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Dive into the research topics where Michael P. Vandenbergh is active.

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Featured researches published by Michael P. Vandenbergh.


Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America | 2009

Household actions can provide a behavioral wedge to rapidly reduce US carbon emissions

Thomas Dietz; Gerald T. Gardner; Jonathan M. Gilligan; Paul C. Stern; Michael P. Vandenbergh

Most climate change policy attention has been addressed to long-term options, such as inducing new, low-carbon energy technologies and creating cap-and-trade regimes for emissions. We use a behavioral approach to examine the reasonably achievable potential for near-term reductions by altered adoption and use of available technologies in US homes and nonbusiness travel. We estimate the plasticity of 17 household action types in 5 behaviorally distinct categories by use of data on the most effective documented interventions that do not involve new regulatory measures. These interventions vary by type of action and typically combine several policy tools and strong social marketing. National implementation could save an estimated 123 million metric tons of carbon per year in year 10, which is 20% of household direct emissions or 7.4% of US national emissions, with little or no reduction in household well-being. The potential of household action deserves increased policy attention. Future analyses of this potential should incorporate behavioral as well as economic and engineering elements.


Energy Economics | 2012

The potential role of carbon labeling in a green economy

Mark A. Cohen; Michael P. Vandenbergh

Over the past several years, labeling schemes that focus on a wide range of environmental and social metrics have proliferated. Although little empirical evidence has been generated with respect to carbon footprint labels, much can be learned from our experience with similar product labels. We first review the theory and evidence on the influence of product labeling on consumer and firm behavior. Next, we consider the role of governments and nongovernmental organizations, concluding that global, multistakeholder organizations have a critical part to play in setting protocols and standards. We argue that it is important to consider the entire life cycle of a product being labeled and develop an international standard for measurement and reporting. Finally, we examine the potential impact of carbon product labeling, discussing methodological and trade challenges and proposing a framework for choosing products best suited for labeling.


Environmental Science & Technology | 2010

Design Principles for Carbon Emissions Reduction Programs

Paul C. Stern; Gerald T. Gardner; Michael P. Vandenbergh; Thomas Dietz; Jonathan M. Gilligan

Thegoal,articulatedbyPresidentObamain2009,ofreducingU.S. carbon emissions 17% from the 2005 level by 2020 iseminentlyachievablewithoutnewtechnologyorappreciablesacrifice by energy users. However, achieving it will in partrequire sophisticated energy efficiency and conservationprograms.Toovercomeinstitutionalandbehavioralbarriers,these programs will need to implement six principles ofeffectivedesignderivedfrom30yearsofbehavioralandsocialscience research. We focus on the household sector, butbelieveourgeneralconclusionslikelyapplytoothersectorsas well.We recently developed an analysis for the householdsector senergy use in homes and for nonbusiness travel ofwhat we call Reasonably Achievable Emissions Reductions(RAER) (


Cornell Law Review | 2013

Private Environmental Governance

Michael P. Vandenbergh

Environmental law has quietly transformed from a positive law field deeply rooted in administrative law to one that is also heavily rooted in private law and private governance. After two decades (1970-1990) of remarkable activity, more than two decades have now passed without a major federal environmental statute (1991-2012). Whether the appropriate next step is expansion or contraction, reforms to the federal statutory framework have stalled. Federal regulatory activity and state and local measures have filled some of the gap, but private governance efforts – the pursuit of public ends through private standards, monitoring, enforcement, and dispute resolution – now play an important role. Corporations report that their toxics use is regulated more by private supply chain contract requirements than the federal toxics statute. The fate of 14% of the temperate forests and 7% of the fisheries around the world is in the hands of private certification systems. More money is spent on private environmental inspections than on the entire federal environmental enforcement office. The emergence of private governance is hiding in plain view because the conceptual model by which environmental law is viewed and the metrics by which legal activity is measured do not square easily with private governance. Environmental preferences are expressed in private market decisions, not through voting or lobbying. Standard-setting, enforcement, and dispute resolution occur through private actions and institutions, not legislatures, agencies and courts. This Article demonstrates the value of conceptualizing seemingly disparate private activities as a discrete new model of environmental governance. Viewing private environmental governance in this way provides new insights about collective action problems, re-frames the standards used for environmental instrument choice, and suggests new actors and actions to address environmental problems.


Archive | 2011

Regulation in the Behavioral Era

Michael P. Vandenbergh; Amanda R. Carrico; Lisa Schultz Bressman

Administrative agencies have long proceeded on the assumption that individuals respond to regulations in ways that are consistent with traditional rational actor theory, but that is beginning to change. Agencies are now relying on behavioral economics to develop regulations that account for responses that depart from common sense and common wisdom, reflecting predictable cognitive anomalies. Furthermore, political officials have now called for behavioral economics to play an explicit role in White House review of agency regulations. This is a significant development for the regulatory process, yet our understanding of how behavioral insights should alter regulatory analysis is incomplete. To account for behavioral anomalies, regulators will need to draw on behavioral and social science insights beyond behavioral economics, and they will need an analytic framework to ensure that regulatory decisions reflect a comprehensive examination of the numerous, seemingly haphazard behavioral insights. Although behavioral research has demonstrated the limits of rational action, it does not provide a framework for considering extra-rational action. Nor have legal scholars developed such a framework, despite excellent theoretical work in the area. In this Article, we take an initial step. We provide a framework to facilitate agency consideration of extra-rational action and extend that framework to include a lesson from behavioral research that academics have noted but not adequately explored: that individuals are concerned with social outcomes (e.g., social status or inclusion) as well as monetary outcomes (e.g., wealth) and that they seek to maximize utility in both rational and extra-rational ways. After sketching our framework, we offer concrete applications in the energy use context. Our framework does not resolve all issues that may arise in the behavioral era, but it provides a means to move forward.


Archive | 2017

Beyond Politics: The Private Governance Response to Climate Change

Michael P. Vandenbergh; Jonathan M. Gilligan

When the United States withdrew from the Paris Climate Agreement, 100 private corporations reaffirmed their commitment to fighting climate change . While governments are often tasked with facing climate change, many major private institutions are taking steps to significantly reduce carbon emissions, reaping the benefits of favorable public image and reduced operational costs from energy and other savings . On September 5, 2018, ELI held an expert panel discussing the role of private institutions in climate change mitigation, the incentives for private actors pursuing carbon reduction initiatives, key factors in successful case studies, and methods for developing and evaluating successful private climate initiatives . Below, we present a transcript of the discussion, which has been edited for style, clarity, and space considerations .


Archive | 2009

Micro-Offsets and Macro-Transformation: An Inconvenient View of Climate Change Justice

Michael P. Vandenbergh; Brooke Ackerly; Forrest Forster

We have been asked to examine climate change justice by discussing the methods of allocating the costs of addressing climate change among nations. Our analysis suggests that climate and justice goals cannot be achieved by better allocating the emissions reduction burdens of current carbon mitigation proposals — there may be no allocation of burdens using current approaches that achieves both climate and justice goals. Instead, achieving just the climate goal without exacerbating justice concerns, much less improving global justice, will require focusing on increasing well-being and inducing fundamental changes in development patterns to generate greater levels of well-being with reduced levels of material throughput. We identify several core characteristics of the public and private policy architectures and initiatives necessary to accomplish this task. We also propose examples of short- and long-term initiatives. Our near-term approach recognizes that a focus on public law remedies and nation-states is necessary but not sufficient. We suggest a feasible new mechanism, equity micro-offsets, that could reduce emissions while improving well-being among the poor. Equity micro-offsets can harness altruistic preferences, market mechanisms, and private oversight to reduce emissions and increase well-being in poor countries. Equity micro-offsets also suggest the nature of the long-term political, social, and economic macro-transformation that may be necessary. From household cook stove initiatives to policy architectures that include forestry, agriculture, and other overlooked sectors, achieving climate and justice goals will require transformative approaches, not just improved cost allocations.


Archive | 2018

Using Meta-Analysis in the Social Sciences to Improve Environmental Policy

Alexander Maki; Mark A. Cohen; Michael P. Vandenbergh

Policymakers have recently looked to the social sciences for effective strategies to address environmental issues, including how to change people’s environmental behaviors. During that time, social scientists have been challenged to improve how they assess, summarize, and convey the state of environmental social science. Meta-analysis, the quantitative review of existing research using data from multiple studies, is one method researchers use to assess the state of knowledge and share best practices. Development of new data reporting standards and systems would improve not only environmental social science, but also the interface between environmental social sciences and policymakers. In particular, dynamic meta-analyses, or frequently updated meta-analyses, would ensure that policymakers have access to up-to-date findings and would allow policymakers to examine subsets of studies that best approximate relevant contexts for new policies. These new standards for conducting and reporting meta-analyses would allow environmental social scientists to more effectively inform policy, and would help policymakers understand and assess the latest developments in the field.


Social Science Research Network | 2016

Employee Energy Benefits: What are They and What Effect Do They Have on Employees?

Alexander Maki; Emmett McKinney; Michael P. Vandenbergh; Mark A. Cohen; Jonathan M. Gilligan

Employee energy benefits (EEBs), such as subsidies for employee home energy audits and financial incentives for carpooling to work, aim to influence employees’ environmental behaviors outside of work. Exploring these understudied benefits would offer new insights that can enrich theories of employer and employee motivations for engaging in environmental behavior, as well as reveal new strategies for making significant progress on environment goals. By drawing upon employer reports and conducting a survey of 482 U.S. adults employed full-time, we found that there are a wide range of types of EEBs currently offered by employers, and furthermore they were more likely to be offered in certain industries, such as state and local governments, but not others such as retail. These benefits were offered to 17% of employees, and included a vast array of strategies and approaches. Guided by theorizing on employer and employee motivation, open-ended responses suggested employers were perceived to offer EEBs to maximize competiveness and because of social responsibility concerns, and employees tended to enroll because they wanted to save money and time or because they cared about the environment. Finally, EEBs were linked to employee environmental behavior and morale. The findings reveal new information about the types of EEBs being offered, motivations for offering and enrolling in EEBs, and their relationship to employee behavior and morale. This work suggests numerous lines of promising new research.


Archive | 2013

Accounting for Political Feasibility in Climate Instrument Choice

Jonathan M. Gilligan; Michael P. Vandenbergh

This Essay argues for consideration of political opportunity costs in the criteria used to evaluate climate policy instruments. Law and policy debates typically evaluate policy instruments by their expected performance after adoption, tacitly excluding consideration of the timing of adoption. Under this standard, a comprehensive carbon pricing instrument, either in the form of a cap and trade program or a carbon tax, has emerged as the preferred approach. Yet by excluding the political process from consideration, this standard obscures the effects of political feasibility on the timing of adoption. For many problems, the advantages of an optimal policy outweigh the advantages of a sub-optimal one that will require less time and effort to adopt. The climate problem is different: the irreversibility of climate change, the possibility of tipping points in the climate system, and lag times in infrastructure investments combine to impose large costs on delay. Excluding political opportunity costs from instrument evaluation leads to a preference for slow, comprehensive remedies. The casualties in this process are incremental instruments that could buy time, facilitate the adoption of additional instruments, and complement those instruments after they are adopted. This Essay proposes explicit consideration of political opportunity costs in evaluating climate policy instruments and applies this approach to several leading climate policies.

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Paul C. Stern

National Research Council

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Thomas Dietz

Michigan State University

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Amanda R. Carrico

University of Colorado Boulder

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Jim Rossi

Vanderbilt University

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