Michał Białek

Conflict detection during moral decision-making: evidence for deontic reasoners’ utilitarian sensitivity

ABSTRACT Moral dilemmas often force us to decide between deontological (harming others is wrong) and utilitarian (harming others can be acceptable depending on the consequences) considerations. Cognitive scientists have shown that utilitarian responders typically engage demanding deliberate thinking to override a conflicting intuitive deontological response. A key question is whether deontic responders also take utilitarian considerations into account and detect that there are conflicting responses at play. The present study addressed this issue by contrasting peoples processing of moral dilemmas in which utilitarian and deontological considerations cued conflicting or non-conflicting decisions. Results showed that deontic responders were slower and less confident about their decision when solving the conflict (vs. no-conflict) dilemmas. This suggests that they are considering both deontic and utilitarian aspects of their decision and indicates that a deontic decision is more informed and less oblivious than it might appear.

Can taking the perspective of an expert debias human decisions?The case of risky and delayed gains

In several previously reported studies, participants increased their normative correctness after being instructed to think hypothetically, specifically taking the perspective of an expert or researcher (Beatty and Thompson, 2012; Morsanyi and Handley, 2012). The goal of this paper was to investigate how this manipulation affects risky or delayed payoffs. In two studies, participants (n = 193) were tested online (in exchange for money) using the adjusting procedure. Individuals produced certain/immediate equivalents for risky/delayed gains. Participants in the control group were solving the problem from their own perspective, while participants in the experimental group were asked to imagine “what would a reliable and honest advisor advise them to do.” Study 1 showed that when taking the perspective of an expert, participants in experimental group became more risk aversive compared to participants in the control group. Additionally, their certain equivalents diverged from the expected value to a greater extent. The results obtained from the experimental group in Study 2 suggest that participants became less impulsive, which means they tried to inhibit their preferences. This favors the explanation, which suggests that the perspective shift forced individuals to override their intuitions with the social norms. Individuals expect to be blamed for impatience or risk taking thus expected an expert to advise them to be more patient and risk aversive.

The Cognitive Reflection Test is robust to multiple exposures

The cognitive reflection test (CRT) is a widely used measure of the propensity to engage in analytic or deliberative reasoning in lieu of gut feelings or intuitions. CRT problems are unique because they reliably cue intuitive but incorrect responses and, therefore, appear simple among those who do poorly. By virtue of being composed of so-called “trick problems” that, in theory, could be discovered as such, it is commonly held that the predictive validity of the CRT is undermined by prior experience with the task. Indeed, recent studies have shown that people who have had previous experience with the CRT score higher on the test. Naturally, however, it is not obvious that this actually undermines the predictive validity of the test. Across six studies with ~ 2,500 participants and 17 variables of interest (e.g., religious belief, bullshit receptivity, smartphone usage, susceptibility to heuristics and biases, and numeracy), we did not find a single case in which the predictive power of the CRT was significantly undermined by repeated exposure. This occurred despite the fact that we replicated the previously reported increase in accuracy among individuals who reported previous experience with the CRT. We speculate that the CRT remains robust after multiple exposures because less reflective (more intuitive) individuals fail to realize that being presented with apparently easy problems more than once confers information about the task’s actual difficulty.

Introducing conjoint analysis method into delayed lotteries studies: its validity and time stability are higher than in adjusting

The delayed lotteries are much more common in everyday life than are pure lotteries. Usually, we need to wait to find out the outcome of the risky decision (e.g., investing in a stock market, engaging in a relationship). However, most research has studied the time discounting and probability discounting in isolation using the methodologies designed specifically to track changes in one parameter. Most commonly used method is adjusting, but its reported validity and time stability in research on discounting are suboptimal. The goal of this study was to introduce the novel method for analyzing delayed lotteries—conjoint analysis—which hypothetically is more suitable for analyzing individual preferences in this area. A set of two studies compared the conjoint analysis with adjusting. The results suggest that individual parameters of discounting strength estimated with conjoint have higher predictive value (Study 1 and 2), and they are more stable over time (Study 2) compared to adjusting. We discuss these findings, despite the exploratory character of reported studies, by suggesting that future research on delayed lotteries should be cross-validated using both methods.

Cognitive Psychological Support for the ADC Model of Moral Judgment

“It is important to provide a common theoretical framework that would link the neuroscience and cognitive science literature on decision making and moral judgment, and the ADC approach with the REACT model is a step in this direction” (Dubljevi c and Racine 2014, 15). Previously, cognitive psychologists researching rationality and decision making mostly utilized a dual-process framework (Evans 2008). However, recently this approach has been brought into question. Here we show how new theoretical frameworks in cognitive psychology can deliver support for the ADC model of moral intuitions proposed by Dubljevi c and Racine. The main goal of this commentary is thus to demonstrate that some tasks typically thought to involve reflective processes, such as evaluating the validity of a conclusion or incorporating base rates into posterior probability judgments, can also be accomplished intuitively. These findings from experimental cognitive psychology support key aspects of the ADC model. Dubljevi c and Racine proposed a three-component model of moral intuition. The authors stated that actions, deeds, and consequences (ADC) are elicited intuitively and subsequently processed/evaluated in order to arrive at a moral decision. The first two intuitions are suggested to be related to social dimensions—socially acceptable behaviors (D), and virtues of the agent (A)—while the third type of intuition is suggested to be related to the anticipated outcome (C). Previous research in moral psychology suggested that this aspect might have a strong reflective component (e.g., Greene et al. 2008). Greene (2009) suggested that deontological judgments have a stronger emotional/intuitive aspect, while reflection/ higher order cognitive processing was involved in utilitarian decisions. However, Dubljevi c and Racine criticized some experimental research, as it would not allow the full range of moral theory to be covered. Dubljevi c and Racine argued that the requirement of conscious analysis of consequences in order to act might be maladaptive: “Consequence tallying has to be very fast because in reallife situations, moral intuitions concerning saving lives involve split-second decisions in which ‘paralysis by overanalysis’ can be costly” (15). Dubljevi c and Racine present a theoretical rationale and philosophically based analysis for their proposal; here we present a brief overview of recent research in the cognitive psychology of reasoning that similarly suggests that judgments previously thought to depend upon reflective reasoning can instead be accomplished through intuitive processing.

Side Effects in Time Discounting Procedures: Fixed Alternatives Become the Reference Point

Typical research on intertemporal choice utilizes a two-alternative forced choice (2AFC) paradigm requiring participants to choose between a smaller sooner and larger later payoff. In the adjusting-amount procedure (AAP) one of the alternatives is fixed and the other is adjusted according to particular choices made by the participant. Such a method makes the alternatives unequal in status and is speculated to make the fixed alternative a reference point for choices, thereby affecting the decision made. The current study shows that fixing different alternatives in the AAP influences discount rates in intertemporal choices. Specifically, individuals’ (N = 283) choices were affected to just the same extent by merely fixing an alternative as when choices were preceded by scenarios explicitly imposing reference points.

COGNITIVE ABILITIES, ANALYTIC COGNITIVE STYLE AND OVERCONFIDENCE: A COMMENTARY ON DUTTLE (2016)

In his recent paper, Duttle (2016) showed that individuals with higher cognitive abilities show less overconfidence. In these findings, cognitive abilities were equated with an analytic cognitive style (as measured by a cognitive reflection test, or CRT), although recent works in the field of cognitive psychology suggest separating these two constructs. In particular, it is argued that the analytic cognitive style, but not cognitive abilities, decreases susceptibility to cognitive biases. Analyses of data from Duttles study support this assertion. Implications for cognitive psychology and behavioural economics are discussed.

Not that neglected! Base rates influence related and unrelated judgments

It is claimed that people are unable (or unwilling) to incorporate prior probabilities into posterior assessments, such as their estimation of the likelihood of a person with characteristics typical of an engineer actually being an engineer given that they are drawn from a sample including a very small number of engineers. This paper shows that base rates are incorporated in classifications (Experiment 1) and, moreover, that base rates also affect unrelated judgments, such as how well a provided description of a person fits a stereotypical engineer (Experiment 2). Finally, Experiment 3 shows that individuals who make both types of assessments - though using base rates to the same extent in the former judgments - are able to decrease the extent to which they incorporate base rates in the latter judgments.

Correction: Side Effects in Time Discounting Procedures: Fixed Alternatives Become the Reference Point

[This corrects the article DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0165245.].

Dual processes and conflict during moral and logical reasoning: a case for utilitarian intuitions?

The prominent dual process model of moral judgment suggests that an individual can intuitively detect that harming others is wrong (deontological morality), but has to deliberate to realize that harming others can be acceptable depending on the consequences (utilitarian morality). In contrast with this received view, we suggest that humans also have the ability to intuitively grasp the utilitarian dimensions of moral judgments. We review findings that indicate that individuals, despite making deontological judgments, show signs of automatic conflict detection between utilitarian and deontological aspects of moral dilemmas. We discuss the link with recent research on logical reasoning and propose a revision of the