S. Michael

Win-win indirect tax reform: A modest proposal

Abstract The literature on tariffs and that on commodity taxes have established sufficient conditions under which tariff or commodity tax reform improves welfare. Since less developed countries need to raise certain revenue from indirect taxation, we consider a policy reform within the complete indirect tax structure (i.e. an increase in consumption taxes combined with a decrease in tariffs) that improves welfare and raises government revenue. We demonstrate that when uniform reductions in trade taxes accompany offsetting increases in consumption taxes, so that consumer prices remain constant, welfare improves and government revenue increases if the initial position provides a net subsidy to producers.

Can Cross-border Pollution Reduce Pollution?

We develop a North-South model of foreign aid and cross-border pollution resulting from production activities in the recipient country. There is both private and public abatement of pollution, the latter being financed through emissions tax revenue and foreign aid. We characterise a Nash equilibrium where the donor country chooses the amount of aid, and the recipient chooses the fraction of aid allocated to pollution abatement and/or the emission tax rate. At this equilibrium, an increase in the donors perceived rate of cross-border pollution reduces net emission levels.

International migration, income taxes and transfers: a welfare analysis

An important issue in public policy debates is the effect of international migration on welfare in source and host countries. We address this issue by constructing a general equilibrium model of a two-class source or host country. Each country produces many traded and non-traded goods, uses income taxes and distributes the tax receipts equally to all individuals. The analysis examines the effects of permanent migration on class, and national welfare. We show, among other things, that marginal immigration hurts people already in the country regardless of whether or not non-traded goods exist. The presence of international capital mobility, however, may reverse the above result.

Foreign aid and public goods

Abstract Most less-developed countries (LDCs) use foreign economic aid to finance public consumption goods, or public intermediate inputs. This paper constructs a two-country general equilibrium trade model, where an income transfer that takes place between the two countries is used by the recipient to finance a public consumption good. Within this framework, the paper identifies the conditions under which the income transfer improves or deteriorates the donor countrys terms of trade, and shows that the transfer can be welfare enriching for the donor, and welfare immiserizing for the recipient country. The paper also demonstrates that the transfer can raise (reduce) world welfare, in which case a welfare increase (decrease) in both the donor and the recipient country is possible.

Real Exchange Rate Effects of Fiscal Expansion under Trade Restrictions

We develop a small open-economy trade model where either a tariff, or a quota, or a voluntary export restraint (VER) exists, and where one exported, one imported, one non-traded, and one public good are produced. Within this context we examine the effects of fiscal expansion on welfare and the real exchange rate (RER). Among other things, it is demonstrated that when the direct social profitability effect of the public good is positive and the public good is a net complement to the non-traded good, fiscal expansion causes an appreciation of the RER under free trade, and under a tariff when the public good is also a net complement to the imported good. The paper identifies additional conditions required to ensure the appreciation of the RER, due to fiscal expansion, under an import quota or a VER.

General Equilibrium Effects of Import Constraints under Variable Labour Supply, Public Goods and Income Taxation

We consider a general equilibrium trade model of a small open economy with a representative consumer, where labour supply is variable, where imports are restricted by a small tariff, a quota or a voluntary export restraint (VER), and where alongside the production of two traded goods one imported and one exported a pure public good is produced and funded through an income tax. Within this framework, we demonstrate, among other things, that under certain conditions, while a small tariff or quota reduces employment and welfare, a VER may increase them. Thus, in the context of a small open economy, contrary to standard results, in certain cases VERs may become the welfare- and employment-dominant instrument over the alternative import restrictions. Copyright 1999 by The London School of Economics and Political Science

Welfare Effects Of Migration In Societies With Indirect Taxes, Income Transfers And Public Good Provision

We construct a general equilibrium trade model of a two-class small open host or source country. When consumption tax revenue finances the provision of a public good, marginal migration reduces social welfare in the source country and raises it in the host. When consumption tax revenue is equally distributed among domestic households in each country, then migration has an ambiguous impact on social welfare in either country. When tariff revenue in either country is either equally distributed among domestic households, or it is used to finance the provision of a public good, then migration has an ambiguous effect on social welfare in the host country, and is expected to reduce social welfare in the source.

Public Goods, Tax Policies, and Unemployment in LDCs

We build a general equilibrium model of a small open economy characterized by unemployment and producing two privately traded goods and one nontraded public consumption good. The provision of public good is financed with an income tax or an excise tax on the manufactured good or an import tariff. Within this framework, the paper examines the effects of such policies on the countrys unemployment ratio and welfare, and it derives the efficiency rules for public good provision for each policy instrument. It shows, among other things, that the private marginal cost of the public good always overstates its social marginal cost in the case of income taxes and may overstate it in the case of an excise tax on the manufactured good or a tariff even if the taxed good and the public good are substitutes in consumption.

International Factor Mobility, Non-traded Goods, Tariffs, and the Terms of Trade

The present paper develops a general model with one imported, one exported, many non-traded goods, where some factors of production are internationally mobile. Within this framework, the analysis establishes the validity of some earlier results and extends others. That is, (1) a tariff increase reduces the countrys welfare; (2) tariff-induced international factor flows reduce a countrys welfare; (3) an improvement in a countrys terms of trade in the presence of a tariff raises its welfare more when factors are internationally mobile than when not; and (4) with preferential trading agreements, trade creation always improves the countrys welfare, while trade diversion may or may not.

Tied to Capital or Untied Foreign Aid

A two-country trade model of foreign aid is developed. The aid-receiving country suffers from Harris-Todaro type unemployment. Aid is either untied, tied to sector-specific capital, or tied to intersectorally mobile capital. These types of aid are compared by examining their terms-of-trade and welfare effects to show that (i) welfare paradoxes are possible, (ii) the world as a whole may gain from aid, (iii) a conflict of interest concerning the type of aid may arise between donor and recipient, and (iv) under plausible conditions untied aid is better for the recipient and the world. Copyright 1998 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd