Michael O. Slobodchikoff

Treaty networks, nesting, and interstate cooperation: Russia, the FSU, and the CIS

Networks of treaties with treaty nesting, wherein treaties build upon, expand upon, or are grounded in preexisting treaties, are an increasingly important dimension of interstate cooperation. Focusing on relations within the area of the former Soviet Union (FSU), with special attention to both multilateral and bilateral arrangements between Russia and other FSU states, we illuminate treaty activism and regional cooperation among Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) members in the security domain. Beyond an analysis of multilateral and bilateral CIS alliance agreements, we evaluate the more focused security arrangements of two FSU–CIS bilateral relationships: Russia–Turkmenistan and Russia–Georgia. We intentionally analyze these two complex and problematic bilateral relationships, where treaty activism and networks permitted the signatory states to address common security issues. The breakdown of the Russian–Georgian relationship with the August 2008 war should not obscure the significant conflict management efforts of the preceding decade and a half; efforts that were grounded in intensive treaty activity. Joined together, these CIS multilateral and focused bilateral relationships point to a treaty complex and architecture that partially manage the contrasting security interests of FSU states.

Mistrust and hegemony: Regional institutional design, the FSU-CIS, and Russia

Power inequalities and mistrust have characterized many relationships between states over the centuries. One approach that states can take to deal with these two, often interrelated, problems is to create intergovernmental institutions and arrangements designed to accommodate the interests of states with varied power capabilities. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) embodies an interesting institutional design in an effort by former Soviet Union (FSU) countries to address these dilemmas. The CIS was not only the first multilateral FSU organization created following the collapse of the Soviet Union, but it also provided a necessary and important framework for the further construction of bilateral and multilateral relations among the former Soviet republics as they reengaged one another. CIS arrangements have been augmented by extensive bilateral negotiations and treaties and, brought together, these interconnected multilateral and bilateral instruments yield a system of cautious regional security governance and framework for international relations within the FSU. This paper analyzes three key features of this foundational CIS institutional design: (1) legalism, (2) an à la carte choice of treaty instruments, and (3) nested bilateralism, wherein many details of the regional, multilateral agreements are implemented via bilateral treaties (hence constituting a combination design feature). Empirically, the paper illuminates this institutional design using a unique dataset of all multilateral security treaties of the CIS (approximately 185) and all bilateral security treaties (more than 500) between the regional hegemon, Russia, and the smaller CIS members. We further investigate the causal mechanisms of the CIS institutional design as it copes with the conditions of hegemony and mistrust in two bilateral case studies, Russia–Armenia, and Russia–Ukraine (Black Sea Fleet status). We find the CIS institutional design, built upon by subsequent FSU regional organizations (including the Eurasian Economic Union and Shanghai Cooperation Organization), has permitted both more and less powerful states to advance their interrelated security interests in the face of considerable power asymmetry and mistrust. More than twenty years after the CIS’s formation, a patchwork of Eurasian regional organizations and numerous related bilateral treaties widen regional security and other arrangements. Meanwhile, the dramatic events surrounding the February 2014 Ukrainian coup and the joining of Crimea to the Russian Federation only reinforce the importance of understanding state treaty activity in channeling state action. Questions surround Russia respecting the 1992 treaty and protocol with Ukraine and the US on the removal of nuclear weapons from the territory of Ukraine and the joint recognition of Ukraine’s sovereign borders. But Russia’s spring 2014 actions involving Crimea and its Crimean bases accorded with the various treaties concluded with Ukraine in 1997; treaties addressing the Black Sea Fleet and the Crimean Peninsula that are a subject of our analysis.

Challenging US Hegemony: The Ukrainian Crisis and Russian Regional Order

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was reduced from the role of a global hegemon to that of a regional hegemon. As the regional hegemon, Russia was responsible for creating a regional order that was nested within the global order. However, since the Soviet Union had collapsed, it could not be assumed that Russia would create a regional order that was compatible with the global order. Would Russia create a regional order that was incompatible with the global order, and further, would Russia be a dissatisfied state that would challenge US hegemony? Using network analysis, I discover that Russia created a regional order that was compatible with the global order. In other words, Russia did not directly challenge the global order. More specifically, Russia accepted the global order that existed at the end of the Cold War. Providing that the global order remained static, Russia would not challenge that order. However, US actions following the collapse of the Soviet Union such as the expansion of NATO and the withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty are interpreted by Russia as a dynamic change in the global order. The Ukrainian crisis further exacerbated the wedge that had developed between the United States and Russia. It has further isolated Russia, destroyed the regional order nested within the global order, and ensured that Russia fully became a dissatisfied state looking to challenge US hegemony. Russia will now turn to China to try to challenge US hegemony.

Roots of Russian Soft Power: Rethinking Russian National Identity

The end of the Cold War heralded a new era as Western soft power was at its zenith in Eastern Europe and regional states accepted and institutionalized a new EuroAmerican ethos. In contrast, Russian soft power was at its lowest point as the Soviet Union imploded, leaving fi fteen newly independent states. While Russia was still the most powerful nation in the region, it lacked competence to deploy soft power and was unable to culturally infl uence its neighbors. Russia had to regain its footing and sought to redefi ne its own national identity prior to being able to build and project its soft power. Thus, Russia turned inward to nineteenth century works in philosophy and literature while Western soft power and expansionism continued to draw closer to Russia’s borders. As Moscow regrouped, it created institutions to spread its message both regionally and globally and expanded its communication prowess. Russia realized that while its national identity might be grounded within its Slavic roots and Russian exceptionalism, the only way it could effectively counter Western soft power was to point out the hypocrisy of American and European governmental policies. Rather than generating a positive projection of cultural and political attractiveness, Russia fought the spread Euro-American soft power by directly challenging it and showed that the Western political ethos ultimately was selfcontradictory and also worked to destroy traditional values.

Shifting alliances and balance of power in Asia: transitions in the Indo-Russian security ties

ABSTRACT Although officially non-aligned during the Cold War, India remained closely aligned with the Soviet Union. After the Cold War, Indo-Russian ties have remained strong; currently the two countries share a Strategic Partnership in addition to numerous other bilateral treaties. When the United States first replaced Russia as India’s largest defence supplier, it made international headlines in security circles. Since then, there has been much speculation on the future of Indo-Russian ties. Since the essence of the Indo-Russian relationship is considered to be the large-scale military trade between the two states, the toppling of Russia as India’s premier defence provider naturally led to dismal predictions about the strength of their future ties. However, this approach discounts the various measures that both India and Russia have taken to institutionalize their friendship. By conducting a systematic analysis of the Indo-Russian bilateral treaties, this article assesses the levels of cooperation within this dyad. By using network analysis it demonstrates that the Indo-Russian relationship is cooperative rather than ad hoc, leading to deeper institutionalization that is unlikely to shift in the recent future.

Overcoming Barriers to Cooperation: Territorial and Issue Neutralization as Tools of Conflict Management

This article investigates how states can begin to cooperate and form bilateral relationships given severe barriers to cooperation. Certain issues can prevent cooperation from occurring despite strategic interests in doing so by both states. However, if states agree to use the institutional design feature of territorial or issue neutralization, then conflict can be averted even if some of the major hindrances to cooperation remains unresolved. I examine in greater detail how both territorial and issue neutralization are used as institutional designs feature in building a cooperative bilateral relationship. Through two major case studies, the self-imposed territorial neutralization of Finland in its relations with the Soviet Union as well as issue neutralization in the relationship between Russia and Ukraine following the collapse of the Soviet Union, I am able to show that territorial and issue neutralization may be effective tools for resolving conflict in the post-Soviet space and could create cooperative relationships instead of conflictual ones.

Constraining Elites: The Impact of Treaty Networks on Foreign Policy

In democracies, elites should be responsive to public opinion. This is especially true in Eastern Europe, where politicians fear electoral sanctions in the process of reform (Roberts and Kim 2011). Public opinion in general in Eastern Europe has been overwhelmingly in favor of European integration (Caplanova et al. 2004). In Ukraine, public opinion was in favor of increased cooperation with the EU, while in Moldova, public opinion was in favor of increased cooperation with the Russian led Customs Union. Ukraine refused to sign an association agreement with the EU, while Moldova enthusiastically signed the same association agreement. Why should both Ukrainian and Moldovan political elites have chosen not to be responsive to public opinion in such an important decision? Using network analysis of bilateral treaties between Russia and Moldova and Russia and Ukraine, I predict the responsiveness of political elites to public opinion toward European integration. I argue that the denser a treaty network between a weaker state and the regional hegemon, the less likely political elites will be to cooperate and move toward European integration. Conversely, less dense treaty networks allow politicians more flexibility in following their own preferences. Further, I offer a prediction for other states in the FSUto seek further cooperation with the EU.

The Oxford Handbook of the Russian Economy by Michael Alexeev and Shlomo Weber, eds.

There are some books that every person teaching about Russian politics and the Russian economy must possess. This is one of them. The book attempts to examine as many different aspects of the Russian economy as possible, assembling an amazing group of contributors. Unlike many such volumes that struggle to find enough qualified contributors who agree to work on such a project, this handbook combines specialists from around the world to give an accurate portrayal of the state of the Russian economy. The book is divided into six sections, with each section examining a different aspect of the Russian economy. For example, the first section examines the historical legacy of the Russian economy. Vladimir Mau and Tatiana Drobyshevskaya do not just quickly examine the legacy of the Soviet economy, but rather examine three hundred years of the Russian economy, going back to Tsarist times, and analyzing the constant state of the Russian economy needing to catch up and modernize to ensure the survival of the Russian state. Other chapters in this section discuss the command economy of the Soviet period as well as the transformation from the command economy to a market economy. Russia’s transformational period after the collapse of the Soviet Union set the stage for the current economic challenges, and this book carefully explains how the transformation occurred, and how privatization and privatization strategies had a profound effect on the economy. The early period of economic development was basically split into two distinct historical periods. The 1990s saw a tremendous recession culminating in the Russian financial crisis of 1998. The volume clearly delineates the two historical periods with two different chapters devoted to the recession leading up to the crisis in 1998, followed by the incredible and rapid economic growth after 1998. In their chapter on the growth trends in Russia after 1998, Revold M. Entov and Oleg V. Lugovoy describe how the era of rapid economic growth peaked in 2004, and project that the Russian economy would grow at a much lower rate through 2020. Despite the fact that both chapters deal with the financial crisis of 1998, there really should be

The Quest for the Liberal Peace: Toward a Measure of Interstate Cooperation

Building on the Kantian tripod of peace in liberal peace theory, we test theories of state intergovernmental organization (IGO) membership and levels of state cooperation. We examine the measurement for IGO joint membership and find that it is inadequate to measure the level of cooperation among states. Using network analysis, we propose a new dyadic measure for the level of bilateral cooperation. We argue that states craft intergovernmental agreements, purposely nested within bilateral treaty networks, to further consolidate and bolster such agreements’ efficacy. States both express and safeguard their power interests via negotiated treaties, and while costs of violating individual treaties are small, violating treaties nested within broader treaty networks are more costly as this significantly inhibits future cooperation with all states in a region. By creating networks of treaties, states bolster compliance, enhance the prospects for cooperative foreign policy behavior, and strengthen the conditions for peace. We argue that the strength of a bilateral treaty network is a better measure than joint IGO membership for liberal peace theory. We test this measure in the post-Soviet space, where many scholars expect dyadic conflict due to Russia’s regional economic and military dominance. Using militarized interstate disputes (MID’s) as the dependent variable in our model, we find that dyads that have stronger treaty networks are significantly less likely to experience a MID than dyads without a strong treaty network. We propose that the strength of treaty networks is a better measure for tapping cooperation among states, yielding analytical results more compatible with liberal peace theory.