Michael S. Brady

Emotional insight : the epistemic role of emotional experience

Introduction 1. Towards the Perceptual Model 2. The Perceptual Model 3. Against the Perceptual Model 4. Emotion and Understanding 5. Emotion, Attention, and Virtue Bibliography

Moral and Epistemic Virtues

Introduction: Moral and Epistemic Virtues: Michael S. Brady (University of Stirling) and Duncan Pritchard (University of Stirling). Part I: Theory:. 1. The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good: Linda Zagzebski (University of Oklahoma). 2. The Pursuit of Epistemic Good: Philip Percival (University of Glasgow). 3. Epistemic Presuppositions and Their Consequences: Juli Eflin (Ball State University). 4. Traditional Epistemology Reconsidered: A Reply to Eflin: Andrew McGonigal (University of Leeds). 5. Affective States and Epistemic Immediacy: Christopher Hookway (University of Sheffield). 6. Reply to Hookway: Marie McGinn (University of York). 7. The Conflation of Moral and Epistemic Virtue: Julia Driver (Dartmouth College). 8. Sentimentalist Virtue and Moral Judgement: Outline of a Project: Michael Slote (University of Miami). 9. Some Worries about Normative and Metaethical Sentimentalism: Michael S. Brady (University of Stirling). Part II: Application:. 1. Epistemic Injustice and a Role for Virtue in the Politics of Knowing: Miranda Fricker (Birkbeck College, University of London). 2. Epistemic Injustice: The Third Way?: S. E. Marshall (University of Stirling). 3. Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue--Centred Theory of Judging: Lawrence B. Solum (Loyola Law School). 4. The Limits of Virtue Jurisprudence: R. A. Duff (University of Stirling). Part III: Symposia on Epistemic Luck:. 1. Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck: Duncan Pritchard (University of Stirling). 2. Felix Culpa: Luck in Ethics and Epistemology: Guy Axtell (University of Nevada, USA). 3. Virtue and Luck, Epistemic and Otherwise: John Greco (Fordham University, USA)

Against agent-based virtue ethics

Abstract Agent-based virtue ethics is a unitary normative theory according to which the moral status of actions is entirely dependent upon the moral status of an agents motives and character traits. One of the problems any such approach faces is to capture the common-sense distinction between an agents doing the right thing, and her doing it for the right (or wrong) reason. In this paper I argue that agent-based virtue ethics ultimately fails to capture this kind of fine-grained distinction, and to this extent ought to be rejected. I focus first on Michael Slotes agent-based theory, according to which the moral status of actions depends upon an agents actual motives, and argue that this leads to a paradox. I then consider whether the ‘counterfactual’ version of agent-basing favoured by Rosalind Hursthouse and Linda Zagzebski fares any better, and conclude that it does not.

How to Understand Internalism

Internalism about practical reasons claims that there is a necessary connection between what an agent has reason to do and what he would be motivated to do if he were in privileged or optimal conditions. Internalism is traditionally supported by the claim that it alone can capture two (supposed) conditions of adequacy for any theory of practical reasons, that reasons must be capable of justifying actions, and that reasons must be capable of explaining intentional acts. Robert Johnson (The Philosophical Quarterly, 49 (1999), pp. 53–71) has argued that versions of internalism which avoid obvious problems nevertheless fail to capture both conditions. I argue that Johnsons criticisms rest upon a misinterpretation of the ‘explanatory condition’, and I proceed to formulate a version of internalism which will allow practical reasons to have both justificatory and explanatory force.

Some Worries about Normative and Metaethical Sentimentalism

In this response I raise a number of problems for Michael Slotes normative and metaethical sentimentalism. The first is that his agent–based account of rightness needs be qualified in order to be plausible; any such qualification, however, leaves Slotes normative ethics in tension with his metaethical views. The second is that an agent–based ethics of empathic caring will indeed struggle to capture our common–sense understanding of deontological constraints, and that appeal to the notion of causal immediacy will be of little help here. Finally, it seems to me that Slotes metaethical account will turn out to be much less externalist (and hence, by his own lights, much less plausible) than he suspects.

Valuing, desiring and normative priority

Judgement internalism claims that our evaluative judgements will motivate us to act appropriately, at least in so far as we are rational. I examine how this claim should be understood, with particular focus on whether valuing enjoys a kind of ‘normative priority’ over desiring. I consider and reject views according to which valuing something provides one with a reason to be moved; this claim of normative priority and the readings of internalism it suggests are too strong. I also reject an interpretation which eschews claims of normative priority, whilst maintaining that valuing nevertheless rationally commits or requires one to be motivated; this rejection of normative priority and the reading of internalism it supports are too weak. In the final sections I sketch the understanding of judgement internalism I favour, and defend it against objections.

Suffering and Virtue

Suffering, in one form or another, is present in all of our lives. But why do we suffer? On one reading, this is a question about the causes of physical and emotional suffering. But on another, it is a question about whether suffering has a point or purpose or value. In this ground-breaking book, Michael Brady argues that suffering is vital for the development of virtue, and hence for us to live happy or flourishing lives. After presenting a distinctive account of suffering, and a novel account of its core element, unpleasantness, Brady proceeds to focus on three claims that are central to his picture. The first is that forms of suffering, like pain and remorse, can themselves constitute virtuous responses. The second is that suffering is essential for four important classes of virtue - virtues of strength, such as fortitude and courage; virtues of vulnerability, such as adaptability and humility; moral virtues, such as compassion; and the practical and epistemic excellences that make up wisdom. His final claim third is that suffering is vital for the social virtues of justice, love, and trust, and hence for the flourishing of social groups.

Philosophy of Pain: Unpleasantness, Emotion, and Deviance

Over recent decades pain has received increasing attention as philosophers, psychologists and neuroscientists try to answer deep and difficult questions about it. What is pain? What makes pain unpleasant? How is pain related to the emotions? This volume provides a rich and wide-ranging exploration of these questions and provides important new insights into the philosophy of pain. Divided into three clear sections – pain and motivation; pain and emotion; and deviant pain – the collection covers fundamental topics in the philosophy and psychology of pain. These include pain and sensory affect, the neuroscience of pain, pain and rationality, placebos, and pain and consciousness.

Reasons and rational motivational access

Practical Internalism holds that an agents reasons for acting are entirely determined by his rational desires. This account is thought to be preferable to externalism, on the grounds that internalism alone can guarantee that agents have ‘rational motivational access’ (RMA) to their reasons. Rachel Cohon has recently argued that (i) internalism fails to ensure this, and (ii) an externalist account, akin to relativism, can guarantee RMA. I suggest that both of these claims are mistaken. I argue that relativism is best understood as an internalist theory, and claim that one version of internalism can therefore guarantee RMA.