Michael Kerr

Books at a Glance: Politics, History and Culture

The rise of the State of Israel must be counted as one of the most improbable events of the twentieth century. The Jewish people, as recently as 100 years ago, remained a widely scattered and largely oppressed nation, with only a few tens of thousands of its most pious and impoverished members actually residing in its ancient homeland. Yet, today, Israel is a prosperous and powerful state of more than 7 million citizens, about 80 percent of them Jewish. It boasts a vibrant culture, flourishing economy, cutting-edge scientific/technological scene and worldclass army. The contrast between the early twentieth and early twenty-first centuries could not be more stark. How, in the span of 100 years, a despised people living at the margins of civilization managed to re-invent itself in the form of a developed state that is now the envy of other nations around the world is a phenomenon that does not lend itself to a simple explanation. Jonathan Adelman, an expert on the Russian and Chinese revolutions, but who also has a solid grasp of the basic facts about Zionism and Israel, takes on a formidable challenge in attempting to provide an answer in his accessible and thought-provoking book. Essentially, Adelman argues that Israel has matured into a developed state as a consequence of the Zionist movement’s ability to carry out two revolutions in the past century. In the pre-state era, it initiated a socialist revolution that created effective national institutions on which to found a state and, in the immediate post-independence era, it subsequently utilized these institutions to create a centralized state. Then, since the late 1970s, the Jewish state has been transformed from a developing into a developed state by an ongoing capitalist revolution. Adelman, as he himself acknowledges, uncovers no new historical information about Zionism and Israel. His book is not meant to be an original treatment of these subjects in terms of the facts. Rather, what really distinguishes his work from other general histories of Zionism and Israel is his fruitful decision to focus on the ‘big picture’—to illustrate how a revolutionary movement and state have overcome tremendous internal and external obstacles not only to survive, but also to thrive. Even for those

‘A Positive Aspect to the Tragedy of Lebanon’: The Convergence of US, Syrian and Israeli Interests at the Outset of Lebanon's Civil War

Jimmy Carter’s narrow victory over Gerald Ford in the US presidential elections, on 2 November 1976, had brought US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s masterful command over American foreign policy to an untimely and inconclusive end. It also marked a cooling off of US– Syrian relations following Kissinger’s attempts to draw President Hafez al-Asad of Syria into a comprehensive Middle East peace process. Before clearing his desk at the end of 1976, Kissinger had promised Asad that he would personally inform the new administration of Syria’s centrality to any future US-led efforts to achieve a just and comprehensive settlement to the Arab–Israeli conflict. More than that, on the eve of his departure, Kissinger wrote a long and thoughtful message to Asad, reiterating his belief that there should be ‘no boundaries to the cooperation’ between the US and Syria as they sought renewed progress in the peace process. From Asad’s perspective, the reconciliation that had occurred between the US and Syria following the outbreak of civil war in Lebanon, in 1975, had been both fortuitous and expedient. This allowed him to advance considerably Syria’s irredentist claim to Lebanon by establishing a military foothold in the country without provoking another war with Israel. By brokering the Sinai II interim agreement between Egypt and Israel in 1975, Kissinger had excluded Syria and the Palestine Liberation