Michael McDermott

Truth and Assertability

Deflationists say that the equivalence between ‘p is true’ and p is all there is to the meaning of ‘true’. “Use” theories generally construe meaning as acceptance conditions. I argue: (i) there are certain obvious objections to a deflationary theory of truth so formulated; but (ii) they can be overcome if we employ a graded notion of use, i.e. a notion of assertability; but (iii) there appear to be certain further difficulties which cannot be overcome in this way.

Jonathan Bennett, A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003, pp. 402, £50 (cloth), £17.99 (paper)

This is a guide that takes sides. As a guide, I strongly recommend it. Its emphases fairly represent the current state of the subject: it covers everything important, and gives most space to what is most important. Its exposition is generally full, accurate, and very clear. (One major exception is noted below.) Bennett’s original contributions are less valuable, in my opinion, but they are usually interesting and seldom eccentric. He begins with a defence of the standard division of conditionals into ‘indicative’ and ‘subjunctive’, to use his admittedly imperfect labels. In eight chapters on indicatives, he rejects Grice’s and Jackson’s defences of a material conditional analysis, defends Adams’s Hypothesis, argues for ‘NTV’ (‘No Truth Value’—but he thinks that some indicatives have truth value), and applies Adams’s probabilistic conception of validity. In ten chapters on subjunctives, Bennett lays out Lewis’s analysis and proposes adjustments at various points; there are two further chapters rejecting ‘support’ (Goodman-style) theories, and defending the use of possible worlds. The last two chapters consider the important question of the relation between the two types of conditional.