Michael LaCour-Little

Risk-based capital requirements for mortgage loans

We develop estimates of risk-based capital requirements for single-family mortgage loans held in portfolio by financial intermediaries. Our method relies on simulation of default and loss probability distributions via simulation of changes in economic variables with conditional default probabilities calibrated to recent actual mortgage loan performance data from the 1990s. Based on simulations with varying input parameters, we find that appropriate capital charges for credit risk vary substantially with loan or borrower characteristics and are generally below the current regulatory standard. These factors may help explain the high degree of securitization, or regulatory capital arbitrage, observed for this asset category.

Discrimination in Mortgage Lending: A Critical Review of the Literature

This article surveys the diverse research that examines racial disparities in mortgage lending markets in the context of the fair housing legislation of recent decades. A review of the theoretical models, data, and empirical methods reveals deficiencies in all three areas. A new research agenda focusing on development of more complete models of mortgage lending together with panel data tracking mortgage loan performance over time is needed.

Movers and Shuckers: Interdependent Prepayment Decisions

We model competing risks of mortgage termination where the borrower faces a repeated choice to continue to pay, refinance the loan, move or default. Most previous empirical work on mortgage prepayment has ignored the distinction between prepayments triggered by refinancing and moving, combining them into a single prepayment rate. We show that financial considerations are the primary drivers of the refinance choice while homeowner characteristics have more influence on the move decision. We demonstrate that these differences are statistically significant and that combining these two distinct choices into a single measure of prepayment shifts coefficients toward zero and produces inaccurate predictions of aggregate termination rates. For example, a combined model underestimates the effect of the market price of the loan on refinancing; it misses entirely the opposite effects of borrower income on moving and refinancing. Our results suggest that existing prepayment models are inconsistent predictors of mobility-driven prepayment and underestimate the effect of market conditions and borrower characteristics on refinancing and housing decisions. Our findings have great significance to mortgage investors because mobility-driven prepayments are likely to be a more significant source of prepayments in thenext decade. Copyright 2001 by the American Real Estate and Urban Ecopnomics Assocaition.

Risk Based Capital Requirements for Mortgage Loans

We develop estimates of risk-based capital requirements for single-family mortgage loans held in portfolio by financial intermediaries. Our method relies on simulation of default and loss probability distributions via simulation of changes in economic variables with conditional default probabilities calibrated to recent actual mortgage loan performance data from the 1990s. Based on simulations with varying input parameters, we find that appropriate capital charges for credit risk vary substantially with loan or borrower characteristics and are generally below the current regulatory standard. These factors may help explain the high degree of securitization, or regulatory capital arbitrage, observed for this asset category.

Appraisal Quality and Residential Mortgage Default: Evidence from Alaska

We empirically examine the effect of appraisal quality on subsequent mortgage loan performance using data from the high volatility housing market of Alaska in the 1980s. We develop measures of appraisal quality by computing the residual between a hedonic estimate of house value using available information from other appraisals compared to actual ex ante appraised value. We then estimate proportional hazard models of mortgage default and find that several measures of appraisal quality, particularly appraised value in excess of hedonic estimates, are significantly related to default risk. Using valuations subsequent to loan default, we are also able to evaluate how well house price indices perform in terms of estimating current loan-to-value and offer some additional evidence on the controversy over the role of net equity versus trigger events as determinants of mortgage default. We also show that defaults are related to ex ante measures of housing market conditions, with additional implications for underwriting policies and the current industry trend away from traditional appraisal and toward automated valuation.

Does Regulatory Capital Arbitrage or Asymmetric Information Drive Securitization

Banks face the choice of keeping loans on their balance sheet as private debt or transforming them into public debt via asset securitization. Securitization transfers credit and interest rate risk, increases liquidity, augments fee income, and improves capital ratios. Yet many lenders still choose to retain a portion of their loans in portfolio. An open research question is whether lenders exploit asymmetric information to sell riskier loans into the public markets or retain riskier loans in response to regulatory capital incentives (regulatory capital arbitrage). We examine this question empirically using micro-level data and find that securitized mortgage loans have experienced lower ex-post defaults than those retained in portfolio, providing evidence consistent with the latter explanation for securitization.

The Home Purchase Mortgage Preferences of Low- and Moderate-Income Households

Housing policy in the United States has long supported homeownership, yet variation persists across income groups. This article employs recent mortgage origination data to focus on the revealed preferences of low- and moderate-income (LMI) households in home purchase mortgage choice. I identify the factors associated with conventional conforming, FHA, nonprime and specially targeted programs. Empirical results show that individual credit characteristics and financial factors, including pricing, generally drive product choice, with some variation evident when loans are originated through brokers. Results also indicate that targeted conventional programs effectively compete with government-insured products in the LMI segment.

Pay Me Now or Pay Me Later: Alternative Mortgage Products and the Mortgage Crisis

Mortgage contract design has been identified as a contributory factor in the recent market crisis. Here we examine alternative mortgage products (including interest-only and other deferred amortization structures) and develop a game theoretic model of contract choice given uncertain future income and house prices across different types of borrowers. Results imply that deferred amortization contracts are more likely to be selected in housing markets with greater expected price appreciation and by households with greater risk tolerance; moreover, such products necessarily entail greater default risk, especially among lower-income households who are aggressive in housing consumption levels. Empirical tests of model predictions generally provide support for the theory.

Are Minorities or Minority Neighborhoods More Likely to Get Low Appraisals

We empirically examine the role of appraisal in the residential mortgage lending process—in particular, the incidence, consequences, and determinants of appraisal below contract purchase price. Using the Boston Federal Reserve Study data set, we find that, as expected, low appraised value significantly increases the probability of mortgage loan application rejection. We find no evidence that low appraised value is related to census tract racial composition, an important finding given the history of the appraisal industry; however, low appraised value is related to proxies for neighborhood quality. Moreover, properties securing adjustable rate mortgages, condominiums, and properties purchased by African American buyers show an increased probability of low appraisal, though the race effect result is highly sensitive to model specification.

Prepayment penalties in residential mortgage contracts: A cost‐benefit analysis

Abstract Prepayment penalties are ubiquitous in the commercial mortgage market yet reviled and highly restricted by law and regulation in the residential mortgage market. Considering the perspectives of both the borrower and the lender, we attempt a balanced cost‐benefit analysis of this controversial contract feature for residential mortgage loans. We will address the following questions: What is the economic value of the prepayment penalty feature? Why is it more prevalent in the subprime than the prime market segment? Do borrowers obtain an offsetting economic benefit when they contract for a loan containing a prepayment penalty? What is the average cost of a prepayment penalty to borrowers, and how often is this cost actually incurred? In general, although we find a significant reduction in interest rates for loans containing a prepayment penalty, the expected costs outweigh the benefits by a considerable margin.