attack in a lab setting by extracting an ElGamal decryption key from a victim using the most recent version of the libgcrypt cryptographic library.
Distributed Computing | 1998
Dahlia Malkhi; Michael K. Reiter
Summary. Quorum systems are well-known tools for ensuring the consistency and availability of replicated data despite the benign failure of data repositories. In this paper we consider the arbitrary (Byzantine) failure of data repositories and present the first study of quorum system requirements and constructions that ensure data availability and consistency despite these failures. We also consider the load associated with our quorum systems, i.e., the minimal access probability of the busiest server. For services subject to arbitrary failures, we demonstrate quorum systems over
computer and communications security | 1999
Fabian Monrose; Michael K. Reiter; Susanne Wetzel
n
ieee symposium on security and privacy | 2001
Fabian Monrose; Michael K. Reiter; Qi Li; Susanne Wetzel
servers with a load of
Communications of The ACM | 1999
Michael K. Reiter; Aviel D. Rubin
O(\frac{1}{\sqrt{n}})
symposium on operating systems principles | 2005
Michael Abd-El-Malek; Gregory R. Ganger; Garth R. Goodson; Michael K. Reiter; Jay J. Wylie
, thus meeting the lower bound on load for benignly fault-tolerant quorum systems. We explore several variations of our quorum systems and extend our constructions to cope with arbitrary client failures.
computer and communications security | 1994
Michael K. Reiter
We present a novel approach to improving the security of passwords. In our approach, the legitimate users typing patterns (e.g., durations of keystrokes, and latencies between keystrokes) are combined with the users password to generate a hardened password that is convincingly more secure than conventional passwords against both online and offline attackers. In addition, our scheme automatically adapts to gradual changes in a users typing patterns while maintaining the same hardened password across multiple logins, for use in file encryption or other applications requiring a longterm secret key. Using empirical data and a prototype implementation of our scheme, we give evidence that our approach is viable in practice, in terms of ease of use, improved security, and performance