Michael Philips

The justification of punishment and the justification of political authority

Philosophical accounts of punishment are primarily concerned with punishment by the (or: a) state. More specifically, they attempt to explain why the (a) state may justifiably penalize those who are judged to violate its laws and the conditions under which it is entitled to do so. But any full account of these matters must surely be grounded in an account of the nature and purpose of the state and the justification of state authority. Because they are not so grounded, deterrence and retributive theories are incomplete as they are typically formulated. The intuitions behind these theories can be satisfied in a variety of complete theories, i.e., theories that understand the justification of punishment in relation to the justification of state authority. A consequence of this is that at least some of the intuitions underlying deterrence and retributive theories can be satisfied at the same time by a given theory.

Normative contexts and moral decision

This paper attempts to explain the significance of the ‘ideologies’ — or ‘middle-level’ normative discourse — described by Kenneth Goodpaster in his paper ‘Business Ethics, Ideology, and the Naturalistic Fallacy’. It is argued that the propositions constitutive of this discourse are not invokable moral principles (i.e. principles which generate solutions to actual moral problems). Rather, they are characterizations of the normative contexts in which moral decisions are made. As such, they place limits on the ways in which the abstract moral principles of traditional moral theory may be applied or interpreted in making real-life moral decisions.

Bribery, consent and prima facie duty: A rejoinder to Carson

Responding to my paper “Bribery” Tom Carson argues that bribe takers violate promisory obligations in a wider range of cases than I acknowledge and insists that bribe taking is prima facie wrong in all contexts. I argue that he is wrong on both counts.

Do banks loan money

There is an obvious and important difference between bank ‘loans’ and typical personal loans, viz., that banks charge interest in order to make a profit. Accordingly, what banks do is more accurately described as selling or renting money than as loaning money. Moreover, it is advantageous to banks misleadingly to describe their activity as loaning. For this assimilates their activity to the case of personal loans and helps to create an impression that banks do us a favor by loaning us money and that we owe them gratitude for so doing. Since these impressions are false, banks ought cease to describe what they do in this way.

A pleasure paradox

(1981). A pleasure paradox. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 59, No. 3, pp. 323-331.