Michael Silberstein

The Search for Ontological Emergence

We survey and clarify some recent appearances of the term ‘emergence’. We distinguish epistemological emergence, which is merely a limitation of descriptive apparatus, from ontological emergence, which should involve causal features of a whole system not reducible to the properties of its parts, thus implying the failure of part/whole reductionism and of mereological supervenience for that system. Are there actually any plausible cases of the latter among the numerous and various mentions of ‘emergence’ in the recent literature? Quantum mechanics seems to offer one, in the Bell properties of entangled particles, but other apparently promising candidates, such as non-linear dynamical systems investigated by complexity studies and chaos theory, seem on careful analysis to display only epistemological emergence. We examine the consequences for physicalism of admitting ontological emergence in the micro-physical.

The Blackwell guide to the philosophy of science

Notes on Contributors. Preface. 1. A Brief Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science (and prognostications about its future): Peter Machamer (University of Pittsburgh). 2. Philosophy of Science: Classic Debates, Standard Problems, Future Prospects: John Worrall (London School of Economics). 3. Explanation: Jim Woodward (California Institute of Technology). 4. Structures of Scientific Theories: Carl F. Craver (Washington University, Saint Louis). 5. Reduction, Emergence and Explanation: Michael Silberstein (Elizabethtown College). 6. Models, Metaphors and Analogies: Daniela Bailer-Jones (University of Pittsburgh). 7. Experiment and Observation: James Bogen (University of Pittsburgh) . 8. Induction and Probability: Alan Hajek (California Institute of Technology) and Ned Hall (Massachusetts Institute of Technology). 9. Philosophy of Space-Time Physics: Craig Callender (University of California at San Diego) and Carl Hoefer (London School of Economics). 10 . Interpreting Quantum Theories: Laura Ruetsche (University of Pittsburgh). 11. Evolution: Roberta L. Millstein (California State University, Hayward). 12. Molecular and Developmental Biology: Paul Griffiths (University of Pittsburgh). 13. Cognitive science: Rick Grush (University of California, San Diego). 14. Philosophy of Social Science: Harold Kincaid (University of Alabama at Birmingham). 15. Feminist Philosophy of Science: Lynn Hankinson Nelson (University of Missouri-St. Louis).

After the Philosophy of Mind: Replacing Scholasticism with Science

We provide a taxonomy of the two most important debates in the philosophy of the cognitive and neural sciences. The first debate is over methodological individualism: is the object of the cognitive and neural sciences the brain, the whole animal, or the animal—environment system? The second is over explanatory style: should explanation in cognitive and neural science be reductionist‐mechanistic, interlevel mechanistic, or dynamical? After setting out the debates, we discuss the ways in which they are interconnected. Finally, we make some recommendations that we hope will help philosophers interested in the cognitive and neural sciences to avoid dead ends.

Constraints on Localization and Decomposition as Explanatory Strategies in the Biological Sciences

Several articles have recently appeared arguing that there really are no viable alternatives to mechanistic explanation in the biological sciences (Kaplan and Bechtel; Kaplan and Craver). We argue that mechanistic explanation is defined by localization and decomposition. We argue further that systems neuroscience contains explanations that violate both localization and decomposition. We conclude that the mechanistic model of explanation needs to either stretch to now include explanations wherein localization or decomposition fail or acknowledge that there are counterexamples to mechanistic explanation in the biological sciences.

Relativity of Simultaneity and Eternalism: In Defense of the Block Universe

Ever since Hermann Minkowski’s now infamous comments in 1908 concerning the proper way to view space-time, the debate has raged as to whether or not the universe should be viewed as a four-dimensional, unified whole wherein the past, present, and future are regarded as equally real or whether the views espoused by the possibilists, historicists, and presentists regarding the unreality of the future (and, for presentists, the past) are more accurate. Now, a century after Minkowski’s proposed block universe first sparked debate, we present a new, more conclusive argument in favor of the eternalism. Utilizing an argument based on the relativity of simultaneity in the tradition of Putnam and Rietdijk and explicit novel but reasonable assumptions as to the nature of reality, we argue that the past, present, and future should be treated as equally real, thus ruling that presentism and other theories of time that bestow special ontological status to the past, present, or future are untenable. Finally, we respond to our critics who suggest that: (1) there is no metaphysical difference between the positions of eternalism and presentism, (2) the present must be defined as the “here” as well as the “now”, or (3) presentism is correct and physicists’ current understanding of relativity is incomplete because it does not incorporate a preferred frame. We call response 1 deflationary since it purports to dissolve or deconstruct the age-old debate between the two views and response 2 compatibilist because it does nothing to alter special relativity (SR), arguing instead that SR unadorned has the resources to save presentism. Response 3 we will call incompatibilist because it adorns SR in some way in order to save presentism a la some sort of preferred frame. We show that neither 1 nor 2 can save presentism and 3 is not well motivated at this juncture except as an ad hoc device to refute eternalism.

For whom the Bell arguments toll

We will formulate two Bell arguments. Together they show that if the probabilities given by quantum mechanics are approximately correct, then the properties exhibited by certain physical systems must be nontrivially dependent on thetypes of measurements performedand eithernonlocally connected orholistically related to distant events. Although a number of related arguments have appeared since John Bells original paper (1964), they tend to be either highly technical or to lack full generality. The following arguments depend on the weakest of premises, and the structure of the arguments is simpler than most (without any loss of rigor or generality). The technical simplicity is due in part to a novel version of the generalized Bell inequality. The arguments are self contained and presuppose no knowledge of quantum mechanics. We will also offer a Dutch Book argument for measurement type dependence.

Being, Becoming and the Undivided Universe: A Dialogue Between Relational Blockworld and the Implicate Order Concerning the Unification of Relativity and Quantum Theory

In this paper two different approaches to unification will be compared, Relational Blockworld (RBW) and Hiley’s implicate order. Both approaches are monistic in that they attempt to derive matter and spacetime geometry ‘at once’ in an interdependent and background independent fashion from something underneath both quantum theory and relativity. Hiley’s monism resides in the implicate order via Clifford algebras and is based on process as fundamental while RBW’s monism resides in spacetimematter via path integrals over graphs whereby space, time and matter are co-constructed per a global constraint equation. RBW’s monism therefore resides in being (relational blockworld) while that of Hiley’s resides in becoming (elementary processes). Regarding the derivation of quantum theory and relativity, the promises and pitfalls of both approaches will be elaborated. Finally, special attention will be paid as to how Hiley’s process account might avoid the blockworld implications of relativity and the frozen time problem of canonical quantum gravity.

An Argument for 4D Blockworld from a Geometric Interpretation of Non-relativistic Quantum Mechanics

We use a new, distinctly “geometrical” interpretation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics (NRQM) to argue for the fundamentality of the 4D blockworld ontology. We argue for a geometrical interpretation whose fundamental ontology is one of spacetime relations as opposed to constructive entities whose time-dependent behavior is governed by dynamical laws. Our view rests on two formal results: Kaiser (1981 & 1990), Bohr & Ulfbeck (1995) and Anandan, (2003) showed independently that the Heisenberg commutation relations of NRQM follow from the relativity of simultaneity (RoS) per the Poincare Lie algebra. And, Bohr, Ulfbeck & Mottelson (2004a & 2004b) showed that the density matrix for a particular NRQM experimental outcome may be obtained from the spacetime symmetry group of the experimental configuration. This shows how the blockworld view is not only consistent with NRQM, not only an implication of our geometrical interpretation of NRQM, but it is necessary in a non-trivial way for explaining quantum interference and “non-locality” from the spacetime perspective. Together the formal results imply that contrary to accepted wisdom, NRQM, the measurement problem and so-called quantum non-locality do not provide reasons to abandon the 4D blockworld implication of RoS. But rather, the deep non-commutative structure of the quantum and the deep structure of spacetime as given by the Minkowski interpretation of special relativity (STR) are deeply unified in a 4D spacetime regime that lies between Galilean spacetime (G4) and Minkowski spacetime (M4). Taken together the aforementioned formal results allow us to model NRQM phenomena such as interference without the need for realism about 3N Hilbert space, establishing that the world is really 4D and that configuration space is nothing more than a calculational device. Our new geometrical interpretation of NRQM provides a geometric account of quantum entanglement and so-called non-locality free of conflict with STR and free of interpretative mystery. In section 2 we discuss the various tensions between STR and NRQM with respect to the dimensionality of the world. Section 3 is devoted to an explication of the Kaiser et al. results and their philosophical implications. Likewise, the Bohr et al. results and their implications are the subject of section 4. In section 5, we present our geometric interpretation of quantum entanglement and “non-locality.”

End of a dark age

We argue that dark matter and dark energy phenomena associated with galactic rotation curves, X-ray cluster mass profiles, and type Ia supernova data can be accounted for via small corrections to idealized general relativistic spacetime geometries due to disordered locality. Accordingly, we fit THINGS rotation curve data rivaling modified Newtonian dynamics, ROSAT/ASCA X-ray cluster mass profile data rivaling metric-skew-tensor gravity, and SCP Union2.1 SN Ia data rivaling

The implications of neural reuse for the future of both cognitive neuroscience and folk psychology.

\Lambda