Michael Nair-Collins

Abandoning the dead donor rule? A national survey of public views on death and organ donation

Brain dead organ donors are the principal source of transplantable organs. However, it is controversial whether brain death is the same as biological death. Therefore, it is unclear whether organ removal in brain death is consistent with the ‘dead donor rule’, which states that organ removal must not cause death. Our aim was to evaluate the publics opinion about organ removal if explicitly described as causing the death of a donor in irreversible apneic coma. We conducted a cross-sectional internet survey of the American public (n=1096). Questionnaire domains included opinions about a hypothetical scenario of organ removal described as causing the death of a patient in irreversible coma, and items measuring willingness to donate organs after death. Some 71% of the sample agreed that it should be legal for patients to donate organs in the scenario described and 67% agreed that they would want to donate organs in a similar situation. Of the 85% of the sample who agreed that they were willing to donate organs after death, 76% agreed that they would donate in the scenario of irreversible coma with organ removal causing death. There appears to be public support for organ donation in a scenario explicitly described as violating the dead donor rule. Further, most but not all people who would agree to donate when organ removal is described as occurring after death would also agree to donate when organ removal is described as causing death in irreversible coma.

Early sensory–perceptual processing deficits for affectively valenced inputs are more pronounced in schizophrenia patients with a history of violence than in their non-violent peers

Individuals with schizophrenia are more prone to violent behaviors than the general population. It is increasingly recognized that processing of emotionally valenced stimuli is impaired in schizophrenia, a deficit that may play a role in aggressive behavior. Our goal was to establish whether patients with a history of violence would show more severe deficits in processing emotionally valenced inputs than non-violent patients. Using event-related potentials, we measured how early during processing of emotional valence, evidence of aberrant function was observed. A total of 42 schizophrenia patients (21 with history of violence; 21 without) and 28 healthy controls were tested. Participants performed an inhibitory control task, making speeded responses to pictorial stimuli. Pictures occasionally repeated twice and participants withheld responses to these repeats. Valenced pictures from the International Affective Picture System were presented. Results in controls showed modulations during the earliest phases of sensory processing (<100 ms) for negatively valenced pictures. A cascade of modulations ensued, involving sensory and perceptual processing stages. In contrast, neither schizophrenia group showed early differentiation. Non-violent patients showed earliest modulations beginning ∼150 ms. For violent patients, however, earliest modulations were further delayed and highly attenuated. The current study reveals sensory-perceptual processing dysfunction for negatively valenced inputs, which is particularly pronounced in aggressive patients.

Taking Science Seriously in the Debate on Death and Organ Transplantation

The effort to develop international guidelines for determination of death purports to start with an objective examination of the biology of death. So far, however, it is showing once again how moral and metaphysical claims about death masquerade as scientific facts.

Brain Death, Paternalism, and the Language of "Death"

The controversy surrounding the dead donor rule and the adequacy of neurological criteria for death continues unabated. However, despite disagreement on fundamental theoretical questions, I argue that there is significant (but not complete) agreement on the permissibility of organ retrieval from heart-beating donors. Many disagreements are rooted in disputes surrounding language meaning and use, rather than the practices of transplant medicine. Thus I suggest that the debate can be fruitfully recast in terms of a dispute about language. Given this recasting, I argue that the language used to describe organ donation is misleading and paternalistic. Finally, I suggest that the near-agreement on the permissibility of heart-beating organ retrieval ought to be reconsidered. If the paternalism is not justified, then either the language used to describe organ transplantation must change radically, or it would seem to follow that much of the transplant enterprise lacks ethical justification.

Hypothalamic–Pituitary Function in Brain Death A Review

The Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) states that an individual is dead when “all functions of the entire brain” have ceased irreversibly. However, it has been questioned whether some functions of the hypothalamus, particularly osmoregulation, can continue after the clinical diagnosis of brain death (BD). In order to learn whether parts of the hypothalamus can continue to function after the diagnosis of BD, we performed 2 separate systematic searches of the MEDLINE database, corresponding to the functions of the posterior and anterior pituitary. No meta-analysis is possible due to nonuniformity in the clinical literature. However, some modest generalizations can reasonably be drawn from a narrative review and from anatomic considerations that explain why these findings should be expected. We found evidence suggesting the preservation of hypothalamic function, including secretion of hypophysiotropic hormones, responsiveness to anterior pituitary stimulation, and osmoregulation, in a substantial proportion of patients declared dead by neurological criteria. We discuss several possible explanations for these findings. We conclude by suggesting that additional clinical research with strict inclusion criteria is necessary and further that a more nuanced and forthright public dialogue is needed, particularly since standard diagnostic practices and the UDDA may not be entirely in accord.

Clinical and ethical perspectives on brain death

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Laying Futility to Rest

In this essay I examine the formal structure of the concept of futility, enabling identification of the appropriate roles played by patient, professional, and society. I argue that the concept of futility does not justify unilateral decisions to forego life-sustaining medical treatment over patient or legitimate surrogate objection, even when futility is determined by a process or subject to ethics committee review. Furthermore, I argue for a limited positive ethical obligation on the part of health care professionals to assist patients in achieving certain restricted goals, including the preservation of life, even in circumstances in which most would agree that that life is of no benefit to the patient. Finally, I address the objection that professional integrity overrides this limited obligation and find the objection unconvincing. In short, my aim in this essay is to see the concept of futility finally buried, once and for all.

Do the ‘brain dead’ merely appear to be alive?

The established view regarding ‘brain death’ in medicine and medical ethics is that patients determined to be dead by neurological criteria are dead in terms of a biological conception of death, not a philosophical conception of personhood, a social construction or a legal fiction. Although such individuals show apparent signs of being alive, in reality they are (biologically) dead, though this reality is masked by the intervention of medical technology. In this article, we argue that an appeal to the distinction between appearance and reality fails in defending the view that the ‘brain dead’ are dead. Specifically, this view relies on an inaccurate and overly simplistic account of the role of medical technology in the physiology of a ‘brain dead’ patient. We conclude by offering an explanation of why the conventional view on ‘brain death’, though mistaken, continues to be endorsed in light of its connection to organ transplantation and the dead donor rule.

Is heart transplantation after circulatory death compatible with the dead donor rule

Dalle Ave et al (2016) provide a valuable overview of several protocols for heart transplantation after circulatory death. However, their analysis of the compatibility of heart donation after circulatory death (DCD) with the dead donor rule (DDR) is flawed. Their permanence-based criteria for death, which depart substantially from established law and bioethics, are ad hoc and unfounded. Furthermore, their analysis is self-defeating, because it undercuts the central motivation for DDR as both a legal and a moral constraint, rendering the DDR vacuous and trivial. Rather than devise new and ad hoc criteria for death for the purpose of rendering DCD nominally consistent with DDR, we contend that the best approach is to explicitly abandon DDR.

Moral Evaluations of Organ Transplantation Influence Judgments of Death and Causation

Two experiments investigated whether moral evaluations of organ transplantation influence judgments of death and causation. Participants’ beliefs about whether an unconscious organ donor was dead and whether organ removal caused death in a hypothetical vignette varied depending on the moral valence of the vignette. Those who were randomly assigned to the good condition (vs. bad) were more likely to believe that the donor was dead prior to organ removal and that organ removal did not cause death. Furthermore, attitudes toward euthanasia and organ donation independently predicted judgments of death and causation, regardless of experimental condition. The results are discussed in light of the framework of motivated reasoning, in which motivation influences the selection of cognitive processes and representations applied to a given domain, as well as Knobe’s person-as-moralist model, in which many basic concepts are appropriately imbued with moral features. On either explanatory framework, these data cast doubt on the psychological legitimacy of the mainstream justification for vital organ procurement from heart-beating donors, which holds that neurological criteria for death are scientifically justified, independently of concerns about organ transplantation. These data suggest that, rather than concluding that organ removal is permissible because the donor is dead, people may believe that the donor is dead because they believe organ removal to be permissible.