Michael Lockwood

Singer on killing and the preference for Life

According to Singer, it is not directly wrong to kill ‘non‐self‐conscious beings’, such as lower animals, human foetuses and newborn infants, provided that any consequent loss of happiness is made good by the creation of new sentient life. In contrast, normal adult humans, being ‘self‐conscious’, generally have a strong preference for going on living, the flouting of which cannot, Singer argues, be morally counterbalanced by creating new, equally happy individuals. Singers case might be reinforced by taking account, not only of the preference for continued life itself, but also of other preferences for whose satisfaction continued life is essential. It proves difficult, however, to find a formulation of ‘preference utilitarianism’ which, while lacking other obviously unacceptable consequences, supports Singers ‘non‐replaceability principle’. Also, Singers position fails adequately to accommodate our conviction that the lives of human beings are, in general, more valuable than those of other animals. Fi...

Of persons and organisms: a reply to Howsepian.

Howsepian has presented a number of thought experiments, which are designed to undermine my claim that our identity through time is grounded in the continued existence of those structures in our brains which directly underlie mental functioning. I argue that the conclusions which Howsepian draws from these thought experiments are mistaken, and that his discussion of them is vitiated, in particular, by his failure to distinguish between personal identity and the identity of the associated human organism.